imprecise but comprehensible normative standard in Ohio

2023This court reasoned that “‘[a] facial challenge requires that the challenging party * * * show that the statute is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting State v. Carrick, 131 Ohio St.3d 340 , 2012-Ohio-608 , 965 N.E.2d 264 , ¶ 15.

2023This court reasoned that “‘[a] facial challenge requires that the challenging party * * * show that the statute is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting State v. Carrick, 131 Ohio St.3d 340 , 2012-Ohio-608 , 965 N.E.2d 264 , ¶ 15.

2026Huron v. Kisil, 2025-Ohio-2921, ¶ 11 , citing State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269-270 (1991) (citing State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108-109 (1972); and United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). {¶13} A party challenging a statute as unconstitutionally vague must demonstrate that “the statute is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”’ Kisil at ¶ 10 , quoting Columbus Po

2026Huron v. Kisil, 2025-Ohio-2921, ¶ 11 , citing State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269-270 (1991) (citing State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108-109 (1972); and United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). {¶13} A party challenging a statute as unconstitutionally vague must demonstrate that “the statute is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”’ Kisil at ¶ 10 , quoting Columbus Po

2024(B) No person * * * shall treat a human corpse in a way that would outrage reasonable community sensibilities.” {¶ 49} Appellant’s void for vagueness claim regarding R.C. 2927.01 has been previously presented to, and uniformly rejected by, courts throughout Ohio, including this court. {¶ 50} In State v. Glover, 17 Ohio App.3d 256 , (8th Dist. 1984), the Eighth District Court of Appeals flatly rejected an R.C. 2927.01 void for vagueness argument, determining that the, “[R.C. 2927.01 language can be] commonly understood by persons of common intelligence * * * a criminal statute is not void for v

2003The court observed that "[a] criminal statute is not void for vagueness simply because it requires a person to conform to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard," but only when "it specifies no standard of conduct at all." Id. at 258 , 406 N.E.2d 499 .

2019However, “‘[i]mpossible standards of specificity are not required. * * * The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.’” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 , 231–232, 71 S.Ct. 703 , 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951). {¶40} A facial challenge requires that “the challenging party * * * show that the statute is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of condu

2019However, “‘[i]mpossible standards of specificity are not required. * * * The test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.’” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 , 231–232, 71 S.Ct. 703 , 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951). {¶40} A facial challenge requires that “the challenging party * * * show that the statute is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of condu

2003Perez v. Cleveland (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 376, 378 , 678 N.E.2d 537 . {¶ 23} In Anderson , the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously held with regard to a challenge for vagueness: “In order to prove such an assertion, the challenging party must show that the statute is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. * * *’ Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611, 614 [ 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214, 217 ].

2003Perez v. Cleveland (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 376, 378 , 678 N.E.2d 537 . {¶ 23} In Anderson , the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously held with regard to a challenge for vagueness: “In order to prove such an assertion, the challenging party must show that the statute is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. * * *’ Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611, 614 [ 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214, 217 ].

2024(Appellant’s Brief at 26.) As the party challenging the constitutionality of the provisions of the city code Ullmann: “must show that the statute is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ In other words, the challenger ‘must show that upon examining the statute, an individual of ordinary intelligence would not understand what he is required to do’ and ‘must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute was so unclear that he cou

2008In order for a person to successfully challenge a statute as unconstitutionally vague, the statute cannot merely be vague because it "requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard." Instead, the challenging party must "prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute was so unclear that he could not reasonably understand that it prohibited the acts in which he engaged." Columbus v. Kim , 118 Ohio St.3d 93 , 2008-Ohio-1817 , 886 N.E.2d 217 , at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168 , 171 , 566 N.E.2d 1224 . {¶ 13} In an almo

2017If the statute is being challenged only as applied to the circumstances of the case, the challenger " 'contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, [is] unconstitutional.' " State v. Lowe , 112 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2007-Ohio-606 , 861 N.E.2d 512 , ¶ 17, quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 506 U.S. 1011 , 113 S.Ct. 633 , 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia J., dissenting). {¶ 12} As pertinent to the remand in the present case, appellant contends that even if his acts had been clearly defined as criminal,

2017If the statute is being challenged only as applied to the circumstances of the case, the challenger " 'contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, [is] unconstitutional.' " State v. Lowe , 112 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2007-Ohio-606 , 861 N.E.2d 512 , ¶ 17, quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 506 U.S. 1011 , 113 S.Ct. 633 , 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia J., dissenting). {¶ 12} As pertinent to the remand in the present case, appellant contends that even if his acts had been clearly defined as criminal,

2009Therefore, the complainant in a facial-vagueness challenge must prove that the statute is vague “ ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” Smith v. Goguen (1974), 415 U.S. 566, 578 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 , quoting Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 . {¶ 58} Appellants maintain that the characteristics enumerated in R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(2) that exclude a machine from the definition of a le

2009Therefore, the complainant in a facial-vagueness challenge must prove that the statute is vague “ ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” Smith v. Goguen (1974), 415 U.S. 566, 578 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 , quoting Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 . {¶ 58} Appellants maintain that the characteristics enumerated in R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(2) that exclude a machine from the definition of a le

