71 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1904–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dubowy v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2014When determining whether leave to file a late notice of claim should be granted, the court must consider “whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter of Dubowy v City of New York, 305 AD2d 320, 321 [1st Dept 2003]). 2013When presented with an application for leave to file a late notice of claim, the court considers “whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter of Dubowy v City of New York, 305 AD2d 320, 321 [1st Dept 2003]). | 11 | 11 |
Williams v. Nassau County Medical Centergreen2 sentences2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006].) The notice must be served within 90 days after the claim arises, but courts have discretion to grant an extension of time for service of a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1], [5]). “ ‘The key factors which the court must consider in determining if leave should be granted are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable ti 2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006].) The notice must be served within 90 days after the claim arises, but courts have discretion to grant an extension for service of a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1], [5]). “ ‘The key factors which the court must consider in determining if leave should be granted are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time there | 4 | 4 |
Jordan v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2011In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the key factors which the court must consider are whether the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, whether the claimant was physically incapacitated, whether the claimant made an excusable error concerning the identity of the public corporation, and whether the delay would substan 2009In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the key factors which the court must consider are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a rea sonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Blair v Pleasantville Union Free School Dist., 52 AD3d 827 [2008]; Ma | 3 | 4 |
Village of Chestnut Ridge v. Town of Ramapogreen2 sentences2024"Standing is . . . a threshold requirement for a plaintiff [or petitioner] seeking to challenge governmental action" ( New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello , 2 NY3d 207, 211 ). "'[T]he right of a municipality to challenge the acts of its neighbors must be determined on the basis of the same rules of standing that apply to litigants generally'" ( Village of Pomona v Town of Ramapo , 94 AD3d 1103, 1105 , quoting Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo , 45 AD3d 74, 86 ). 2012However, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the motions which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3), (7) and 7804 (f) to dismiss the fourth and fifth causes of action, which alleged violations of General Municipal Law § 239-m, and of SEQRA, respectively. “[T]he right of a municipality to challenge the acts of its neighbors must be determined on the basis of the same rules of standing that apply to litigants generally” (Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo, 45 AD3d at 86 ). | 2 | 3 |
Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. County of Suffolkgreen2 sentences2012“To establish standing under SEQRA, the petitioner[ ] must show (1) that [it] will suffer an environmental injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and (2) that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interest sought to be protected or promoted by SEQRA” (id. at 89-90 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 687 [1996]; Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 772-774 [1991]; Matter of Barrett v Dutchess County Legislature, 38 AD3d 651, 653 [2007]). “[Villages may 2007The issue presented by the doctrine of standing is whether the litigants “should be allowed access to the courts to adjudicate the merits of [the] dispute” (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 769 [1991]). | 2 | 2 |
Conroy v. Smithtown Central School Districtgreen2 sentences2006School Dist., 3 AD3d 492, 493 [2004]; see Matter of Termini v Valley Stream Union Free School Dist. 2006School Dist., 3 AD3d 492, 493 [2004]; see Matter of Termini v Valley Stream Union Free School Dist. | 2 | 2 |
Porcaro v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006].) The notice must be served within 90 days after the claim arises, but courts have discretion to grant an extension for service of a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1], [5]). “ ‘The key factors which the court must consider in determining if leave should be granted are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time there 2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006].) The notice must be served within 90 days after the claim arises, but courts have discretion to grant an extension of time for service of a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1], [5]). “ ‘The key factors which the court must consider in determining if leave should be granted are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable ti | 2 | 2 |
Powell v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006].) The notice must be served within 90 days after the claim arises, but courts have discretion to grant an extension of time for service of a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1], [5]). “ ‘The key factors which the court must consider in determining if leave should be granted are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable ti 2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006].) The notice must be served within 90 days after the claim arises, but courts have discretion to grant an extension for service of a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1], [5]). “ ‘The key factors which the court must consider in determining if leave should be granted are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve the notice of claim within the statutory time frame, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time there | 2 | 2 |
Valestil v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2009School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2008]), after considering “whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter ofValestil v City of New York, 295 AD2d 619 [2002]; see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Felice v Eastport!South Manor Cent. 2008School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2d Dept 2008]; Matter of Lodati v City of New York, 303 AD2d 406 [2003]), after considering “ ‘whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense’ ” (Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658, 659 [2007], quoting Matter of Hicks v City of New York, 8 AD3d 566 [2004]; see Matter of Vale | 1 | 8 |
