last antecedent rule in Michigan

2024While we agree with GLWA that 7 The last-antecedent rule is “a rule of statutory construction that provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.” Hardaway v Wayne Co, 494 Mich 423, 427 ; 835 NW2d 336 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -9- the project is less about construction of a new facility, and more about maintenance of an existing one, the fact remains that GLWA is exercising its power to determine a p

2024While we agree with GLWA that 7 The last-antecedent rule is “a rule of statutory construction that provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.” Hardaway v Wayne Co, 494 Mich 423, 427 ; 835 NW2d 336 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). -9- the project is less about construction of a new facility, and more about maintenance of an existing one, the fact remains that GLWA is exercising its power to determine a p

2020The Compass Healthcare panel stated: As the trial court concluded in its opinion and order on reconsideration, “[t]he only effect of Covenant was to place the dispute over the reasonableness of the charges between a provider and a patient-insured, rather than between a 14 The last antecedent rule is a grammatical rule which “provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.” Tuscola Co Bd of Comm’rs v Tuscola Co Apportionme

2017First, with respect to the last antecedent rule, once again, in part, the first sentence of MCL 208.1107(3) states: that “compensation” means “all wages, salaries, fees, bonuses, commissions, other payments made in the tax year on behalf of or for the benefit of employees, officers, or directors of the taxpayers, and any earnings that are net earnings from self- employment . . . .” Given the grammatical structure of this sentence, Four Zero One argues that, under the last antecedent rule, the phrase “made in the tax year on behalf of or for the benefit of employees, officers, or directors of t

2020The Compass Healthcare panel stated: As the trial court concluded in its opinion and order on reconsideration, “[t]he only effect of Covenant was to place the dispute over the reasonableness of the charges between a provider and a patient-insured, rather than between a 14 The last antecedent rule is a grammatical rule which “provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.” Tuscola Co Bd of Comm’rs v Tuscola Co Apportionme

2017First, with respect to the last antecedent rule, once again, in part, the first sentence of MCL 208.1107(3) states: that “compensation” means “all wages, salaries, fees, bonuses, commissions, other payments made in the tax year on behalf of or for the benefit of employees, officers, or directors of the taxpayers, and any earnings that are net earnings from self- employment . . . .” Given the grammatical structure of this sentence, Four Zero One argues that, under the last antecedent rule, the phrase “made in the tax year on behalf of or for the benefit of employees, officers, or directors of t

2020The “last antecedent” rule “provides that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent, unless something in the subject matter or dominant purpose [of the statute] requires a different interpretation.” Dessart v Burak, 470 Mich 37, 41 ; 678 NW2d 615 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).

2006It is odd that Justice Weaver here attempts to overrule Devillers and Welton on the basis of the last antecedent rule when she has herself recently argued that the rule is "optional, not mandatory," "`not inflexible and uniformly binding,'" and inapplicable "`[w]here the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding or even succeeding sections.'" Dessart, supra at 44 , 678 N.W.2d 615 (Weaver, J., concurring in the result), quoting 2A Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction (6th rev. ed.), § 433, p. 372. [33] See Jarrad v. Integon Nat'l Ins.

2018“Because the Legislature is presumed to know the rules of grammar, statutory language must be read within its grammatical context unless something else was clearly intended.” Niles Twp v Berrien Co Bd of Comm’rs, 261 Mich App 308, 315 ; 683 NW2d 148 (2004).

2018"Because the Legislature is presumed to know the rules of grammar, ...statutory language must be read within its grammatical context unless something else was clearly intended ...." Niles Twp. v. Berrien Co. Bd. of Comm'rs , 261 Mich. App. 308 , 315, 683 N.W.2d 148 (2004).

2018“Because the Legislature is presumed to know the rules of grammar, statutory language must be read within its grammatical context unless something else was clearly intended.” Niles Twp v Berrien Co Bd of Comm’rs, 261 Mich App 308, 315 ; 683 NW2d 148 (2004).

2018"Because the Legislature is presumed to know the rules of grammar, ...statutory language must be read within its grammatical context unless something else was clearly intended ...." Niles Twp. v. Berrien Co. Bd. of Comm'rs , 261 Mich. App. 308 , 315, 683 N.W.2d 148 (2004).

2017The absurd result rule applies only when statutes are ambiguous, Gauthier v Alpena Co Prosecutor, 267 Mich App 167, 174 ; 703 NW2d 818 (2005), and, as we have determined, the statutory definition of “compensation” is unambiguous.

