diligence claim in Utah

2025And this limitation “should not be narrowly or strictly construed,” because it is “meant to secure to communities their water systems and prohibit any sale or lease to private parties.” Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 935 (Utah 1938). ¶52 Our supreme court addressed this constitutional restriction in Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991), and there the court held that a property owner’s diligence claim was barred because a municipality had owned the land associated with the diligence claim before its conveyance to a private party.

2025And this limitation “should not be narrowly or strictly construed,” because it is “meant to secure to communities their water systems and prohibit any sale or lease to private parties.” Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 935 (Utah 1938). ¶52 Our supreme court addressed this constitutional restriction in Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991), and there the court held that a property owner’s diligence claim was barred because a municipality had owned the land associated with the diligence claim before its conveyance to a private party.

2025And this limitation “should not be narrowly or strictly construed,” because it is “meant to secure to communities their water systems and prohibit any sale or lease to private parties.” Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 935 (Utah 1938). ¶52 Our supreme court addressed this constitutional restriction in Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991), and there the court held that a property owner’s diligence claim was barred because a municipality had owned the land associated with the diligence claim before its conveyance to a private party.

2025And this limitation “should not be narrowly or strictly construed,” because it is “meant to secure to communities their water systems and prohibit any sale or lease to private parties.” Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 80 P.2d 930, 935 (Utah 1938). ¶52 Our supreme court addressed this constitutional restriction in Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991), and there the court held that a property owner’s diligence claim was barred because a municipality had owned the land associated with the diligence claim before its conveyance to a private party.

2018See United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co. , 2003 UT 49 , ¶¶ 15-20, 79 P.3d 945 .

2018See United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co. , 2003 UT 49 , ¶¶ 15-20, 79 P.3d 945 .

2018While the state engineer acts only "in an administrative capacity" by "administering and supervising the appropriation of the waters of the state" and the district court has the duty to adjudicate the claims, see Jensen v. Jones , 2011 UT 67 , ¶¶ 10-11, 270 P.3d 425 (quotation simplified), the state engineer's diligence claim report becomes part of the claim file and may be "admissible in any ... judicial proceeding on the validity of the claim," Utah Code Ann. § 73-5-13 (5)(b). ¶18 One type of judicial proceeding used to determine the validity of water claims is a general adjudication, which

2018While the state engineer acts only "in an administrative capacity" by "administering and supervising the appropriation of the waters of the state" and the district court has the duty to adjudicate the claims, see Jensen v. Jones , 2011 UT 67 , ¶¶ 10-11, 270 P.3d 425 (quotation simplified), the state engineer's diligence claim report becomes part of the claim file and may be "admissible in any ... judicial proceeding on the validity of the claim," Utah Code Ann. § 73-5-13 (5)(b). ¶18 One type of judicial proceeding used to determine the validity of water claims is a general adjudication, which

2018See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (Michie 1989) (providing for and prescribing the general adjudication process). 2 "The purpose of the general adjudication process is to prevent piecemeal litigation regarding water rights and to provide a permanent record of all such rights by decree." Olds , 2004 UT 106 , ¶ 5, 110 P.3d 666 (quotation simplified); see also Green River Adjudication v. United States , 17 Utah 2d 50 , 404 P.2d 251 , 252 (Utah 1965) ("The objective of an adjudication ... is to determine and settle water rights which have not been adjudicated or which may be uncertain

2018See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (Michie 1989) (providing for and prescribing the general adjudication process). 2 "The purpose of the general adjudication process is to prevent piecemeal litigation regarding water rights and to provide a permanent record of all such rights by decree." Olds , 2004 UT 106 , ¶ 5, 110 P.3d 666 (quotation simplified); see also Green River Adjudication v. United States , 17 Utah 2d 50 , 404 P.2d 251 , 252 (Utah 1965) ("The objective of an adjudication ... is to determine and settle water rights which have not been adjudicated or which may be uncertain

2000See Hanson, 115 Utah at 415 , 205 P.2d at 260 .

2000See Hanson, 115 Utah at 415 , 205 P.2d at 260 .

1997Because the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that “a plaintiff must act diligently and take such steps in attempting to give the defendant actual notice of the proceeding as are reasonably practicable,” id. at 1275 , this diligence requirement “is one we imply to avoid constitutional infirmities,” id. at 1277 . 4 It follows therefore that if a plaintiff falsely avers or intentionally misleads a court to believe that he or she has exercised such diligence when he or she has not done so, the court, although at the time appearing to have jurisdiction, never had jurisd

1997Because the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that “a plaintiff must act diligently and take such steps in attempting to give the defendant actual notice of the proceeding as are reasonably practicable,” id. at 1275 , this diligence requirement “is one we imply to avoid constitutional infirmities,” id. at 1277 . 4 It follows therefore that if a plaintiff falsely avers or intentionally misleads a court to believe that he or she has exercised such diligence when he or she has not done so, the court, although at the time appearing to have jurisdiction, never had jurisd

1996See, e.g., Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir.1982) (“Actions such as would deceive a reasonably diligent plaintiff will toll the statute.”); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 , 102 S.Ct. 392 , 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981); Anderson, 775 P.2d at 1204-06 (affirming trial court ruling that law firm members had no duty to inquire further into another member’s receipt of undisclosed client fees, even though member’s office day planner recorded time spent for such fees).

1996See, e.g., Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir.1982) (“Actions such as would deceive a reasonably diligent plaintiff will toll the statute.”); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 , 102 S.Ct. 392 , 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981); Anderson, 775 P.2d at 1204-06 (affirming trial court ruling that law firm members had no duty to inquire further into another member’s receipt of undisclosed client fees, even though member’s office day planner recorded time spent for such fees).

1996See, e.g., Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir.1982) (“Actions such as would deceive a reasonably diligent plaintiff will toll the statute.”); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 , 102 S.Ct. 392 , 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981); Anderson, 775 P.2d at 1204-06 (affirming trial court ruling that law firm members had no duty to inquire further into another member’s receipt of undisclosed client fees, even though member’s office day planner recorded time spent for such fees).