last antecedent rule in California

2024Under the first principle, known as the last antecedent rule, “‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’” (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 .) The second principle, known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “means that ‘the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed . . . .’” (Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice v. City of Moreno Valley (2018) 26 Cal.App

2024Under the first principle, known as the last antecedent rule, “‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’” (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 .) The second principle, known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “means that ‘the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed . . . .’” (Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice v. City of Moreno Valley (2018) 26 Cal.App

2024In evaluating this argument, we consider the last antecedent rule, a “ ‘longstanding rule of statutory construction[, which] . . . provides that “qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.” ’ ” (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743 .) Under this rule, “[a] limiting clause is to be confined to the last antecedent, unless the context or evident meaning requires a different construction.” (Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Compan

2023But even if the Guap report were a compilation of multiple records, we do not agree with Oakland’s reading of subdivision (b)(4) as permitting it to redact “assessments” of separate “incidents.” In arguing that “prior” modifies only “investigation” and not “assessment,” Oakland relies on the last antecedent rule and Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743 , which case explained: “ ‘A longstanding rule of statutory construction—the “last antecedent rule”—provides that “qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not

2022Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 530 [“The exemplar application of the last antecedent rule is a case where a modifying phrase appears after a list of multiple items or phrases”].) But more generally, the last antecedent rule can be understood to express the same rules of English word order discussed in part II.A., ante, meaning that a restrictive relative clause usually modifies the noun immediately preceding it.

2018Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516 , 529, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 .) Mr. Shine relies on the rule of natural construction, which provides an exception to the last antecedent rule: "[W]hen several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, ' " 'the natural construction of the language demands *685 that the clause be read as applicable to all.' " ' [Citation.]" ( Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735 , 743, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 28 P.3d 876 .) Williams-Sonoma argues that under the last antecedent rule, the phrase "pled in

2024In evaluating this argument, we consider the last antecedent rule, a “ ‘longstanding rule of statutory construction[, which] . . . provides that “qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.” ’ ” (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743 .) Under this rule, “[a] limiting clause is to be confined to the last antecedent, unless the context or evident meaning requires a different construction.” (Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Compan

2018No such situation is presented here." ( Id . at pp. 349-350, 75 Cal.Rptr. 739 .) The same is true here; our interpretation is not based on the last antecedent rule, it is merely supported by it.

2016Appeals Bd. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 705, 111 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] [the last antecedent rule is “not applicable when the natural construction of the language demands the clause be read as applicable to the first and other words, as well as to the last, or when the sense of the entire statute requires a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding words”].) Here, restricting the phrase “conducted by” state and local authorities to its nearest antecedent, “audit,” makes little sense.

2016Appeals Bd. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 705, 111 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] [the last antecedent rule is “not applicable when the natural construction of the language demands the clause be read as applicable to the first and other words, as well as to the last, or when the sense of the entire statute requires a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding words”].) Here, restricting the phrase “conducted by” state and local authorities to its nearest antecedent, “audit,” makes little sense.

2013Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 530 ; see In re Phelps (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 451, 456 .) One exception “provides that when several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, „the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.‟ [Citation] Another 29 provides that when the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding words, its application will not be restricted to the last.” (Renee J., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 743 .) These “exceptions

2013Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 530 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 ]; see In re Phelps (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 451, 456 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ].) One exception “provides that when several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, ‘ “ ‘the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.’ ” ’ [Citation] Another provides that when the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding words, its application will not be restricted to the last.” (Renee su

2022In ACS Systems, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 137 , for example, the court applied the last antecedent rule to a group of insurance policies that covered liability for “ ‘[m]aking known to any person or organization written or spoken material that violates 19 YAHOO INC. v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. an individual’s right of privacy.’ ” (Id. at p. 143.) The ACS Systems court read the clause “ ‘that violates an individual’s right of privacy’ ” as modifying only the word “ ‘material,’ ” not as modifying the phrase “ ‘[m]aking known.’ ” (Id

2022In ACS Systems, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 137 , for example, the court applied the last antecedent rule to a group of insurance policies that covered liability for “ ‘[m]aking known to any person or organization written or spoken material that violates 19 YAHOO INC. v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. an individual’s right of privacy.’ ” (Id. at p. 143.) The ACS Systems court read the clause “ ‘that violates an individual’s right of privacy’ ” as modifying only the word “ ‘material,’ ” not as modifying the phrase “ ‘[m]aking known.’ ” (Id

