section 241(6) causes of action in New York

1997"To make out a prima facie cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), plaintiff! ] must allege that defendant! ] violated a rule or regulation of the Commissioner of Labor that sets forth a specific standard of conduct as opposed to a general reiteration of common-law principles” (Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972, 973 ; see, Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec.

1996"To make out a prima facie cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), plaintiffs must allege that defendants violated a rule or regulation of the Commissioner of Labor that sets forth a specific standard of conduct as opposed to a general reiteration of common-law principles” (Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972, 973 ).

2015Plaintiff does, however, have a viable cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6) as premised on an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (2), which, inter alia, requires that “working areas” be kept free from scattered tools (see Harkin v City of New York, 69 AD3d 901 [2d Dept 2010]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) is inapplicable as plaintiff fell within a work shanty, not a passageway (see e.g.

2015Plaintiff does, however, have a viable cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6) as premised on an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (2), which, inter alia, requires that “working areas” be kept free from scattered tools (see Harkin v City of New York, 69 AD3d 901 [2d Dept 2010]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) is inapplicable as plaintiff fell within a work shanty, not a passageway (see e.g.

2015Zieris v City of New York, 93 AD3d 479 [1st Dept 2012]; O’Sullivan v IDI Constr.

2015Zieris v City of New York, 93 AD3d 479 [1st Dept 2012]; O’Sullivan v IDI Constr.

2011Moreover, the fourth cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6) was not applicable to the City defendants, since they were not owners or contractors, or statutory agents thereof, within the meaning of that statute (see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d at 317-318 ; Lopes v Interstate Concrete, 293 AD2d at 579 ).

1995"An implicit precondition to [the duty imposed by Labor Law § 200] to provide a safe place to work is that the party charged with that responsibility have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury to enable it to avoid or correct an unsafe condition [citation omitted]” (Russin v Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317 ; see, Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 ; D’Amico v New York Racing Assn., 203 AD2d 509 ; Walsh v Sweet Assocs., 172 AD2d 111, 113 , lv denied 79 NY2d 755 ; Lachajezyk v Schriber, 155 AD2d 874 ; Nowak v Smith & Mahoney, 110 AD2d 288, 289 )

1997Co., 81 NY2d 494, 502-504 ; Dombrowski v Schwartz, 217 AD2d 914, 915 ).

1997To make out a prima facie cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), plaintiffs must allege that defendant violated a rule or regulation of the Commissioner of Labor that sets forth a specific standard of conduct as opposed to a reiteration of common-law principles (see, id., at 502-505; White v Sperry Supply & Warehouse, 225 AD2d 130, 134 ; Dombrowski v Schwartz, 217 AD2d 914, 915 ).

2023We further agree with Northeast, Hamburg, and Militello that the court erred in denying those parts of the motions of Northeast and Hamburg for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) causes of action insofar as they are premised on an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (b) (1) (i), which applies to any "hazardous opening into which a person may step or fall . . . provided that [it is] one of significant depth and size" ( Wrobel v Town of Pendleton , 120 AD3d 963 , 966 [4th Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Ellis v J.M.G., Inc. , 31 AD3d 1220 , 1221 [4th

2022The defendants' evidence established, prima facie, that the work being performed was directly related to the residential uses of their property ( see Bartoo v Buell , 87 NY2d at 369 ; Nicholas v Phillips , 151 AD3d at 731 ; Kosinski v Brendan Moran Custom Carpentry, Inc. , 138 AD3d 935, 937 ; Umanzor v Charles Hofer Painting & Wallpapering, Inc. , 48 AD3d 552, 553 ), and it is undisputed that they did not direct or control the work.

2022The defendants' evidence established, prima facie, that the work being performed was directly related to the residential uses of their property ( see Bartoo v Buell , 87 NY2d at 369 ; Nicholas v Phillips , 151 AD3d at 731 ; Kosinski v Brendan Moran Custom Carpentry, Inc. , 138 AD3d 935, 937 ; Umanzor v Charles Hofer Painting & Wallpapering, Inc. , 48 AD3d 552, 553 ), and it is undisputed that they did not direct or control the work.

2022The defendants' evidence established, prima facie, that the work being performed was directly related to the residential uses of their property ( see Bartoo v Buell , 87 NY2d at 369 ; Nicholas v Phillips , 151 AD3d at 731 ; Kosinski v Brendan Moran Custom Carpentry, Inc. , 138 AD3d 935, 937 ; Umanzor v Charles Hofer Painting & Wallpapering, Inc. , 48 AD3d 552, 553 ), and it is undisputed that they did not direct or control the work.

2021Mgt., PLLC , 121 AD3d 877, 878 ; Giovanniello v E.W.

2021The plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability on the Labor Law § 241(6) causes of action predicated upon 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) and (e), as the record revealed the existence of triable issues of fact as to whether there were violations of those provisions which were a proximate cause of accident ( see Fazekas v Time Warner Cable, Inc. , 132 AD3d 1401, 1404-1405 ; Arenas v Bon-Ton Dept.

2021However, the construction manager and Queens Ball Park were not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) causes of action predicated upon 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) and (e) insofar as asserted against them. "[T]o establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's violation of a specific rule or regulation was a proximate cause of the accident" ( Seaman v Bellmore Fire Dist. , 59 AD3d 515, 516 ; see Creese v Long Is.

2021Stores, Inc. , 35 AD3d 1205, 1206 ).

2014Plaintiffs raise no issues on appeal with respect to section 240 (1) and thus are deemed to have abandoned any issues with respect thereto (see Hale v Odd Fellow & Rebekah Health Care Facility, 302 AD2d 948, 949 ; Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 984 ). -2- 1373 CA 13-00925 We reject plaintiffs’ contention on their appeal that defendant was liable pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6) as an agent of the District.

2014Defendants failed to demonstrate, with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim, that 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) is inapplicable to this case, given plaintiffs testimony that the she tripped over the electrical cord in the passageway (see Thomas v Goldman Sachs Headquarters, LLC, 109 AD3d 421 [1st Dept 2013]).

2014Plaintiffs raise no issues on appeal with respect to section 240 (1) and thus are deemed to have abandoned any issues with respect thereto (see Hale v Odd Fellow & Rebekah Health Care Facility, 302 AD2d 948, 949 ; Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984, 984 ). -2- 1373 CA 13-00925 We reject plaintiffs’ contention on their appeal that defendant was liable pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6) as an agent of the District.

2013Assoc., LLC, 100 AD3d 607 , 608 [2d Dept 2012]).

2012Under the homeowner’s exemption, owners of a one- or two-family dwelling are exempt from liability under Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 unless they directed or controlled the work being performed (see Bartoo v Buell, 87 NY2d 362, 367 [1996]; Cannon v Putnam, 76 NY2d 644 [1990]; Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121 [2008]).