last antecedent doctrine in Texas

2025Second, the majority’s interpretation ignores the last-antecedent doctrine, which provides “a qualifying phrase in [a statute] must be confined to the words and phrases immediately preceding it to which it may, without impairing the meaning of the sentence, be applied.” Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000); accord In the Interest of C.J.N.-S, 540 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Tex. 2018) (determining phrase “a parent of the child or another person having physical custody or guardianship of the child under a court order” gives standing to parents regardless of custody under last

2025In addressing that interpretation, however, it helps to notice that executive branch does not necessarily modify even the word “commission.” The Supreme Court of Texas has embraced the “doctrine of last antecedent” before, including in Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 34 SW 3d 578 (2000).

2022Lines Corp. v. U.S. Polyco, Inc. Page 10 Areas.” We do note, however, that the Texas Supreme Court has stated that the last- antecedent doctrine is “neither controlling nor inflexible.” Willmann, 216 S.W.2d at 176 .

2018As in Sullivan , we conclude that the absence of a comma after the term "premises" indicates an intent to limit the now-owned-by-Grantor modifier "to the last item in the series." If the clause had separated the now-owned-by-Grantor phrase from the rest of the clause by including a comma after the word premises, it might indicate an intent that the phrase modify "royalties," "minerals," and "premises," or perhaps even just the term "royalties." And it certainly would have indicated that intent had it saved and excepted 1/2 "of all royalties which are now owned by Grantor, from the production o

2015Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 , 124 S.Ct. 376 , 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003) (last antecedent rule not absolute and can be overcome by other indicia of meaning). 2 The last antecedent rule of construction means that “A or B with respect to C” contains two items: (1) “A” and (2) “B with respect to C.” Stepnowski v. Comm’r, 456 F.3d 320 , 324 n. 7 (3d Cir.2006).

2015Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 , 124 S.Ct. 376 , 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003) (last antecedent rule not absolute and can be overcome by other indicia of meaning). 2 The last antecedent rule of construction means that “A or B with respect to C” contains two items: (1) “A” and (2) “B with respect to C.” Stepnowski v. Comm’r, 456 F.3d 320 , 324 n. 7 (3d Cir.2006).

2005Jordan v. State, 36 S.W.3d 871, 874 (Tex. 2001) (“We interpret a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its language unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results.”).

2005Jordan v. State , 36 S.W.3d 871, 874 (Tex. 2001) ("We interpret a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its language unless the language is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results.").

2013Stewman Ranch, Inc., 192 S.W.3d at 812 (“relative and qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding them . . . .”). 2 The last antecedent rule of construction means that “A or B with respect to C” contains two items: (1) “A” and (2) “B with respect to C.” Stepnowski v. Comm’r, 456 F.3d 320 , 324 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006). 8 Woody makes a passing alternative claim that the notice provision of the sublease is ambiguous.

2006Ranch, Ltd., 192 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, pet. denied) ("One of the basic rules of grammatical construction is the doctrine of last antecedent.”). 3 .

2015This rule is related to the last antecedent doctrine of statutory interpretation, which provides that “a qualifying phrase should be applied only to the portion of the sentence ‘immediately preceding it.’” Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 185 (quoting City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562 , 571 n. 14 (Tex.2012)).

2015And what parties could claim to have damages as the result of the injury or death of a patient but spouses The Court's conclusion that a health care liability or relatives with their own claims for loss of support or claim for breach of a safety standard depends entirely *198 consortium or mental anguish, or others acting in a on the last antecedent doctrine, 371 S.W.3d at 182 , or representative capacity, such as an estate or next friend? the notion that “ ‘[m]odifiers should come, if possible, In light of that history, it seems fairly obvious that the next to the words they modify.’ ” 371 S.

2025Second, the majority’s interpretation ignores the last-antecedent doctrine, which provides “a qualifying phrase in [a statute] must be confined to the words and phrases immediately preceding it to which it may, without impairing the meaning of the sentence, be applied.” Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000); accord In the Interest of C.J.N.-S, 540 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Tex. 2018) (determining phrase “a parent of the child or another person having physical custody or guardianship of the child under a court order” gives standing to parents regardless of custody under last

2018See, e.g. , In re C.J.N.-S. , No. 16-0909, 540 S.W.3d 589 , 590-92 (Tex. 2018) (applying last-antecedent doctrine to statute that grants standing to "a parent of the child or another person having physical custody or guardianship of the child under a court order," and holding that phrase "under a court order" does not modify the phrase "a parent of the child"). *122 The Perrymans and EOG, however, rely on two court of appeals decisions they contend reach the opposite result.

2024However, we quote directly from Yohe’s affidavit. 8 series, to include “affliates.” Contrast that with the “Last-Antecedent-Canon” that instructs “A pronoun, relative pronoun, or demonstrative adjective generally refers to the nearest reasonable antecedent.” Id. 144 ; see also In re ReadyOne Indus., Inc., 394 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) (“Similarly, the last antecedent rule states that a qualifying phrase in a statute must be confined to the words and phrases immediately preceding it to which it may, without impairing the meaning of the sentence, be applied.”).

