last antecedent doctrine in Illinois

2022The Department argues that the phrase “would jeopardize the security of the system or its data or the security of materials exempt under this Section” modifies only the catchall phrase “any other information” and not “file layouts” based on an application of the last antecedent canon of statutory -9- 1-20-0547 interpretation. ¶ 24 “The last antecedent doctrine, a long-recognized grammatical canon of statutory construction, provides that relative or qualifying words, phrases, or clauses are applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding them and are not construed as extending to or inclu

2022The phrase “signed by a judge” modifies both a “copy of the judgment” and “memorandum.” See In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 468 (2008) (under “corollary rule to the last antecedent rule,” a “qualifying phrase [can] apply to [two] preceding phrases”). ¶ 24 Indeed, plaintiff’s position that “signed by a judge” modifies only “copy of the judgment” would lead to three absurd results that we must presume the legislature did not intend.

2005In Davis , this court explained that in addition to the last antecedent doctrine, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is used to interpret statutes by providing that "when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes `other persons or things,' the word `other' is interpreted as meaning `other such like.'" Davis, 199 Ill.2d at 138 , 262 Ill.Dec. 721 , 766 N.E.2d 641 , quoting Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill.2d 432, 436 , 328 N.E.2d 318 (1975).

2005In Davis, this court explained that in addition to the last antecedent doctrine, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is used to interpret statutes by providing that “when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted as meaning ‘other such like.’ ” Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 138 , quoting Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975).

2005In Davis , this court explained that in addition to the last antecedent doctrine, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is used to interpret statutes by providing that "when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes `other persons or things,' the word `other' is interpreted as meaning `other such like.'" Davis, 199 Ill.2d at 138 , 262 Ill.Dec. 721 , 766 N.E.2d 641 , quoting Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill.2d 432, 436 , 328 N.E.2d 318 (1975).

2005In Davis, this court explained that in addition to the last antecedent doctrine, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is used to interpret statutes by providing that “when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the word ‘other’ is interpreted as meaning ‘other such like.’ ” Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 138 , quoting Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975).

2008McMahan v. Industrial Comm’n, 183 Ill. 2d 499, 511-12 (1998).

2008McMahan v. The Industrial Commission, 183 Ill.2d 499, 511-12 , 234 Ill.Dec. 205 , 702 N.E.2d *364 545 (1998).

2021Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016); see also Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (1996) (it is generally accepted that a qualifying phrase refers solely to the last antecedent).

2017This canon is inapplicable to the statutory language at issue in this case, since the canon refers solely to “referential and qualifying phrase[s]” that are preceded by multiple clauses (Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 26-27 (1996)), whereas in this case, the word “final” comes before the phrase “judgment or order of court.” ¶ 21 Finally, the Clerk contends that Gassman’s interpretation of the statute would create practical difficulties for the Clerk’s office in multiple ways.

2015As here, "[w]here the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to canons of statutory construction such as the last-antecedent rule." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Department of Transportation v. Singh, 393 Ill.

2015As here, “[w]here the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to canons of statutory construction such as the last-antecedent rule.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Department of Transportation v. Singh, 393 Ill.

2007See Bowman v. American River Transportation Co., 217 Ill. 2d 75, 83 (2005) (stating the doctrine for statutes). -5-

2007See Bowman v. American River Transportation Co., 217 Ill. 2d 75, 83 (2005) (stating the doctrine for statutes).

2005People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 138 , 262 Ill.Dec. 721 , 766 N.E.2d 641 (2002); McMahan v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ill.2d 499, 511-12 , 234 Ill.Dec. 205 , 702 N.E.2d 545 (1998); In re Application for *954 Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill.2d 161, 169 , 212 Ill.Dec. 215 , 656 N.E.2d 1049 (1995); Hutton, 341 Ill.App.3d at 406 , 276 Ill.Dec. 950 , 795 N.E.2d 303 .

2005People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 138 (2002); McMahan v. Industrial Comm’n, 183 Ill. 2d 499, 511-12 (1998); In re Application for Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 169 (1995); Hutton, 341 Ill.

2004In applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis and the last antecedent rule, the court also determined that the pellet/BB gun did not fit within the second clause, “any other deadly or dangerous weapon or instrument of like nature.” The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes “other persons or things,” the word “other” is interpreted as meaning “other such like.” Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975), quoting People v. Capuzi, 20 Ill. 2d 486, 493-94 (1960).

2004In applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis and the last antecedent rule, the court also determined that the pellet/BB gun did not fit within the second clause, "any other deadly or dangerous weapon or instrument of like nature." The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then includes "other persons or things," the word "other" is interpreted as meaning "other such like." Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co. , 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975), quoting People v. Capuzi , 20 Ill. 2d 486, 493-94 (1960).

1982Under the last-antecedent rule of statutory construction, which is followed in Illinois (City of Mount Carmel v. Partee (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 371, 375 ), the qualifying phrase “in this State” modifies the immediate preceding word “messages.” This supports the conclusion that the Act authorized taxation only on messages which both begin and end in Illinois.

1982Under the last-antecedent rule of statutory construction, which is followed in Illinois ( City of Mount Carmel v. Partee (1979), 74 Ill.2d 371, 375 ), the qualifying phrase "in this State" modifies the immediate preceding word "messages." This supports the conclusion that the Act authorized taxation only on messages which both begin and end in Illinois.