2025In order to prove that a statute or ordinance is void for vagueness, “a challenging party ‘must show that the statute is vague “not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO standard of conduct is specified at all.”‘” Id., quoting Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d at 171 , quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). {¶ 11} In order to pass constitutional muster, the challenged statute or ordinance must: (1) provide fair warning about what conduct is proscribed, (

2024(B) No person * * * shall treat a human corpse in a way that would outrage reasonable community sensibilities.” {¶ 49} Appellant’s void for vagueness claim regarding R.C. 2927.01 has been previously presented to, and uniformly rejected by, courts throughout Ohio, including this court. {¶ 50} In State v. Glover, 17 Ohio App.3d 256 , (8th Dist. 1984), the Eighth District Court of Appeals flatly rejected an R.C. 2927.01 void for vagueness argument, determining that the, “[R.C. 2927.01 language can be] commonly understood by persons of common intelligence * * * a criminal statute is not void for v

2017If the statute is being challenged only as applied to the circumstances of the case, the challenger " 'contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, [is] unconstitutional.' " State v. Lowe , 112 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2007-Ohio-606 , 861 N.E.2d 512 , ¶ 17, quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 506 U.S. 1011 , 113 S.Ct. 633 , 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia J., dissenting). {¶ 12} As pertinent to the remand in the present case, appellant contends that even if his acts had been clearly defined as criminal,

2017If the statute is being challenged only as applied to the circumstances of the case, the challenger " 'contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, [is] unconstitutional.' " State v. Lowe , 112 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2007-Ohio-606 , 861 N.E.2d 512 , ¶ 17, quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 506 U.S. 1011 , 113 S.Ct. 633 , 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia J., dissenting). {¶ 12} As pertinent to the remand in the present case, appellant contends that even if his acts had been clearly defined as criminal,

2017If the statute is being challenged only as applied to the circumstances of the case, the challenger " 'contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, [is] unconstitutional.' " State v. Lowe , 112 Ohio St.3d 507 , 2007-Ohio-606 , 861 N.E.2d 512 , ¶ 17, quoting Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 506 U.S. 1011 , 113 S.Ct. 633 , 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia J., dissenting). {¶ 12} As pertinent to the remand in the present case, appellant contends that even if his acts had been clearly defined as criminal,

2014Cane Task Force v. Nahum, 159 Ohio App.3d 579 , 2005-Ohio-300 , 824 N.E.2d 1019, at ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). “[A] law will survive a void for vagueness challenge if it is written so that a person of common intelligence is able to ascertain what conduct is prohibited, and if the law provides sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 537 , 2003-Ohio-4779 , 795 N.E.2d 633, at ¶ 16 , citing State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 533 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000). {¶ 15} “Ready at hand” has been defined as being conveniently accessible and 6 within imm

2014Cane Task Force v. Nahum, 159 Ohio App.3d 579 , 2005-Ohio-300 , 824 N.E.2d 1019, at ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). “[A] law will survive a void for vagueness challenge if it is written so that a person of common intelligence is able to ascertain what conduct is prohibited, and if the law provides sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 537 , 2003-Ohio-4779 , 795 N.E.2d 633, at ¶ 16 , citing State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 533 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000). {¶ 15} “Ready at hand” has been defined as being conveniently accessible and 6 within imm

2014Cane Task Force v. Nahum, 159 Ohio App.3d 579 , 2005-Ohio-300 , 824 N.E.2d 1019, at ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). “[A] law will survive a void for vagueness challenge if it is written so that a person of common intelligence is able to ascertain what conduct is prohibited, and if the law provides sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 537 , 2003-Ohio-4779 , 795 N.E.2d 633, at ¶ 16 , citing State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 533 , 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000). {¶ 15} “Ready at hand” has been defined as being conveniently accessible and 6 within imm

2011A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” State v. VFW Post 431, Montgomery App. No. 19892, 2004-Ohio-3566 , 2004 WL 1497554 . {¶ 17} A challenge for vagueness requires one to show that the statute is vague “ ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” State v. Anderson (199

2008No. 06CA0072-M, 2007-Ohio-2553 , at ¶ 6 , quoting Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611 , 614 .

2008In State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 171 , 566 N.E.2d 1224 , quoting Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 , we stated that “[i]n order to prove such an assertion, the challenging party must show that the statute is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” In other words, the challenger “must show that upon examining the statute, an individual of ordinary intelligence would not und

2008In State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 171 , 566 N.E.2d 1224 , quoting Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 , we stated that “[i]n order to prove such an assertion, the challenging party must show that the statute is vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ ” In other words, the challenger “must show that upon examining the statute, an individual of ordinary intelligence would not und

2007"Accordingly, when a statute is challenged under the due process doctrine of vagueness, a court must determine whether the enactment (1) provides sufficient notice of its proscriptions and (2) contains reasonably clear guidelines to prevent official arbitrariness or discrimination in its enforcement." Perez v. Cleveland (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 376 , 378 , 678 N.E.2d 537 , 1997-Ohio-33 . {¶ 6} "'Detention' means * * * supervision by an employee of the department of rehabilitation and correction of a person on any type of release from a state correctional institution." R.C. 2921.01 (E).