2015CODE ANN.§ 1304.1581(b)-(c) (West 2012); see In re Readyone Indus., Inc., 394 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding) (explaining the last antecedent rule, in which a qualifying phrase in a statute modifies "the words and phrases immediately preceding it to which it may, without impairing the meaning of the sentence, be applied").

2018In support of its contention, Mewbourne cites In re Finley, 220 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

2015Relevant to the structure of subsection 61.003(a)(4), the doctrine of the last antecedent provides that "a qualifying phrase in a statute . . . must be confined to the words and phrases immediately preceding it to which it may, without impairing the meaning of the sentence, be applied." Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000); accord In re Guardianship of Finley, 220 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

2016See Mikob Props., Inc. v. Joachim, 468 S.W.3d 587, 596 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).

2016See Mikob Props., Inc. v. Joachim, 468 S.W.3d 587, 596 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2015, pet. denied).

2015This rule is related to the last antecedent doctrine of statutory interpretation, which provides that “a qualifying phrase should be applied only to the portion of the sentence ‘immediately preceding it.’” Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 185 (quoting City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562 , 571 n. 14 (Tex.2012)).

2015The fact that subsection (a)(1) uses “court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other expenses 4 See also Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 184 (applying the last antecedent rule to Section 74.001(a)(13) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which states in part: “claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant” and finding that the phrase “directly related to health care” only modified “professional or administrative s

2010See Barhnart v. Thomas , 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003); Laredo Road , 389 F. Supp. 2d at 735 ; Rowan Cos. v. Wilmington Trust Co. , 305 S.W.3d 698 , 710–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. filed).

2010See Barhnart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 , 124 S.Ct. 376 , 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003); Laredo Road, 389 F.Supp.2d at 735 ; Rowan Cos. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 305 S.W.3d 698, 710-11 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. filed).

2023Standing alone, either canon “might reasonably apply to this text,” the court of appeals explained, but “ ‘[p]unctuation is a permissible indicator of meaning,’ ” and “based on the absence of a comma” before the “as are agreed in writing” phrase, that phrase “appears to only apply to ‘other items in or adjacent to the [property],’ as suggested by the last-antecedent doctrine.” Id. at *5 (quoting Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex. 2016)).

2021TPG Owner relies on several interpretative canons, including (1) the scope-of-subparts canon, which instructs that “[m]aterial within an indented subpart relates only to that subpart,”12 (2) the last-antecedent rule, which instructs that “qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding [them], and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote,”13 (3) the instruction to construe contracts according to their plain language,14 and (4) the instruction against reading a contract in a way that renders certain words meani

2021TPG Owner relies on several interpretative canons, including (1) the scope-of-subparts canon, which instructs that “[m]aterial within an indented subpart relates only to that subpart,”12 (2) the last-antecedent rule, which instructs that “qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding [them], and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote,”13 (3) the instruction to construe contracts according to their plain language,14 and (4) the instruction against reading a contract in a way that renders certain words meani

2021Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 443 (Tex. 2017). 35 section 2.4 of the Construction Contract.

2021TPG Owner relies on several interpretative canons, including (1) the scope-of-subparts canon, which instructs that “[m]aterial within an indented subpart relates only to that subpart,”12 (2) the last-antecedent rule, which instructs that “qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding [them], and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote,”13 (3) the instruction to construe contracts according to their plain language,14 and (4) the instruction against reading a contract in a way that renders certain words meani

2015See, e.g., DLB Architects, P.C. v. Weaver, 305 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Tex. App.―Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (“Every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose, and every word excluded from a statute must also be presumed to be excluded for a purpose.”).

2009Nurse Benish’s brief raises three issues. 4: See Lewis v. Funderburk , 253 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. 2008) (authorizing appeal from trial court order determining that expert report was adequate and denying motion to dismiss). 5: Because we do not decide whether Appellants provided emergency medical care, we do not address the portions of Dr. Dingler and Nurse Hopson’s subissues arguing that Amarissa was not “stable” when she arrived at the emergency room on the day of her death; we likewise need not address the Grotties’ argument that the wilful and wanton negligence standard of proof is an affirm

2005Neither party disputes the facts found by the court. 2 “Statutory construction is a matter of law, which we review de novo.” City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003).

2002It has been suggested in a brief submitted to this office that, in line with the doctrine of the last antecedent, see, e.g., In re M.A.M., 35 S.W.3d 788,790 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 200 1, no pet.), the phrase “ordered to be paid by a court” might be held only to modify “fines, fees, restitution, and other debts or costs” and not “the more remote words ‘debts and accounts receivable’ .“3 One principal difficulty with this argument is that the phrase “such as fines, fees, restitutions, and other debts or costs” is a single illustrative series referring precisely to “debts and accounts receivable.” F

2001Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 9 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex.App.-Dallas), aff'd, 34 S.W.3d 578 (Tex.2000).

2001Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 9 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex.App.—Dallas), aff 'd, 34 S.W.3d 578 (Tex.2000).

1979Quindlen v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 482 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir. 1973); City of Corsicana v. Willmann, 147 Tex. 377 , 216 S.W.2d 175, 176 (1949).