second component test (Wisconsin) · Go Syfert
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second component test in Wisconsin

5 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Rabegreen
wis · 1980 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991Id. at 63 , 291 N.W.2d at 816 (emphasis added; citation omitted).

1991Id. at 63 , 291 N.W.2d at 816 (emphasis added; citation omitted).

11
United States v. Leogreen
wied · 1976 · cited in 1 Wisconsin opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
1 sentence

1980The second component of the test for multiplicity focuses on the legislative intent as to the allowable unit of prosecution under the statute in question. [11] We conclude that the four counts charged in this case related to separate and distinct offenses and, for the reasons discussed below, the counts are not multiplicitous under either component of the test. [12] The test uniformly used in Wisconsin to determine multiplicity is the "additional fact" test, which examines "whether each count requires proof of an additional fact which the other count or counts do not." United States *64 v. Leo

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Pitsch green
wis · 1985
2 sentences

1993Id. at 640-41 , 369 N.W.2d at 718 .

1993Id. at 640-41 , 369 N.W.2d at 718 .

21993–1993
Steele v. State green
wis · 1980
2 sentences

2025However, citing Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72 , 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980), the State argues that “Wisconsin law barred McCandless from using the psychological evidence to argue that she lacked the requisite mens rea.” In Steele, our supreme court stated that “repeated reasoned statements of this court have amply demonstrated a sufficient state justification for the exclusion of expert opinion testimony on mental capacity to form an intent in the guilt phase of a bifurcated [NGI] trial.” Id. at 85 .

2025However, citing Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72 , 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980), the State argues that “Wisconsin law barred McCandless from using the psychological evidence to argue that she lacked the requisite mens rea.” In Steele, our supreme court stated that “repeated reasoned statements of this court have amply demonstrated a sufficient state justification for the exclusion of expert opinion testimony on mental capacity to form an intent in the guilt phase of a bifurcated [NGI] trial.” Id. at 85 .

12025–2025

Where else courts name it

IA 5 (1984–1989) WI 5 (1980–2025) CA 5 (1996–2015) WA 3 (1990–2002) UT 3 (1994–2007) LA 2 (1990–2022) TN 2 (1999–2000)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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