imprecise but comprehensible normative standard in Massachusetts

2025We also adopt for this context the standard for determining when a probation condition satisfies the notice requirement -- whether a condition provides at least "an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard so that [people] of common intelligence will know its meaning." Kendrick, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977).

2020Probation conditions "need not provide the fullest warning imaginable": "[t]he notice requirement can be satisfied by 'an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.'" Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 446 Mass. 72, 75 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977).

2022Thus, a regulation is sufficiently precise to pass constitutional muster “if it ‘conveys [a] sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.’ ” Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 414 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 270 (1983).

2016See Power, 420 Mass. at 421 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 270 (1983) (“[I]f the language which is challenged conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices, it is constitutionally adequate”).

2022A regulation may not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague “where the challenged provisions are merely general in nature, requiring a person to conform his or her conduct ‘to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.’ Rather, the doctrine is applied to strike down statutes in which ‘no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 788 (1978), quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

2021A law “is not to be invalidated under the void-for-vagueness doctrine where the challenged provisions are merely general in nature, requiring a person to conform his or her conduct ‘to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.’ Rather, the doctrine is applied to strike down statutes in which ‘no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 788 (1978), quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

2015Its language will be constitutionally adequate if it “conveys [a] sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 270 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 359 Mass. 491, 496-497 (1971).

2013Its language will be adequate if it “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 270 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 359 Mass. 491, 496-497 (1971).

2018A statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because its terms require judicial construction, or because "it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard." Commonwealth v. Gallant , 373 Mass. 577 , 580, 369 N.E.2d 707 (1977) (quotation omitted).

2018A statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because its terms require judicial construction, or because "it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard." Commonwealth v. Gallant , 373 Mass. 577 , 580, 369 N.E.2d 707 (1977) (quotation omitted).

2018Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601 , 608 [ 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 ] (1973).

2018Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601 , 608 [ 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 ] (1973).

2022A regulation may not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague “where the challenged provisions are merely general in nature, requiring a person to conform his or her conduct ‘to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.’ Rather, the doctrine is applied to strike down statutes in which ‘no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 788 (1978), quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

2021A law “is not to be invalidated under the void-for-vagueness doctrine where the challenged provisions are merely general in nature, requiring a person to conform his or her conduct ‘to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.’ Rather, the doctrine is applied to strike down statutes in which ‘no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 788 (1978), quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

2014See Commonwealth v. Jarrett , 359 Mass, at 496 (“[M]ere difficulty in determining whether certain marginal of-fences are within the meaning of the language under attack as vague does not automatically render it unconstitutional for indefiniteness”); Commonwealth v. Miozza, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 570 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 301-302 (1994), S.C., 420 Mass. 508 (1995) (“[A] statute is not vague merely because ‘it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard’ ”).

2006However, a statute is not vague merely because “it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.” Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 301-302 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 420 Mass. 508 (1995), quoting from Commonwealth v. Benoit, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 641, 646 (1988).

2006However, a statute is not vague merely because “it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.” Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 301-302 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 420 Mass. 508 (1995), quoting from Commonwealth v. Benoit, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 641, 646 (1988).

1994L. c. 265, § 13B, infringes on “family life” activities that are constitutionally protected, “sweeping within its reach behavior which nearly everyone would consider decent and appropriate.” 11 A statute “is not vague simply because ‘it re *302 quires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard. . . .’ Commonwealth v. Williams, 355 Mass. [302,] 304 [1985], quoting from Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977).” Commonwealth v. Benoit, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 646 (unsuccessful vagueness challenge to prohibition of “unnatural and lascivious act”).

2017Moreover, a statute is not vague simply because "it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard." Commonwealth v. Williams , 395 Mass. 302 , 304 (1985), quoting from Commonwealth v. Orlando , 371 Mass. 732 , 734 (1977).

1994“An ordinance is not vague if it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard . . .” Williams, supra at 304 , quoting Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977).

2025We also adopt for this context the standard for determining when a probation condition satisfies the notice requirement -- whether a condition provides at least "an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard so that [people] of common intelligence will know its meaning." Kendrick, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977).

2020Probation conditions "need not provide the fullest warning imaginable": "[t]he notice requirement can be satisfied by 'an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.'" Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 446 Mass. 72, 75 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977).

2018A statute is not void for vagueness "if it requires a person to conform [her] conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard." Commonwealth v. McGhee , 472 Mass. 405 , 414 (2015), quoting from Commonwealth v. Orlando , 371 Mass. 732 , 734 (1977).

2018A provision is not impermissibly vague "if it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard." Commonwealth v. McGhee , 472 Mass. 405 , 414, 35 N.E.3d 329 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Orlando , 371 Mass. 732 , 734, 359 N.E.2d 310 (1977).

2014See Commonwealth v. Jarrett , 359 Mass, at 496 (“[M]ere difficulty in determining whether certain marginal of-fences are within the meaning of the language under attack as vague does not automatically render it unconstitutional for indefiniteness”); Commonwealth v. Miozza, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 570 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 301-302 (1994), S.C., 420 Mass. 508 (1995) (“[A] statute is not vague merely because ‘it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard’ ”).

2006However, a statute is not vague merely because “it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard.” Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 301-302 (1994), rev’d on other grounds, 420 Mass. 508 (1995), quoting from Commonwealth v. Benoit, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 641, 646 (1988).

2021“Further, even a vague statute may be made constitutionally definite by giving it a reasonable construction.” Commonwealth v. Arthur, 420 Mass. 535, 539 (1995).

2017See Commonwealth v. Ruiz , 453 Mass. 474 , 479 (2009) (quotation omitted) ("[A] condition of probation must provide 'reasonable guidance' as to the conduct prohibited so that people of 'common intelligence' will understand its meaning").

2016See Power, 420 Mass. at 421 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 270 (1983) (“[I]f the language which is challenged conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices, it is constitutionally adequate”).

2014See Commonwealth v. Reyes, supra. As the motion judge correctly determined, G.

2014See Commonwealth v. Jarrett , 359 Mass, at 496 (“[M]ere difficulty in determining whether certain marginal of-fences are within the meaning of the language under attack as vague does not automatically render it unconstitutional for indefiniteness”); Commonwealth v. Miozza, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 570 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 301-302 (1994), S.C., 420 Mass. 508 (1995) (“[A] statute is not vague merely because ‘it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard’ ”).

2014A statute is not vague “if it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard so that men of common intelligence will know its meaning.” Commonwealth v. Orlando, supra. A sufficiently definite warning about what conduct has been made criminal “may be achieved by the common law meaning or statutory history of particular terms.” Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 300 (1974).

2006“A law is unconstitutionally vague and denies due process of law if it fails to provide a reasonable opportunity for a person of ordinary intelligence to know what is prohibited or if it does not provide explicit standards for those who apply it.” Commonwealth v. Jasmin, 396 Mass. 653, 655 (1986), citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108-109 (1972). “[A] sufficiently definite warning of criminal culpability may be achieved through judicial application of the statute to the same or similar conduct.” Commonwealth v. Nuby, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 363 (1992), quoting from Commonwealth v. Beno

2006“A law is unconstitutionally vague and denies due process of law if it fails to provide a reasonable opportunity for a person of ordinary intelligence to know what is prohibited or if it does not provide explicit standards for those who apply it.” Commonwealth v. Jasmin, 396 Mass. 653, 655 (1986), citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108-109 (1972). “[A] sufficiently definite warning of criminal culpability may be achieved through judicial application of the statute to the same or similar conduct.” Commonwealth v. Nuby, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 363 (1992), quoting from Commonwealth v. Beno