2021We disagree. ¶ 88 Pursuant to the last antecedent rule, “ ‘[i]n the construction of written instruments a qualifying phrase is to be confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the instrument which requires a different construction.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Curry, 21 Ill.

2020We disagree. ¶ 88 Pursuant to the last antecedent rule, “ ‘[i]n the construction of written instruments a qualifying phrase is to be confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the instrument which requires a different construction.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Curry, 21 Ill.

2021App. 2d 343, 349 (1959) (quoting City Trust, Safe Deposit & Surety Co. v. Lee, 204 Ill. 69, 71-72 (1903)); see also Johnson-Maday v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 276 Ill.

2020App. 2d 343, 349 (1959) (quoting City Trust, Safe Deposit & Surety Co. of Philadelphia v. Lee, 204 Ill. 69, 71-72 (1903)); see also Johnson-Maday v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 276 Ill.

2021Sykes v. Schmitz, 2019 IL App (1st) 180458, ¶ 39 .

2021See Sykes, 2019 IL App (1st) 180458, ¶ 39 .

2021Pursuant to the last antecedent rule, “relative or qualifying words are normally interpreted as modifying those words or phrases which immediately precede them and not those words which are more remote.” Illinois Department of Revenue v. Country Gardens, Inc., 145 Ill.

2020Pursuant to the last antecedent rule, “relative or qualifying words are normally interpreted as modifying those words or phrases which immediately precede them and not those which are more remote.” Illinois Department of Revenue v. Country Gardens, Inc., 145 Ill.

2021App. 2d 343, 349 (1959) (quoting City Trust, Safe Deposit & Surety Co. v. Lee, 204 Ill. 69, 71-72 (1903)); see also Johnson-Maday v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 276 Ill.

2021See Johnson-Maday, 276 Ill.

2015Illini Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Elsah Hills Corp., 112 Ill.

2015Illini Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Elsah Hills Corp., 112 Ill.

2005People v. Wittenmyer, 151 Ill. 2d 175, 195 (1992).

2005People v. Wittenmyer , 151 Ill. 2d 175, 195 (1992).

2005Section 33B — 1(d)(2) requires that the “third offense” be committed “within 20 years of the date that judgment was entered on the first conviction, provided, however, that time spent in custody shall not be counted.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant marshals in his cause the last-antecedent rule, which requires that “relative or qualifying words, phrases, or clauses are to be applied to the words immediately preceding, and do not modify words, phrases, or clauses which are more remote.” People v. Storms, 254 Ill.

2005Section 33B--1(d)(2) requires that the "third offense" be committed "within 20 years of the date that judgment was entered on the first conviction, provided, however, that time spent in custody shall not be counted ." (Emphasis added.) Defendant marshals in his cause the last- antecedent rule, which requires that "relative or qualifying words, phrases, or clauses are to be applied to the words immediately preceding, and do not modify words, phrases, or clauses which are more remote." People v. Storms , 254 Ill.

2000K.B.J., 305 Ill.App.3d at 922-23, 238 Ill.Dec. 1007 , 713 N.E.2d at 257.

2000K.B.J., 305 Ill.

1999See People v. Bartlett, 294 Ill.

1999See People v. Bartlett , 294 Ill.

2011At the same time, we note that in, Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 134 , 48 N.E.2d 508 (1943), the supreme court, construing the predecessor of Rule 183, said unqualifiedly that the rule does not permit the enlargement of "limitation periods fixed by a statute." This seems to suggest that Rule 183 gives no authority to enlarge any time limitation fixed by statute.

2011At the same time, we note that in, Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127, 134 , 48 N.E.2d 508 (1943), the supreme court, construing the predecessor of Rule 183, said unqualifiedly that the rule does not permit the enlargement of "limitation periods fixed by a statute." This seems to suggest that Rule 183 gives no authority to enlarge any time limitation fixed by statute.

2023Moreover, MariWorks’s interpretation violates the last-antecedent rule of grammar, “according to which a limiting clause or phrase *** should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). ¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, we reject MariWorks’s argument and hold that section 1300.405(a)(2) of the Code requires a cannabis-infuser applicant to provide position descriptions for all positions it includes in its organizational chart, regardless of whether the positions have been filled at the time of application. ¶ 19

2023Louis Board of Election 6 Commissions, 2015 IL 118929, ¶¶ 36-37 (holding that while substantial compliance can apply in the context of the Election Code, strict compliance was required for a provision mandating a specific number of signatures before a candidate could be placed on a ballot); Scott v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 140570, ¶¶ 2-5 (involving two municipal ordinances requiring an individual who seeks to invalidate a zoning ordinance to provide pre-suit notice to all property owners who would be affected by the invalidation); Kennedy v. City of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 210492

2023Louis Board of Election 6 Commissions, 2015 IL 118929, ¶¶ 36-37 (holding that while substantial compliance can apply in the context of the Election Code, strict compliance was required for a provision mandating a specific number of signatures before a candidate could be placed on a ballot); Scott v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 140570, ¶¶ 2-5 (involving two municipal ordinances requiring an individual who seeks to invalidate a zoning ordinance to provide pre-suit notice to all property owners who would be affected by the invalidation); Kennedy v. City of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 210492

2022See Souza, 2021 IL App (2d) 200047 , ¶ 43.