section 14 legal disqualification in Texas

1983Jim Pfau Tire, Inc., supra, 630 S.W.2d at 806 .

1979Justice Daniel in his concurring opinion in Trader v. Dear, supra, states that “Even a court of continuing jurisdiction, however, is bound by the mandatory language of Section 14.-10.

1979It must grant a writ of habeas corpus for the delivery of possession of a child in accordance with an existing court order without any delay for separate or simultaneous consideration of a pending motion for modification of the existing custody order and without consideration of the best interests of the child. . . .” In Lamphere v. Chrisman, supra, Chief Justice Greenhill discusses the effect of § 14.10, supra, on motions for change of custody raised at a habeas corpus proceeding and states: “ . . .

1947In the instant case, the agreement is that the lease be taken in the name of appellant, and the judgment sought and obtained is not one to change this record title, except in so far as a judgment declaring appellee’s interest in the leases and that appellant holds such interest in trust for appellee be notice of that fact.” See also: Sorrells v. Coffield, 144 Tex. 31 , 187 S.W.2d 980 , Tex.Civ.App., 183 S. W.2d 223 ; Smith v. Rampy, Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d 592 .

1947In the instant case, the agreement is that the lease be taken in the name of appellant, and the judgment sought and obtained is not one to change this record title, except in so far as a judgment declaring appellee’s interest in the leases and that appellant holds such interest in trust for appellee be notice of that fact.” See also: Sorrells v. Coffield, 144 Tex. 31 , 187 S.W.2d 980 , Tex.Civ.App., 183 S. W.2d 223 ; Smith v. Rampy, Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d 592 .

1947In the instant case, the agreement is that the lease be taken in the name of appellant, and the judgment sought and obtained is not one to change this record title, except in so far as a judgment declaring appellee’s interest in the leases and that appellant holds such interest in trust for appellee be notice of that fact.” See also: Sorrells v. Coffield, 144 Tex. 31 , 187 S.W.2d 980 , Tex.Civ.App., 183 S. W.2d 223 ; Smith v. Rampy, Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d 592 .

1947In the instant case, the agreement is that the lease be taken in the name of appellant, and the judgment sought and obtained is not one to change this record title, except in so far as a judgment declaring appellee’s interest in the leases and that appellant holds such interest in trust for appellee be notice of that fact.” See also: Sorrells v. Coffield, 144 Tex. 31 , 187 S.W.2d 980 , Tex.Civ.App., 183 S. W.2d 223 ; Smith v. Rampy, Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d 592 .

1940Appellants also cite Service Drilling Co. v. Woods, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 608 ; that case is not in point but falls within the rule of construction invoked in the Reagan County case on the three points summarized above.