diligence requirement in California

2026(See Younessi, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145 [“Given the absence of evidence explaining the seven-week delay in seeking to set aside the dismissal, the diligence requirement was not satisfied”].) 27 DISPOSITION The judgment of dismissal and order denying the motion to set-aside judgment are affirmed.

2025(See Younessi, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145 [“Given the absence of evidence explaining the seven-week delay in seeking to set aside the dismissal, the diligence requirement was not satisfied”].) 27 DISPOSITION The judgment of dismissal and order denying the motion to set-aside judgment are affirmed.

2021Wks. v. McCoy (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 27, 30 ; see also Broden v. Marin Humane Society (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1222 [“A motion to 31 reopen is also subject to a diligence requirement”]; Horning, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 209 .) “[A] trial court may properly refuse to reopen a case for introduction of further testimony, or other additional evidence, where there has not been a sufficient showing of any excuse for not having produced the evidence at trial [citation], or where there is no showing of diligence. [Citation.]” (Estate of Horman (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 796, 807 .) Pini acknowledged

2005(See Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1052-1053 [denial of motion to reopen not an abuse of discretion where failure to introduce evidence earlier was the product of trial tactics]; Broden v. Marin Humane Society (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1222 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 1212 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 ] [motion to reopen is subject to a diligence requirement].) VI Trial Court’s Award of Attorney Fees Was Not an Abuse of Discretion The trial court found that Shilberg was the prevailing party and awarded contractual attorney fees to Shilberg of $80,373 plus $5,558.72 as costs.

2021It is more accurate to say that coram nobis is one type of motion to vacate the judgment.” (Cal. Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2017) § 41.25.) That treatise summarizes the prerequisites for the writ, including the rule that a petition may be denied “for undue delay in bringing it after knowing of the need and for delay in developing the facts.” (Ibid., citing People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1098 .) In stating that “[m]otions to vacate the judgment are not limited to motions that could also be writs of error coram nobis” (ibid.), the treatise does not imply, as Colt ar

2015People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893 , 908-[90]9.” 3 did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be justified.’ [Citation.]” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 244 ; see also People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1097-1098 [“The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated”].) “Controll

2010Development Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 725 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 882 ]; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ] [“information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it . . .” in previous motion]; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [“strict requirement of diligence”]; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 317 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ]; Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1013

2010Development Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 725 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 882 ]; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ] [“information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it . . .” in previous motion]; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [“strict requirement of diligence”]; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 317 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ]; Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1013

2013(See Baldwin v. Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1199 [“Without a diligence requirement the number of times a court could be required to reconsider its prior orders would be limited only by the ability of counsel to belatedly conjure a legal theory different from those previously rejected, which is not much of a limitation”].) Accordingly, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny the motion for reconsideration.

2010Development Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 725 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 882 ]; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ] [“information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it . . .” in previous motion]; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [“strict requirement of diligence”]; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 317 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ]; Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1013

2014(Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1577 .) Respondent raises no procedural issues that would bar our consideration of appellant’s appeal from the denial of her motion to reconsider, and we proceed to the merits of that claim. 3 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 5 explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time.’ [Citation.]” (Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342 .) This diligence requirement is also applicable when the motion for reconsideration is based on different law.

1997(See, e.g., Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 ]; Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 195 ]; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 317 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ]; Jade K. v. Viguri (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1467 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 907 ].) It was recently claimed, however, that the diligence requirement established under the Blue Mountain Development Co. line of cases was eliminated by the 1992 amendment of section 1008.

1997(See, e.g., Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 ]; Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 195 ]; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 317 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ]; Jade K. v. Viguri (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1467 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 907 ].) It was recently claimed, however, that the diligence requirement established under the Blue Mountain Development Co. line of cases was eliminated by the 1992 amendment of section 1008.

1997(See, e.g., Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 695 ]; Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 195 ]; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 317 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ]; Jade K. v. Viguri (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1467 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 907 ].) It was recently claimed, however, that the diligence requirement established under the Blue Mountain Development Co. line of cases was eliminated by the 1992 amendment of section 1008.

2010Development Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 725 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 882 ]; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ] [“information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it . . .” in previous motion]; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [“strict requirement of diligence”]; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 317 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ]; Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1013

2010Development Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 725 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 882 ]; New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ] [“information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it . . .” in previous motion]; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [“strict requirement of diligence”]; Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 317 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 649 ]; Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1013

2009(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 779 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 ] [“a habeas corpus petitioner, like a petitioner who mounts a collateral attack by petition for writ of [error] coram nobis,” must allege facts showing due diligence].) The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated. “[I]t is the trial that is the m

2009(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 779 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 ] [“a habeas corpus petitioner, like a petitioner who mounts a collateral attack by petition for writ of [error] coram nobis,” must allege facts showing due diligence].) The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated. “[I]t is the trial that is the m

2005(See Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1052-1053 [denial of motion to reopen not an abuse of discretion where failure to introduce evidence earlier was the product of trial tactics]; Broden v. Marin Humane Society (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1222 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 1212 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 ] [motion to reopen is subject to a diligence requirement].) VI Trial Court’s Award of Attorney Fees Was Not an Abuse of Discretion The trial court found that Shilberg was the prevailing party and awarded contractual attorney fees to Shilberg of $80,373 plus $5,558.72 as costs.

2005(See Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1052-1053 [denial of motion to reopen not an abuse of discretion where failure to introduce evidence earlier was the product of trial tactics]; Broden v. Marin Humane Society (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1222 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 1212 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 ] [motion to reopen is subject to a diligence requirement].) VI Trial Court’s Award of Attorney Fees Was Not an Abuse of Discretion The trial court found that Shilberg was the prevailing party and awarded contractual attorney fees to Shilberg of $80,373 plus $5,558.72 as costs.

1995Whereas the 1988 version required the application for mandatory relief to be “timely,” which the Billings court construed to incorporate the diligence requirement ( 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 258 ), the current version requires only that the application be made within six months after entry of judgment.

1994In Billings v. Health Plan of America (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 250, 258 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 80 ], the court determined that the 1988 amendment to section 473, which added the provision for mandatory relief for attorney error, did not alter the diligence requirement.

2026(See Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 162, 166 [party failed to show diligence where newly discovered evidence was accessible through “inquiry or examination” of public records].) The Russells contend the trial court failed properly to evaluate whether Renita’s search efforts “satisfied the diligence standard under the particular circumstances of searching years of electronic communications.” They contend the court instead simply considered whether “perfect diligence theoretically could have uncovered the evidence sooner.” The record refutes their contentions.

2022Indeed, tolling under section 583.310 is “automatic and not subject to a ‘reasonable diligence’ standard.” (Ocean Services Corp. v. Ventura Port Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1762, 1774, 1775 [“ ‘plaintiff’s diligence, or lack thereof, has no place in the analysis’ ”].) The trial court correctly denied appellants’ motion to dismiss the action under section 583.310.

2022(E.g., Brown & Bryant, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 257 ; Rose v. Scott (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 537 , 541–542; New West, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1156 [affirming tolling of deadline based on period of impossibility; the fact that plaintiffs only needed the benefit of tolling because they miscalculated the correct deadline was “irrelevant”].) 35 De Santiago, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at page 376 , did not distinguish between the concepts of causation and diligence, so consistency would demand that a diligence inquiry be limited to the period of putative tolling, just like a causation inquiry.