just compensation clause in California

2005V, XIV.) The just compensation clause “is primarily aimed at making a landowner whole for any governmental taking or damage to his or her property.” (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 694, 715 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 630 , 941 P.2d 809 ].) *959 Because just compensation is a constitutional requirement, it “ ‘cannot be made to depend upon state [or federal] statutory provisions.’ ” (Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 797 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 904 , 700 P.2d 794 ], quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. U. S. (1923) 261 U.

2005V, XIV.) The just compensation clause “is primarily aimed at making a landowner whole for any governmental taking or damage to his or her property.” (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 694, 715 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 630 , 941 P.2d 809 ].) *959 Because just compensation is a constitutional requirement, it “ ‘cannot be made to depend upon state [or federal] statutory provisions.’ ” (Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 797 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 904 , 700 P.2d 794 ], quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. U. S. (1923) 261 U.

2019At one point, courts had limited inverse condemnation only *1103 to circumstances where a private party would be liable to the property owner for the injury. ( Bunch , at p. 439, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 , 935 P.2d 796 ; Belair , at p. 562, 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ; Albers v. Los Angeles County (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 , 256, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ( Albers ).) We subsequently clarified that ultimately, the just compensation clause is the "distinct constitutional source" that underlies a public entity's responsibility to compensate owners for those damages to private property resulting

2019At one point, courts had limited inverse condemnation only *1103 to circumstances where a private party would be liable to the property owner for the injury. ( Bunch , at p. 439, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 , 935 P.2d 796 ; Belair , at p. 562, 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ; Albers v. Los Angeles County (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 , 256, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ( Albers ).) We subsequently clarified that ultimately, the just compensation clause is the "distinct constitutional source" that underlies a public entity's responsibility to compensate owners for those damages to private property resulting

2025We agree plaintiffs are not entitled to inverse condemnation compensation under the “emergency exception to the just compensation requirement” (Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 383 ) for City’s legitimate exercise of its police power.

1999I As I have noted elsewhere, courts have long struggled with the difficult question of how to determine whether a particular government action is a taking requiring compensation under the just compensation clause. ( Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368 , 394 & fn. 1, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) And as I mentioned at the outset here, in the past 20 years the United States Supreme Court has adopted the rule that government regulation of property is a taking if it fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest.

2019At one point, courts had limited inverse condemnation only *1103 to circumstances where a private party would be liable to the property owner for the injury. ( Bunch , at p. 439, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 , 935 P.2d 796 ; Belair , at p. 562, 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ; Albers v. Los Angeles County (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 , 256, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ( Albers ).) We subsequently clarified that ultimately, the just compensation clause is the "distinct constitutional source" that underlies a public entity's responsibility to compensate owners for those damages to private property resulting

2019At one point, courts had limited inverse condemnation only *1103 to circumstances where a private party would be liable to the property owner for the injury. ( Bunch , at p. 439, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 , 935 P.2d 796 ; Belair , at p. 562, 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ; Albers v. Los Angeles County (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 , 256, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ( Albers ).) We subsequently clarified that ultimately, the just compensation clause is the "distinct constitutional source" that underlies a public entity's responsibility to compensate owners for those damages to private property resulting

2019At one point, courts had limited inverse condemnation only *1103 to circumstances where a private party would be liable to the property owner for the injury. ( Bunch , at p. 439, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 , 935 P.2d 796 ; Belair , at p. 562, 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ; Albers v. Los Angeles County (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 , 256, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ( Albers ).) We subsequently clarified that ultimately, the just compensation clause is the "distinct constitutional source" that underlies a public entity's responsibility to compensate owners for those damages to private property resulting

2019At one point, courts had limited inverse condemnation only *1103 to circumstances where a private party would be liable to the property owner for the injury. ( Bunch , at p. 439, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 , 935 P.2d 796 ; Belair , at p. 562, 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ; Albers v. Los Angeles County (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 , 256, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ( Albers ).) We subsequently clarified that ultimately, the just compensation clause is the "distinct constitutional source" that underlies a public entity's responsibility to compensate owners for those damages to private property resulting

1995Such interest accrues not from the time the action is commenced, but from the time the damage occurs. ( Holtz v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 648, 657 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 646 , 552 P.2d 430 ].) Because the plaintiff has a constitutional right to such prejudgment interest under the just compensation clause, the Legislature cannot restrict this right. ( Ibid. ["[I]nterest must be computed from the date the taking or damaging was sustained in order to fulfill the constitutional mandate for just compensation. [Citations.]"]; Heimann v. City of Los Angeles (1947) 30 Cal.

1995Such interest accrues not from the time the action is commenced, but from the time the damage occurs. ( Holtz v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 648, 657 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 646 , 552 P.2d 430 ].) Because the plaintiff has a constitutional right to such prejudgment interest under the just compensation clause, the Legislature cannot restrict this right. ( Ibid. ["[I]nterest must be computed from the date the taking or damaging was sustained in order to fulfill the constitutional mandate for just compensation. [Citations.]"]; Heimann v. City of Los Angeles (1947) 30 Cal.