2017The absurd result rule applies only when statutes are ambiguous, Gauthier v Alpena Co Prosecutor, 267 Mich App 167, 174 ; 703 NW2d 818 (2005), and, as we have determined, the statutory definition of “compensation” is unambiguous.

2026That rule provides that, in general, “a modifying clause will be construed to modify only the last antecedent, unless something in the subject matter or dominant purpose requires a different interpretation.” People v King, 297 Mich App 465, 486 ; 824 NW2d 258 (2012).

2026That rule provides that, in general, “a modifying clause will be construed to modify only the last antecedent, unless something in the subject matter or dominant purpose requires a different interpretation.” People v King, 297 Mich App 465, 486 ; 824 NW2d 258 (2012).

2026This reading is consistent with the last-antecedent rule, under which “a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent[.]” Maurer v Fremont Ins Co, 325 Mich App 685, 700 ; 926 NW2d 848 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026This reading is consistent with the last-antecedent rule, under which “a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent[.]” Maurer v Fremont Ins Co, 325 Mich App 685, 700 ; 926 NW2d 848 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024Lastly, GLWA cites Knauff v Oscoda Drain Comm’r, 240 Mich App 485 ; 618 NW2d 1 (2000), for the proposition that the “without reference . . . to any other law” language in MCL 124.284(2)(e) also applies to GLWA’s authority to determine project locations.

2024Lastly, GLWA cites Knauff v Oscoda Drain Comm’r, 240 Mich App 485 ; 618 NW2d 1 (2000), for the proposition that the “without reference . . . to any other law” language in MCL 124.284(2)(e) also applies to GLWA’s authority to determine project locations.

2024However, the MSWSSA must be interpreted according to its own language, In re Complaint of Rovas, 482 Mich 90, 93 ; 754 NW2d 259 (2008), and defendant relies heavily on the statutory language exempting GLWA’s design power from other laws, granting GLWA the authority to: (e) Determine the location of any project constructed by it under the provisions of this act, and to determine, in its discretion and without reference to any other provisions of this act or any other law, the design, standards, and the materials of construction, and construct, maintain, repair, and operate the project. [MCL 124

2024Relying on the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), see Detroit City Council v Detroit Mayor, 283 Mich App 442, 456 ; 770 NW2d 117 (2009), defendant further argues that, because the Legislature expressly exempted GLWA from complying with other laws with respect to its design power, the Legislature did not intend to exempt GLWA from complying with other laws, including ordinances, when determining the location of its projects.

2024Relying on the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), see Detroit City Council v Detroit Mayor, 283 Mich App 442, 456 ; 770 NW2d 117 (2009), defendant further argues that, because the Legislature expressly exempted GLWA from complying with other laws with respect to its design power, the Legislature did not intend to exempt GLWA from complying with other laws, including ordinances, when determining the location of its projects.

2024However, the MSWSSA must be interpreted according to its own language, In re Complaint of Rovas, 482 Mich 90, 93 ; 754 NW2d 259 (2008), and defendant relies heavily on the statutory language exempting GLWA’s design power from other laws, granting GLWA the authority to: (e) Determine the location of any project constructed by it under the provisions of this act, and to determine, in its discretion and without reference to any other provisions of this act or any other law, the design, standards, and the materials of construction, and construct, maintain, repair, and operate the project. [MCL 124

2022But the rule “does not apply when its application results in a construction that is contrary to the plain language of the statute.” Lafarge Midwest, Inc v Detroit, 290 Mich App 240, 250 ; 801 NW2d 629 (2010).

2022But the rule “does not apply when its application results in a construction that is contrary to the plain language of the statute.” Lafarge Midwest, Inc v Detroit, 290 Mich App 240, 250 ; 801 NW2d 629 (2010).

2022While the last-antecedent rule would appear to restrict the term “off site” to modify only the word “improvements,” this interpretation is inappropriate in light of the purpose of the consent judgment and the presence of the disjunctive term “or.” A “bedrock principle of American contract law [is] that parties are free to contract as they see fit[.]” Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 51 ; 664 NW2d 776 (2003).

2022While the last-antecedent rule would appear to restrict the term “off site” to modify only the word “improvements,” this interpretation is inappropriate in light of the purpose of the consent judgment and the presence of the disjunctive term “or.” A “bedrock principle of American contract law [is] that parties are free to contract as they see fit[.]” Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 51 ; 664 NW2d 776 (2003).

2021In addition, the Court determined that under Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661 (2004), the RUA barred her suit because although she had originally entered defendant’s property for a family party, plaintiff was on the property for the purpose of zip lining at the time of the accident and zip lining fit within the plain meaning of the phrase “any other outdoor recreational use.” Plaintiff sought leave to appeal.

