imprecise but comprehensible normative standard in Texas

1998Although we have found no authority discussing the constitutionality of the word "embarrass," we believe it is comparable to "annoy." The Supreme Court held in Coates that the word "annoy" was unconstitutionally vague, "not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Id. at 611 n. 1, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686 .

1998Although we have found no authority discussing the constitutionality of the word “embarrass,” we believe it is comparable to “annoy.” The Supreme Court held in Coates that the word “annoy” was unconstitutionally vague, “not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Id. at 611 n. 1, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686 .

2022Id. (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).

1986A facial challenge to a statute for vagueness is appropriate only on an allegation that the law is vague “not in a sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971); Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.1983).

1980As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 .” By a pointed comparison ( 402 U.S. 613 n. 3, 91 S.Ct. 1687 ) to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 , 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), where a statute that punished “offensive, derisive or annoying” words was upheld because the state court had given it a limited definition, the Supreme Court showed that the Ohio court had abnegated its responsibility to construe the ordinance in a constitutional way.

1980As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 .” By a pointed comparison ( 402 U.S. 613 n. 3, 91 S.Ct. 1687 ) to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 , 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), where a statute that punished “offensive, derisive or annoying” words was upheld because the state court had given it a limited definition, the Supreme Court showed that the Ohio court had abnegated its responsibility to construe the ordinance in a constitutional way.

1980As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 .” By a pointed comparison ( 402 U.S. 613 n. 3, 91 S.Ct. 1687 ) to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 , 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), where a statute that punished “offensive, derisive or annoying” words was upheld because the state court had given it a limited definition, the Supreme Court showed that the Ohio court had abnegated its responsibility to construe the ordinance in a constitutional way.

1980As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 .” By a pointed comparison ( 402 U.S. 613 n. 3, 91 S.Ct. 1687 ) to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 , 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), where a statute that punished “offensive, derisive or annoying” words was upheld because the state court had given it a limited definition, the Supreme Court showed that the Ohio court had abnegated its responsibility to construe the ordinance in a constitutional way.