2020These two prior felony convictions for violating section 647.6 authorized the court to impose a four-year sentence on Graves under subdivision (c)(2). 7 There is an exception to the last antecedent rule “which ‘provides that “ ‘[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be applicable to all.’ ” ’ ” (Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 726 .) We are aware of no case that applies the exception to disregard the effect of clauses, like those in sec

2013The clause “in which the recovery of a fine, penalty, or restitution is sought by the Attorney General, any district attorney, any city prosecutor, or any county counsel” applies “as much to” “any criminal action or proceeding” as to “action or proceeding brought pursuant to [the UCL and FAL].” (See Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 726 [last antecedent rule did not apply because qualifying phrase “is just as applicable to the more remote [words] . . . as it is to the immediately preceding term”].) With the exception of county counsel (which we discuss below), the named public ent

2013(See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Travelers Companies, Inc. (10th Cir. 2009) 585 F.3d 1366, 1371-1372 [“while the rules of English grammar often afford a valuable starting point to understanding a speaker‟s meaning, they are violated so often by so many of us that they can hardly be safely relied upon as the end point of analysis”].) A. The last antecedent rule Mt.

2013(See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Travelers Companies, Inc. (10th Cir. 2009) 585 F.3d 1366, 1371-1372 [“while the rules of English grammar often afford a valuable starting point to understanding a speaker’s meaning, they are violated so often by so many of us that they can hardly be safely relied upon as the end point of any analysis”].) (A) The last antecedent rule Mt.

2010Under the last antecedent rule, “ ‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’ ” (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 646 P.2d 191 ], quoting Board of Port Commrs. v. Williams (1937) 9 Cal.2d 381, 389 [ 70 P.2d 918 ].) There is an exception to that rule, however, which “provides that ‘ “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural con

2010Under the last antecedent rule, “ ‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’ ” (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 646 P.2d 191 ], quoting Board of Port Commrs. v. Williams (1937) 9 Cal.2d 381, 389 [ 70 P.2d 918 ].) There is an exception to that rule, however, which “provides that ‘ “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural con

2019Rather, we 'instead interpret the statute as a whole, so as to make sense of the entire statutory scheme.' " ( Bonnell v. Medical Board (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255 , 1261, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 82 P.3d 740 .) We must also "interpret legislative enactments so as to avoid absurd results." ( People v. Torres (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1151 , 1158, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 836 .) *457 *741 C.

2019Rather, we 'instead interpret the statute as a whole, so as to make sense of the entire statutory scheme.' " ( Bonnell v. Medical Board (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255 , 1261, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 82 P.3d 740 .) We must also "interpret legislative enactments so as to avoid absurd results." ( People v. Torres (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1151 , 1158, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 836 .) *457 *741 C.

2019Rather, we 'instead interpret the statute as a whole, so as to make sense of the entire statutory scheme.' " ( Bonnell v. Medical Board (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255 , 1261, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 82 P.3d 740 .) We must also "interpret legislative enactments so as to avoid absurd results." ( People v. Torres (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1151 , 1158, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 836 .) *457 *741 C.

2019Rather, we 'instead interpret the statute as a whole, so as to make sense of the entire statutory scheme.' " ( Bonnell v. Medical Board (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255 , 1261, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 82 P.3d 740 .) We must also "interpret legislative enactments so as to avoid absurd results." ( People v. Torres (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1151 , 1158, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 836 .) *457 *741 C.

2022According to the last antecedent rule, “[r]elative and qualifying words and phrases, grammatically and legally, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.” (Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (1891) § 267, p. 349; see Black’s Law Dict., supra, pp. 1532–1533.) This rule of construction has been repeatedly recognized and applied by the United States Supreme Court (see, e.g., Lockhart v. United States (2016) 577 U.S. 347, 351 ; Barnhart v. Thomas (2003) 540 18 YAHOO INC. v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA Opinion of the Court by

2020Lockhart v. United States (2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___–___ [ 136 S.Ct. 958 , 963–964].) Under this “last antecedent rule,” we would understand the qualifying phrase “for usual current expenses” to modify its immediate antecedent — “appropriations” — and not the earlier-appearing phrase “tax levies.” Of course like all such interpretive rules, the last antecedent rule has its exceptions, such as when the qualifying language applies just as naturally to the earlier items in a list as the later items.