2020Thus, the penalties found in MCL 438.32 apply to “[a]ny seller or lender or his assigns” who enters into a usurious contract, i.e., one that “does not comply with the provisions of this act” or that “charges interest in excess of that allowed by this act.” Indeed, this interpretation is consistent with our characterization of MCL 438.32 as “a forfeiture provision that is intended to penalize a lender attempting to enforce a usurious contract.” Washburn v Michailoff, 240 Mich App 669, 674 ; 613 NW2d 405 (2000) (emphasis added).

2020Thus, the penalties found in MCL 438.32 apply to “[a]ny seller or lender or his assigns” who enters into a usurious contract, i.e., one that “does not comply with the provisions of this act” or that “charges interest in excess of that allowed by this act.” Indeed, this interpretation is consistent with our characterization of MCL 438.32 as “a forfeiture provision that is intended to penalize a lender attempting to enforce a usurious contract.” Washburn v Michailoff, 240 Mich App 669, 674 ; 613 NW2d 405 (2000) (emphasis added).

2020In addition, the last antecedent rule does not apply when the modifying clause is set off by punctuation, “such as a comma.” Cameron, 476 Mich at 71 .

2020In addition, the last antecedent rule does not apply when the modifying clause is set off by punctuation, “such as a comma.” Cameron, 476 Mich at 71 .

2019The “last antecedent” of a given term or phrase is “the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence[.]” People v English, 317 Mich App 607, 614 ; 897 NW2d 184 (2016) (opinion of WILDER, P.J.), quoting 2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (7th ed), § 47:33, pp 494-497. -6- In this circumstance, the last antecedent rule does not support petitioners’ argument that the statute is ambiguous.

2018As the Supreme Court noted in Small , 467 Mich. at 263 , 650 N.W.2d 328 , the last-antecedent rule of construction generally controls "unless some language in the statute requires a different interpretation." See also People v. Pinkney , 501 Mich. 259 , 282-284, 912 N.W.2d 535 (2018) (holding that canons of construction can be overcome if the language of a statute is clear enough).

2018As the Supreme Court noted in Small , 467 Mich. at 263 , 650 N.W.2d 328 , the last-antecedent rule of construction generally controls "unless some language in the statute requires a different interpretation." See also People v. Pinkney , 501 Mich. 259 , 282-284, 912 N.W.2d 535 (2018) (holding that canons of construction can be overcome if the language of a statute is clear enough).

2018Stated differently, the security required by MCL 500.3101(1) was in effect for purposes of MCL 500.3113(b) as it related to the BMW. [ Id . at 39-40, 748 N.W.2d 574 .] In sum, Iqbal followed the last-antecedent rule based on the plain language of the statute.

2016The Michigan Supreme Court “has recognized the benefit of using legislative history when a statute is ambiguous and construction of [the] ambiguous provision becomes necessary.” In re Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 468 Mich 109 , 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003).

2016The Michigan Supreme Court “has recognized the benefit of using legislative history when a statute is ambiguous and construction of [the] ambiguous provision becomes necessary.” In re Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 468 Mich 109 , 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003).

2016The Michigan Supreme Court “has recognized the benefit of using legislative history when a statute is ambiguous and construction of [the] ambiguous provision becomes necessary.” In re Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 468 Mich 109 , 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003).

2016The Michigan Supreme Court “has recognized the benefit of using legislative history when a statute is ambiguous and construction of [the] ambiguous provision becomes necessary.” In re Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 468 Mich 109 , 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003).

2015Under the last antecedent rule,3 “beyond the time necessary to commit the offense” modifies only the phrase “held captive.” See generally Chelmicki, 305 Mich App at 70 .

2015For example, in Greater Bethesda, this Court interpreted the meaning of MCR 3.602(1), which stated that “[a]n arbitration award filed with the clerk of the court designated in the agreement or statute within one year after the award was rendered may be confirmed by the court. . . .” Id. at 412 .

2015According to the last antecedent rule of statutory construction, “a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.” Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v Evangel Builders & Constr Manag *420 ers, LLC, 282 Mich App 410, 414 ; 766 NW2d 874 (2009).

2015Under the last antecedent rule, the phrases “by a nonresident” and “in excess of the personal protection insurance benefits provided under [MCL 500.3163(4)]” apply to the phrase “[d]amages for economic loss.” Greater Bethesda, 282 Mich App at 414 .

2015According to the last antecedent rule of statutory construction, “a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.” Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v Evangel Builders & Constr Manag *420 ers, LLC, 282 Mich App 410, 414 ; 766 NW2d 874 (2009).