last antecedent rule in Massachusetts

2015Furthermore, as a general rule of statutory and grammatical construction, a modifying clause is said to modify only that which immediately precedes it • — ■ here, the word “received.” See Taylor v. Burke, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2007), quoting from Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) (“The last antecedent rule is a ‘general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation’ ”).

2015Furthermore, as a general rule of statutory and grammatical construction, a modifying clause is said to modify only that which immediately precedes it -- here, the word "received." See Taylor v. Burke, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2007), quoting from Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) ("The last antecedent rule is a 'general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation'").

2016See, e.g., Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Commn., 324 Mass. 309, 312 (1949); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432 (1983). 18 In particular, we do not apply the last antecedent *639 rule when “there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose [of the statute] which requires a different interpretation.” Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934), and cases cited. c.

1996The last antecedent rule “is only a rule of construction to ascertain the legislative intent.” Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Comm’n, 324 Mass. 309, 312 (1949).

2015Furthermore, as a general rule of statutory and grammatical construction, a modifying clause is said to modify only that which immediately precedes it • — ■ here, the word “received.” See Taylor v. Burke, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2007), quoting from Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) (“The last antecedent rule is a ‘general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation’ ”).

2015Furthermore, as a general rule of statutory and grammatical construction, a modifying clause is said to modify only that which immediately precedes it -- here, the word "received." See Taylor v. Burke, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2007), quoting from Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) ("The last antecedent rule is a 'general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation'").

2025Of special relevance, "we assume that the Legislature intends its statutes to pass constitutional muster, and therefore 'we construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems where possible.'" Chapman, petitioner, 482 Mass. 293, 305-306 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Maloney, 447 Mass. 577, 589 (2006).

2025See Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016) ("When this Court has interpreted statutes that include a list of terms or phrases followed by a limiting clause, we have typically applied an interpretive strategy called the rule of the last antecedent," which "provides that a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows" [quotations and citations omitted]); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) ("It is the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confine

2025Specifically, pursuant to the last antecedent rule, the limiting language "for purposes of firearms competition" applies only to "alien[s] that reside[] outside the commonwealth." Because that limiting language does not apply to "nonresident[s]," the last antecedent rule implies that § 131F provides that a temporary license "shall be issued" to a nonresident not only for purposes of firearms competition but also for other purposes -- so long as the nonresident is "not a prohibited person and is not determined unsuitable." To be sure, "[t]he last antecedent rule is not always a certain guide."

2025Accs., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 631 , 638 n.17 (2016) ("a modifying clause is confined to the phrase that immediately precedes it and not to the phrases appearing earlier").[8] As applied to § 131F, the last antecedent rule validates the Commonwealth's position.

2025Of special relevance, "we assume that the Legislature intends its statutes to pass constitutional muster, and therefore 'we construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems where possible.'" Chapman, petitioner, 482 Mass. 293, 305-306 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Maloney, 447 Mass. 577, 589 (2006).

2024It explained that “[w]here several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.” Id., quoting Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920). -11- Here, in contrast, the two antecedents (“adds restrictions” and “amends any pre-existing restrictions”) are not contained in a single phrase; instead, each antecedent introduces much longer and independent phrases.

2016See, e.g., Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Commn., 324 Mass. 309, 312 (1949); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432 (1983). 18 In particular, we do not apply the last antecedent *639 rule when “there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose [of the statute] which requires a different interpretation.” Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934), and cases cited. c.

2011The hotel chiefly relies for its proposed reading of the provision on the last antecedent rule, “the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation.” Druzik v. Board of Health of Haverhill, 324 Mass. 129, 133 (1949), quoting from Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934).

2011Citing to this rule, the hotel maintains that the phrase, “which informs the patron that the fee does not represent a tip or service charge,” should modify only the last antecedent, “written description of that house or administrative fee,” and should not modify the first antecedent, “designation.” 14 The rule, however, has little ready application here since its common and most powerful use occurs where a list of multiple, distinct antecedents precedes the modifying clause. 15 See Druzik, supra at 132-133 ; Moulton v. Brookline Rent Control Bd., 385 *813 Mass. 228, 230-232 (1982); Herrick v.

2011See DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 497 n.12 (assuming rule of lenity applies in civil action when statutory violation may trigger criminal penalties, rule was not applicable because definition of “service charge” was not ambiguous in context of entire Act). 15 As with other canons of construction, the last antecedent rule is not always outcome determinative.

2011Where the dominant purpose of the Tips Act is to “protect gratuity payments given to, or intended for, service employees,” DiFiore, 454 Mass. at 496 , application of the last antecedent rule here would not serve the Act’s dominant purpose. 16 The hotel’s reading necessarily would leave the term “designation” entirely unmodified, an unlikely legislative drafting choice given that the term is not defined or described elsewhere in the statute. 17 Moreover, the presence of a comma prior to the modifying clause (“, which informs . . .”) is some indication that the clause is meant to apply to more t

1996See Russell v. Boston Wyman, Inc., 410 Mass. 1005, 1006 (1991), quoting United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751 (1st Cir. 1985) (“last antecedent rule” is that “qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to others more remote”).

1996See Russell v. Boston Wyman, Inc., 410 Mass. 1005, 1006 (1991), quoting United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751 (1st Cir. 1985) (“last antecedent rule” is that “qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to others more remote”).