2018By construing the release in this manner, we give effect to the entire agreement and avoid rendering the general release contained in the first clause of the provision meaningless. ( Ibid. [every provision in instrument should be given effect if possible]; Super 7 Motel Associates v. Wang (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 541 , 546, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 193 [same].) *1081 The parties rely on competing rules for interpretation of a contract: Williams-Sonoma relies on the last antecedent rule, which is "a rule of statutory and contractual interpretation requiring that prepositional phrases be read to modify the p

2018By construing the release in this manner, we give effect to the entire agreement and avoid rendering the general release contained in the first clause of the provision meaningless. ( Ibid. [every provision in instrument should be given effect if possible]; Super 7 Motel Associates v. Wang (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 541 , 546, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 193 [same].) *1081 The parties rely on competing rules for interpretation of a contract: Williams-Sonoma relies on the last antecedent rule, which is "a rule of statutory and contractual interpretation requiring that prepositional phrases be read to modify the p

2013(Absher v. AutoZone, Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 332, 344 ; see U.S. Nat.

2013(Absher v. AutoZone, Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 332, 344 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 817 ]; see United States Nat.

2007One exception to that rule exists when “ ‘ “ ‘several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, [and] the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.’ ” ’ ” (Garcetti v. Superior Court, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121 .) A second exception is made when “ ‘the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding [words] . . . .’ ” “This is, of course, but another way of stating the fundamental rule that a court is to construe a statute ‘ “so as to

2003(Garcetti v. Superior Court (Blake) (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1121-1122 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 ].) Further support for this reading is supplied by the punctuation of the statute.

2022As formulated by this court, the rule provides that “ ‘ “qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding [them] and are not to be construed as extending to or including other[] [words or phrases] more remote.” ’ ” (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743 , quoting White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 ; see Los Angeles County v. Graves (1930) 210 Cal. 21 , 26–27.) The last antecedent rule is often applied where there is a list of terms, and the qualifying words or phrases follow the last item in the list.

2022As formulated by this court, the rule provides that “ ‘ “qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding [them] and are not to be construed as extending to or including other[] [words or phrases] more remote.” ’ ” (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743 , quoting White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 ; see Los Angeles County v. Graves (1930) 210 Cal. 21 , 26–27.) The last antecedent rule is often applied where there is a list of terms, and the qualifying words or phrases follow the last item in the list.

2014Similarly, “in connection with a public issue . . .” refers most sensibly to “conduct,” and least sensibly to “right [of free speech].” (Ibid.) The foregoing analysis disposes of defendants’ invocation of the so-called last antecedent rule, which declares that “ ‘ “qualifying words and phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.” ’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1114 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ] (Briggs), quoting White v. County

2014Similarly, “in connection with a public issue . . .” refers most sensibly to “conduct,” and least sensibly to “right [of free speech].” (Ibid.) The foregoing analysis disposes of defendants’ invocation of the so-called last antecedent rule, which declares that “ ‘ “qualifying words and phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.” ’ ” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1114 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ] (Briggs), quoting White v. County

2014The subordinate clause, “if the property is sold at a foreclosure sale and the tenant was required to move,” modifies the last antecedent “moving expenses” rather than the remote antecedent “actual damages.” (See Orthopedic Systems, Inc. v. Schlein (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 529, 545 [explaining the last antecedent rule of statutory construction].) Nothing in the plain language of subdivision (d) suggests that it was intended to apply only to tenants forced to move or forced to move prematurely.

2013Hawley argues that the use of the word “recovery” in the phrase “in which the recovery of a fine, penalty, or restitution is sought” by the named public agencies “reinforces [the] insurers‟ view that the list of lawyers applies only to civil actions” because a “prosecutor doesn‟t seek „recovery‟ of a conviction in a criminal case.” (Bodell, supra, 119 F.3d at p. 1421 (dis. opn. of Kozinski, J.).) 10 A third exception to the last antecedent rule is the presence of a comma between all of the antecedents and the qualifying phrase (here, between “any criminal action or proceeding” and “any action

2013Maxims of Construction The last antecedent rule “generally provides that ‘“qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.”’ [Citation.] However, ‘[e]vidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by a comma.’ [Citation.]” (Orthopedic Systems, Inc. v. Schlein (2011) 202 12 Cal.App.4th 529, 545 ; accord, People v. Lewis (2008)