2007(Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 522-523 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 ].) Proposition 7 repealed and replaced the former just compensation clause in article I, section 14 of the California Constitution with the current clause in article I, section 19.

2007(Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 522-523 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 ].) Proposition 7 repealed and replaced the former just compensation clause in article I, section 14 of the California Constitution with the current clause in article I, section 19.

2005V, XIV.) The just compensation clause “is primarily aimed at making a landowner whole for any governmental taking or damage to his or her property.” (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 694, 715 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 630 , 941 P.2d 809 ].) *959 Because just compensation is a constitutional requirement, it “ ‘cannot be made to depend upon state [or federal] statutory provisions.’ ” (Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 797 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 904 , 700 P.2d 794 ], quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. U. S. (1923) 261 U.

2002Dept. of Transportation v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 791, 794 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 996 P.2d 711 ] (Edison).) The compensation to which the owner is entitled is “just compensation.” “ ‘[J]ust’ compensation is the ‘full and perfect’ monetary equivalent of the fair market value of the land paid at the time the taking occurred. [Citation.]” (Gilmore, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 801.) “[T]he policy underlying the just compensation clause is to ensure that the owner of damaged [or taken] property is not forced to ‘ “ ‘contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking””; i

2002Dept. of Transportation v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 791, 794 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 996 P.2d 711 ] (Edison).) The compensation to which the owner is entitled is “just compensation.” “ ‘[J]ust’ compensation is the ‘full and perfect’ monetary equivalent of the fair market value of the land paid at the time the taking occurred. [Citation.]” (Gilmore, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 801.) “[T]he policy underlying the just compensation clause is to ensure that the owner of damaged [or taken] property is not forced to ‘ “ ‘contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking””; i

2002Dept. of Transportation v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 791, 794 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 996 P.2d 711 ] (Edison).) The compensation to which the owner is entitled is “just compensation.” “ ‘[J]ust’ compensation is the ‘full and perfect’ monetary equivalent of the fair market value of the land paid at the time the taking occurred. [Citation.]” (Gilmore, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 801.) “[T]he policy underlying the just compensation clause is to ensure that the owner of damaged [or taken] property is not forced to ‘ “ ‘contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking””; i

1999(See, e.g., Pennell v. San Jose, supra, 485 U.S. at pp. 11-13, 108 S.Ct. 849 ; see also Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 3, 107 S.Ct. 3141 .) In light of the history of due process economic standards discussed above, these cases provide no basis for assuming such controls will survive Nollan 's means scrutiny under the just compensation clause.

1999(See, e.g., Pennell v. San Jose, supra, 485 U.S. at pp. 11-13 [108 S.Ct. at pp. 857-858]; see also Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 3 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 3147 ].) In light of the history of due process economic standards discussed above, these cases provide no basis for assuming such controls will survive Nollan’s means scrutiny under the just compensation clause.

1998As recently as 1975, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that damage to a business conducted on property condemned for public use was not compensable as a property right under the just compensation clause of the California Constitution. [Citation.] But in *388 1975, the Legislature enacted a comprehensive revision of California’s eminent domain law, which, among other things, authorizes compensation for the loss of business goodwill.” (Community Development Com. v. Asaro (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1297, 1301-1302 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 231 ], fn. omitted (Asaro).) “Section 1263.510 was e

1998As recently as 1975, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that damage to a business conducted on property condemned for public use was not compensable as a property right under the just compensation clause of the California Constitution. [Citation.] But in *388 1975, the Legislature enacted a comprehensive revision of California’s eminent domain law, which, among other things, authorizes compensation for the loss of business goodwill.” (Community Development Com. v. Asaro (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1297, 1301-1302 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 231 ], fn. omitted (Asaro).) “Section 1263.510 was e

1997The very exercise of the power of eminent domain in effect defeats a landowner’s expectation of holding onto the condemned property and reaping any eventual enhancement in its value, since just compensation requires only that the owner be paid the fair market value of the property, measured on the date of valuation. (§ 1263.320, subd. (a).) In this regard, we note that if the government condemns an entire tract of land, the fair market value of the property in general does not include any increase in the value of the property that is attributable to the project for which the property is taken.

1997The very exercise of the power of eminent domain in effect defeats a landowner’s expectation of holding onto the condemned property and reaping any eventual enhancement in its value, since just compensation requires only that the owner be paid the fair market value of the property, measured on the date of valuation. (§ 1263.320, subd. (a).) In this regard, we note that if the government condemns an entire tract of land, the fair market value of the property in general does not include any increase in the value of the property that is attributable to the project for which the property is taken.

