last antecedent rule in Connecticut

2019As the defendant contends, however, this interpreta- tion of the replacement value calculation provision runs afoul of the last antecedent rule, a principle of contract and statutory interpretation pursuant to which a lim- iting clause or phrase is read as modifying only the noun or phrase that immediately precedes it; e.g., Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Engineered Framing Systems, Inc., 327 Conn. 467, 475 , 174 A.3d 791 (2018); see also Connecticut Ins.

2019As the defendant contends, however, this interpreta- tion of the replacement value calculation provision runs afoul of the last antecedent rule, a principle of contract and statutory interpretation pursuant to which a lim- iting clause or phrase is read as modifying only the noun or phrase that immediately precedes it; e.g., Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Engineered Framing Systems, Inc., 327 Conn. 467, 475 , 174 A.3d 791 (2018); see also Connecticut Ins.

2012Eagle Hill Corp. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 2 Conn.App. 68, 75 , 477 A.2d 660 (1984); 2A N. Singer & J.

2012Eagle Hill Corp. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 2 Conn.App. 68, 75 , 477 A.2d 660 (1984); 2A N. Singer & J.

2019Guaranty Assn. v. Drown, 314 Conn. 161 , 190, 101 A.3d 200 (2014); unless the limiting language is separated from the preceding noun or phrase by a comma, in which case ‘‘one may infer that the qualifying phrase is intended to apply to all its antecedents, not only the one immediately preceding it.’’ State v. Rodriguez-Roman, 297 Conn. 66, 76 , 3 A.3d 783 (2010).

2019Guaranty Assn. v. Drown, 314 Conn. 161 , 190, 101 A.3d 200 (2014); unless the limiting language is separated from the preceding noun or phrase by a comma, in which case ‘‘one may infer that the qualifying phrase is intended to apply to all its antecedents, not only the one immediately preceding it.’’ State v. Rodriguez-Roman, 297 Conn. 66, 76 , 3 A.3d 783 (2010).

2019Applying the canon of statutory construction known as noscitur a sociis, which in Latin means ‘‘it is known by its associates’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Agron, 323 Conn. 629 , 635 n.3, 148 A.3d 1052 (2016); at least two courts also have concluded that, because the other items excluded from coverage under the collapse provisions of the policy generally are located outside of a home,11 the foundation exclusion is ambiguous insofar as it is not clear whether the exclu- sion applies to the foundation beneath an insured’s home or to some other foundation peripheral to the home.

2019Applying the canon of statutory construction known as noscitur a sociis, which in Latin means ‘‘it is known by its associates’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Agron, 323 Conn. 629 , 635 n.3, 148 A.3d 1052 (2016); at least two courts also have concluded that, because the other items excluded from coverage under the collapse provisions of the policy generally are located outside of a home,11 the foundation exclusion is ambiguous insofar as it is not clear whether the exclu- sion applies to the foundation beneath an insured’s home or to some other foundation peripheral to the home.

2014As a presumption, the rule is not inflexible and yields to any apparent contrary intention of the drafting parties.’’ [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Gullett v. Van Dyke Construction Co., 327 Mont. 30, 36 , 111 P.3d 220 (2005) (‘‘[i]n interpreting contracts, this [c]ourt has followed a basic rule of gram- matical construction that, absent the manifestation of a contrary intention, qualifying words and phrases should be applied only to the words or phrases immediately preceding, or in other words, the last antecedent’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Wohl v. Swinne

2014As a presumption, the rule is not inflexible and yields to any apparent contrary intention of the drafting parties.’’ [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Gullett v. Van Dyke Construction Co., 327 Mont. 30, 36 , 111 P.3d 220 (2005) (‘‘[i]n interpreting contracts, this [c]ourt has followed a basic rule of gram- matical construction that, absent the manifestation of a contrary intention, qualifying words and phrases should be applied only to the words or phrases immediately preceding, or in other words, the last antecedent’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Wohl v. Swinne

2014Co., 310 Wis. 2d 751 , 771–72, 751 N.W.2d 764 (2008); are merely means to an ultimate end, which is to deter- mine the intent of the parties to the insurance contract, with the understanding that the ‘‘[t]he provisions of the policy issued by the defendant cannot be construed in a vacuum. . . .

2014Co., 310 Wis. 2d 751 , 771–72, 751 N.W.2d 764 (2008); are merely means to an ultimate end, which is to deter- mine the intent of the parties to the insurance contract, with the understanding that the ‘‘[t]he provisions of the policy issued by the defendant cannot be construed in a vacuum. . . .

2014Reynolds Tobacco Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 516, 530 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (2003) (‘‘the last antecedent rule is not immutable and should not be rigidly applied in all cases’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Chandler-McPhail v. Duffey, 194 P.3d 434, 441 (Colo. App. 2008) (‘‘[W]e discern no reason why the last antecedent rule should not be applied as a grammatical presumption in determining the intent of the contracting parties. . . .

2014Reynolds Tobacco Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 516, 530 , 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (2003) (‘‘the last antecedent rule is not immutable and should not be rigidly applied in all cases’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Chandler-McPhail v. Duffey, 194 P.3d 434, 441 (Colo. App. 2008) (‘‘[W]e discern no reason why the last antecedent rule should not be applied as a grammatical presumption in determining the intent of the contracting parties. . . .

2014As a presumption, the rule is not inflexible and yields to any apparent contrary intention of the drafting parties.’’ [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); Gullett v. Van Dyke Construction Co., 327 Mont. 30, 36 , 111 P.3d 220 (2005) (‘‘[i]n interpreting contracts, this [c]ourt has followed a basic rule of gram- matical construction that, absent the manifestation of a contrary intention, qualifying words and phrases should be applied only to the words or phrases immediately preceding, or in other words, the last antecedent’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Wohl v. Swinne

1996State v. Brown, 486 A.2d 595 , 600 (R.I. 1985).