Lodati v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2008School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2d Dept 2008]; Matter of Lodati v City of New York, 303 AD2d 406 [2003]), after considering “ ‘whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense’ ” (Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658, 659 [2007], quoting Matter of Hicks v City of New York, 8 AD3d 566 [2004]; see Matter of Vale 2008The key factors in determining whether to allow service of a late notice of claim are whether (1) the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d at 659 ; Matter of Lodati v City of New York, 303 AD2d at 407 ). | 1 | 4 |
Etienne v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2025"In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5), the court, in its discretion, must consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, whether (1) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense" ( Etienne v City of New 2025"In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5), the court, in its discretion, must consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, whether (1) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense" ( Etienne v City of New | 1 | 2 |
Matter of Mohamed v. New York Citygreen2 sentences2024Auth. , 202 [*2]AD3d 786, 787). "'While the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarily determinative, whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance'" ( Matter of Mohamed v New York City , 139 AD3d 858, 858 , quoting Matter of Placido v County of Orange , 112 AD3d 722, 723 ; see Matter of Galicia v City of New York , 175 AD3d 681 , 682). 2016The party seeking permission to serve a late notice of claim has the burden of persuading the court that the above-noted factors are in her favor (see Matter of Mohamed v New York City, 139 AD3d 858, 859 [2016]; Matter of Lauray v City of New York, 62 AD3d 467 [2009]). | 1 | 2 |
In re the Estate of Allengreen2 sentences2005In exercising its discretion, the court is to consider (1) whether the petitioner has a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or within a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense on the merits” (Matter of Allen, 268 AD2d 520, 521 [2000] [citations omitted]). 2001In exercising its discretion, the Supreme Court should consider “(1) whether the [plaintiff] has a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or within a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense on the merits” (Matter of Allen, 268 AD2d 520, 521 ). | 1 | 2 |
Polak v. City of Schenectadygreen1 sentence2024Irrespective of the allegations made against the employee, 1f the municipality's investigation demonstrates that the wrongful act or omission actually occurred within the scope of the public employee's duties~ the municipality must provide a defense. 2 Polak v. City of Schenectady, 181 A.D.2d 233, 236 (3d Dept. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Corwin v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stockle v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Town of Sardiniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York City Transit Authority v. New York State Division of Human Rightsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barrett v. Dutchess County Legislaturegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Dominique R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ambrico v. Lynbrook Union Free School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allano v. Olivagreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCoy v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Braverman v. City of White Plainsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Heldma Group, Inc. v. Board of Assessors
green
2 sentences2008Auth., 275 AD2d 746 [2000]). 2007Auth., 275 AD2d 746 [2000])” (Matter of Hicks v City of New York, 8 AD3d 566 [2004]). | 6 | 2002–2008 |
Noonan v. . City of Albany
green
2 sentences1962(Noonan v. City of Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 ; Fox v. City of New Rochelle, 240 N. Y. 109 ; Foster v. Webster, 8 Misc 2d 61, 66 .) In our opinion it is no answer to plaintiffs’ contention that defendants’ property always has been low in relation to the surrounding terrain and has had a tendency to be swampy and to become flooded during certain seasons of the year and following heavy rains or quick thaws, and that the defendants would have to correct this condition before they could make any use of their land for any purposes whatever, and that the existence of the drainage and sanitary easements ma 1947(Noonan v. City of Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 ; Foster v. Webster, 44 N. Y. | 4 | 1946–1962 |
Mitchell v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2020The factors to be considered by a court in determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim include whether: (1) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the petitioner's claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter; (2) the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim; and (3) the delay would not substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense on the merits ( see General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]; Matter of Mitchell v City of New York , 11 2018With respect to the petitioner's remaining state law claims, in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense on the merits ( see General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]; M | 3 | 2016–2020 |
Hicks v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2008In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, “[t]he key factors which the Supreme Court must consider are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter of Valestil v City of New York, 295 AD2d 619 [2002]; see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter o 2008School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2d Dept 2008]; Matter of Lodati v City of New York, 303 AD2d 406 [2003]), after considering “ ‘whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense’ ” (Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658, 659 [2007], quoting Matter of Hicks v City of New York, 8 AD3d 566 [2004]; see Matter of Vale | 3 | 2007–2008 |
Matter of Ibrahim v. New York City Tr. Auth.