1997We have recognized that the policy underlying the just compensation clause is to ensure that the owner of damaged property is not forced to “ ‘ “contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking” ’ ”; in other words, the clause aims “ ‘ “to distribute throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by the making of the public improvements”. . ” (Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 365 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 , 867 P.2d 724 ]; see also Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 409 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ] (dis. opn. of Baxte

1997We have recognized that the policy underlying the just compensation clause is to ensure that the owner of damaged property is not forced to “ ‘ “contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking” ’ ”; in other words, the clause aims “ ‘ “to distribute throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by the making of the public improvements”. . ” (Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 7 Cal.4th 327, 365 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 613 , 867 P.2d 724 ]; see also Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th 368, 409 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 , 895 P.2d 900 ] (dis. opn. of Baxte

1995(See, e.g., Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 , 475 P.2d 441 ]; Albers v. County of Los Angeles (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ]; Bauer v. County of Ventura (1955) 45 Cal.2d 276 [ 289 P.2d 1 ]; Bacich v. Board of Control (1943) 23 Cal.2d 343 [ 144 P.2d 818 ]; Brown v. Board of Supervisors (1899) 124 Cal. 274 [ 57 P. 82 ]; Tyler v. Tehama County (1895) 109 Cal. 618 [ 42 P. 240 ]; Reardon v. San Francisco, supra, 66 Cal. 492 .) However, these decisions neither state nor imply that the just compensation clause applies only to public improvemen

1995(See, e.g., Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 , 475 P.2d 441 ]; Albers v. County of Los Angeles (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ]; Bauer v. County of Ventura (1955) 45 Cal.2d 276 [ 289 P.2d 1 ]; Bacich v. Board of Control (1943) 23 Cal.2d 343 [ 144 P.2d 818 ]; Brown v. Board of Supervisors (1899) 124 Cal. 274 [ 57 P. 82 ]; Tyler v. Tehama County (1895) 109 Cal. 618 [ 42 P. 240 ]; Reardon v. San Francisco, supra, 66 Cal. 492 .) However, these decisions neither state nor imply that the just compensation clause applies only to public improvemen

2001(County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz (1971) 6 Cal.3d 141, 148-149 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 454 , 490 P.2d 1142 , 68 A.L.R.3d 538 ].) The Legislature exercised its discretion by mandating recovery of litigation expenses, including attorney fees, in eminent domain proceedings (§§ 1268.610, 1250.410) as well as inverse condemnation actions.

2001(County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz (1971) 6 Cal.3d 141, 148-149 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 454 , 490 P.2d 1142 , 68 A.L.R.3d 538 ].) The Legislature exercised its discretion by mandating recovery of litigation expenses, including attorney fees, in eminent domain proceedings (§§ 1268.610, 1250.410) as well as inverse condemnation actions.

2025Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 536 (Lingle).) By requiring the government to pay for what it takes, the takings clause prevents the government from “ ‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’ ” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 618 ; Armstrong v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 40, 49 .) The Supreme Court has identified two general categories of takings: “physical takings” and “regulatory takings.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 321 .) A

1995As the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the provision "is designed not to limit ... *409 governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking...." ( First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304, 315 [ 96 L.Ed.2d 250, 264 , 107 S.Ct. 2378 ], italics in original.) Its function is "`to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'" ( Id. at pp. 318-319 [ 96 L.

2019At one point, courts had limited inverse condemnation only *1103 to circumstances where a private party would be liable to the property owner for the injury. ( Bunch , at p. 439, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 , 935 P.2d 796 ; Belair , at p. 562, 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ; Albers v. Los Angeles County (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 , 256, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ( Albers ).) We subsequently clarified that ultimately, the just compensation clause is the "distinct constitutional source" that underlies a public entity's responsibility to compensate owners for those damages to private property resulting

2019At one point, courts had limited inverse condemnation only *1103 to circumstances where a private party would be liable to the property owner for the injury. ( Bunch , at p. 439, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 , 935 P.2d 796 ; Belair , at p. 562, 253 Cal.Rptr. 693 , 764 P.2d 1070 ; Albers v. Los Angeles County (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 , 256, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ( Albers ).) We subsequently clarified that ultimately, the just compensation clause is the "distinct constitutional source" that underlies a public entity's responsibility to compensate owners for those damages to private property resulting

2016(Community Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams (1975) 15 Cal.3d 813, 816-817 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 543 P.2d 905 ].) Instead, the right to compensation for loss of business goodwill is created by statute.

2016(Community Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams (1975) 15 Cal.3d 813, 816-817 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 543 P.2d 905 ].) Instead, the right to compensation for loss of business goodwill is created by statute.