green
2 sentences2025Auth. , 202 AD3d 786, 787 ). 2022Auth. , 202 AD3d 786, 787 ; Etienne v City of New York , 189 AD3d 1400, 1401 ). | 2 | 2022–2025 |
Paige Leeds v. Port Washington Union Free School District
green
2 sentences2011In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the key factors which the court must consider are whether the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, whether the claimant was physically incapacitated, whether the claimant made an excusable error concerning the identity of the public corporation, and whether the delay would substan 2009The presence or absence of any one factor is not necessarily determinative (see Matter of Leeds v Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 55 AD3d 734 [2008]; Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d at 659 ). | 2 | 2009–2011 |
Felice v. Eastport/South Manor Central School District
green
2 sentences2009School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2008]), after considering “whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter ofValestil v City of New York, 295 AD2d 619 [2002]; see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Felice v Eastport!South Manor Cent. 2008School Dist., 50 AD3d 138 [2d Dept 2008]; Matter of Lodati v City of New York, 303 AD2d 406 [2003]), after considering “ ‘whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense’ ” (Jordan v City of New York, 41 AD3d 658, 659 [2007], quoting Matter of Hicks v City of New York, 8 AD3d 566 [2004]; see Matter of Vale | 2 | 2008–2009 |
Pierson v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2006(Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950 [1982].) The Pierson court reasoned that “[t]o permit a court to grant an extension after the Statute of Limitations has run would, in practical effect, allow the court to grant an extension which exceeds the Statute of Limitations, thus rendering meaningless that portion of section 50-e which expressly prohibits the court from doing so.” (Id. at 955.) The City argues that the court has no discretion to grant leave here because petitioners’ claims are time-barred under General Municipal Law § 50-i, which provides for a statute of limitations of one year 2006(Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950 [1982].) The Pierson court reasoned that, “[t]o permit a court to grant an extension after the Statute of Limitations has run would, in practical effect, allow the court to grant an extension which exceeds the Statute of Limitations, thus rendering meaningless that portion of section 50-e which expressly prohibits the court from doing so.” (Id. at 955.) The City argues that the court has no discretion to grant leave here because petitioner’s claims are time-barred under General Municipal Law § 50-i, which provides for a statute of limitations of one yea | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Konstantinides v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2004In making its determination, “[t]he key factors which the Supreme Court must consider are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense” (Matter of Valestil v City of New York, supra; see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Konstantinides v City of New York, 278 AD2d 235 [2000]; Matter of Kittred 2002The key factors which the Supreme Court must consider are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Konstantinides v City of New York, 278 AD2d 235 ; Matter of Kittredge v New York City Hous. | 2 | 2002–2004 |
Carbone v. Town of Brookhaven
green
2 sentences2002The key factors which the court must consider are whether the movant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality or agency acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [1]; Matter of Guiliano v Town of Oyster Bay, 244 AD2d 408 ; Carbone v Town of Brookhaven, 176 AD2d 778 ). 2001In deciding whether to permit the service of a late notice of claim, the court will generally consider three factors: (1) whether the movant has a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) whether the municipality or agency acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense (see, Carbone v Town of Brookhaven, 176 AD2d 778 ; General Municipal Law § 50-e [1]). | 2 | 2001–2002 |
Charles v. New York City Health
green
2 sentences2000Corp., 166 AD2d 526 ). 1998Corp., 166 AD2d 526 ). | 2 | 1998–2000 |
Farrell v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2000In exercising its discretion, the court is to consider (1) whether the petitioner has a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or within a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense on the merits (see, Matter of Farrell v City of New York, 191 AD2d 698 ; Matter of Charles v New York City Health & Hosps. 1998In exercising its discretion, the court is to consider (1) whether the petitioner has a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or within a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense on the merits (see, Matter of Farrell v City of New York, 191 AD2d 698 ; Matter of Charles v New York City Health & Hosps. | 2 | 1998–2000 |
County of Albany v. . Hooker
green
2 sentences1988(Board of Educ. v Allen, 27 AD2d 69 , affd 20 NY2d 109 .) In addition, a municipality may challenge a statute which affects its ownership of funds or property, or an expressly defined statutory duty (County of Albany v Hooker, 204 NY 1 ; City of New York v Town of Colchester, 66 Misc 2d 83 ). 1971A municipality may also challenge a statute which affects its ownership of funds or property, or an expressly defined statutory duty (County of Albany v. Hooker, 204 N. Y. 1 ). | 2 | 1971–1988 |
Matter of Cleary v. Nassau Health Care Corp.
green
1 sentence2025"In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, a court must consider all relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense, and whether the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim" ( Matter of | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Village of Pomona v. Town of Ramapo neutral | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| New York State Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Placido v. County of Orange
green
1 sentence2024Auth. , 202 [*2]AD3d 786, 787). "'While the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarily determinative, whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance'" ( Matter of Mohamed v New York City , 139 AD3d 858, 858 , quoting Matter of Placido v County of Orange , 112 AD3d 722, 723 ; see Matter of Galicia v City of New York , 175 AD3d 681 , 682). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Matter of Vasser v. City of New Rochelle
green
1 sentence2024"The [plaintiff or] petitioner 'has the burden of establishing both an injury-in-fact and that the asserted injury is within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute alleged to have been violated'" ( Matter of Vasser v City of New Rochelle , 180 AD3d 691, 692 , quoting Matter of Association for a Better Long Is., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Rivera v. City of New York green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Matter of Unique Wooden v. City of New York green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Matter of Beverly F. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Destine v. City of New York green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Edwards green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Bakioglu v. Tornabene green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Murray v. Village of Malverne green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Kuterman v. City of New York green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Perez v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Blair v. Pleasantville Union Free School District green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Formisano v. Eastchester Union Free School District green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Kumar v. City of New York green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| White v. New York City Housing Authority green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| DeMolfetto v. City of New York green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Guarneri v. Town of Oyster Bay green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| McHugh v. City of New York neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Gause v. Town of Babylon green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Amabile v. City of Buffalo green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Benzinger v. Town of Brookhaven neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Berner v. Town of Huntington neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Verille v. Kopic green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Ruiz v. New York City Housing Authority neutral | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.