1988Club v. Los Angeles (1920) 182 Cal. 392 , 401 [ 188 P. 554 , 9 A.L.R. 1200 ].) The privilege, however, has never applied to obstructions or diversions of a natural channel, or to the creation of new channels "by which the natural stream waters of the river are carried onto the lands of another that would have been protected therefrom but for the creation of the artificial channel. . . ." ( Clement v. State Reclamation Board, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 636 .) Relying on the now-discredited principle that the just compensation clause waived sovereign immunity but created no new causes of action, the

1988As previously noted, the touchstone of inverse condemnation liability is "whether the owner of the damaged property if uncompensated would contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking." ( Clement v. State Reclamation Board, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 642 .) Balanced against this cost-spreading objective is the reality that boundless liability will thwart the development of beneficial public improvements. ( Albers, p. 263.) This constraint on compensation for damages inflicted by the state, however, is entirely unrelated to the blameworthiness of the damaging conduct; the framers

1995Such interest accrues not from the time the action is commenced, but from the time the damage occurs. ( Holtz v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 648, 657 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 646 , 552 P.2d 430 ].) Because the plaintiff has a constitutional right to such prejudgment interest under the just compensation clause, the Legislature cannot restrict this right. ( Ibid. ["[I]nterest must be computed from the date the taking or damaging was sustained in order to fulfill the constitutional mandate for just compensation. [Citations.]"]; Heimann v. City of Los Angeles (1947) 30 Cal.

1995Such interest accrues not from the time the action is commenced, but from the time the damage occurs. ( Holtz v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 648, 657 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 646 , 552 P.2d 430 ].) Because the plaintiff has a constitutional right to such prejudgment interest under the just compensation clause, the Legislature cannot restrict this right. ( Ibid. ["[I]nterest must be computed from the date the taking or damaging was sustained in order to fulfill the constitutional mandate for just compensation. [Citations.]"]; Heimann v. City of Los Angeles (1947) 30 Cal.

1995(See, e.g., Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 , 475 P.2d 441 ]; Albers v. County of Los Angeles (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ]; Bauer v. County of Ventura (1955) 45 Cal.2d 276 [ 289 P.2d 1 ]; Bacich v. Board of Control (1943) 23 Cal.2d 343 [ 144 P.2d 818 ]; Brown v. Board of Supervisors (1899) 124 Cal. 274 [ 57 P. 82 ]; Tyler v. Tehama County (1895) 109 Cal. 618 [ 42 P. 240 ]; Reardon v. San Francisco, supra, 66 Cal. 492 .) However, these decisions neither state nor imply that the just compensation clause applies only to public improvemen

1995(See, e.g., Holtz v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 296 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 , 475 P.2d 441 ]; Albers v. County of Los Angeles (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 , 398 P.2d 129 ]; Bauer v. County of Ventura (1955) 45 Cal.2d 276 [ 289 P.2d 1 ]; Bacich v. Board of Control (1943) 23 Cal.2d 343 [ 144 P.2d 818 ]; Brown v. Board of Supervisors (1899) 124 Cal. 274 [ 57 P. 82 ]; Tyler v. Tehama County (1895) 109 Cal. 618 [ 42 P. 240 ]; Reardon v. San Francisco, supra, 66 Cal. 492 .) However, these decisions neither state nor imply that the just compensation clause applies only to public improvemen

1995Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 663, fn. 1 [ 39 Cal. Rptr. 903 , 394 P.2d 719 ]; Bacich v. Board of Control (1943) 23 Cal.2d 343, 347 [ 144 P.2d 818 ]; Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility (1966) Wis. L.Rev. 3, 4, fn. 2.) [5] For example, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, supra, 509 U.S. ___ , ___ [ 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 316 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 ], the high court held that the just compensation clause limits the authority of a city to require that a property owner, in order to obtain a building permit, dedicate a portion of his or her property to the city for flood co

1995Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 663, fn. 1 [ 39 Cal. Rptr. 903 , 394 P.2d 719 ]; Bacich v. Board of Control (1943) 23 Cal.2d 343, 347 [ 144 P.2d 818 ]; Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility (1966) Wis. L.Rev. 3, 4, fn. 2.) [5] For example, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, supra, 509 U.S. ___ , ___ [ 129 L.Ed.2d 304, 316 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 ], the high court held that the just compensation clause limits the authority of a city to require that a property owner, in order to obtain a building permit, dedicate a portion of his or her property to the city for flood co

2025Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 536 (Lingle).) By requiring the government to pay for what it takes, the takings clause prevents the government from “ ‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’ ” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 618 ; Armstrong v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 40, 49 .) The Supreme Court has identified two general categories of takings: “physical takings” and “regulatory takings.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 321 .) A

2025Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 536 (Lingle).) By requiring the government to pay for what it takes, the takings clause prevents the government from “ ‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’ ” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 618 ; Armstrong v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 40, 49 .) The Supreme Court has identified two general categories of takings: “physical takings” and “regulatory takings.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 321 .) A