section 217 four month statute of limitations in New York

2015The applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner “received notice of the final administrative determination” (Matter of Jackson v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2009]; see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]), and respondent failed to meet his burden of establishing that petitioner received such notice more than four months before commencing the instant proceeding (see Jackson, 67 AD3d at 1208 ; Matter of Chrysler v Goord, 49 AD3d 1342, 1343 [2008]).

2015The applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner “received notice of the final administrative determination” (Matter of Jackson v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2009]; see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]), and respondent failed to meet his burden of establishing that petitioner received such notice more than four months before commencing the instant proceeding (see Jackson, 67 AD3d at 1208 ; Matter of Chrysler v Goord, 49 AD3d 1342, 1343 [2008]).

2015The applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner “received notice of the final administrative determination” (Matter of Jackson v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2009]; see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]), and respondent failed to meet his burden of establishing that petitioner received such notice more than four months before commencing the instant proceeding (see Jackson, 67 AD3d at 1208 ; Matter of Chrysler v Goord, 49 AD3d 1342, 1343 [2008]).

2015The applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner “received notice of the final administrative determination” (Matter of Jackson v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2009]; see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]), and respondent failed to meet his burden of establishing that petitioner received such notice more than four months before commencing the instant proceeding (see Jackson, 67 AD3d at 1208 ; Matter of Chrysler v Goord, 49 AD3d 1342, 1343 [2008]).

2021The applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner received notice of the determination, and respondents failed to meet their burden of establishing that petitioner received such notice more than four months before commencing this proceeding ( see Matter of Chrysler v Goord , 49 AD3d 1342, 1343 [4th Dept 2008]).

2015The applicable four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 did not begin to run until petitioner “received notice of the final administrative determination” (Matter of Jackson v Fischer, 67 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2009]; see Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 [1983]), and respondent failed to meet his burden of establishing that petitioner received such notice more than four months before commencing the instant proceeding (see Jackson, 67 AD3d at 1208 ; Matter of Chrysler v Goord, 49 AD3d 1342, 1343 [2008]).

2015It is well established that the proper vehicle for challenging an administrative act is a CPLR article 78 proceeding, and thus the four-month statute of limitations under CPLR 217 applies (see Matter of Resnick v Town of Canaan, 38 AD3d 949, 953 [2007]).

2015It is well established that the proper vehicle for challenging an administrative act is a CPLR article 78 proceeding, and thus the four-month statute of limitations under CPLR 217 applies (see Matter of Resnick v Town of Canaan, 38 AD3d 949, 953 [2007]).

2015Contrary to plaintiffs’ further contention, the limitations period “was triggered on . . . the date on which the [Common] Council adopted the resolution” authorizing the sale (Matter of Gach v City of Long Beach, 218 AD2d 801, 801 [1995]; see Matter of Long Is.

2015Contrary to plaintiffs’ further contention, the limitations period “was triggered on . . . the date on which the [Common] Council adopted the resolution” authorizing the sale (Matter of Gach v City of Long Beach, 218 AD2d 801, 801 [1995]; see Matter of Long Is.

2014Town Bd., 86 AD3d 83, 94 [2011]).

2014Town Bd., 86 AD3d 83, 94 [2011]).

2004As both arguments attack procedures followed in enacting those laws as opposed to their substance, a CPLR article 78 proceeding is the appropriate vehicle with which to review them, and the four-month statute of limitations in CPLR 217 applies (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 202-203 [1987]; Matter of McCarthy v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Niskayuna, 283 AD2d 857, 857-858 [2001]).

2004However, since Sylcox challenged only the procedural aspects of the Local Law, the Supreme Court properly determined that this proceeding was time-barred by the four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 202 [1987]; Matter of McCarthy v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Niskayuna, 283 AD2d 857, 858 [2001]).

2025See Owners Comm. , 150 AD2d at 52-54 .

2025See Owners Comm. , 150 AD2d at 52-54 .

2004As both arguments attack procedures followed in enacting those laws as opposed to their substance, a CPLR article 78 proceeding is the appropriate vehicle with which to review them, and the four-month statute of limitations in CPLR 217 applies (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 202-203 [1987]; Matter of McCarthy v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Niskayuna, 283 AD2d 857, 857-858 [2001]).

2004However, since Sylcox challenged only the procedural aspects of the Local Law, the Supreme Court properly determined that this proceeding was time-barred by the four-month statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 217 (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 202 [1987]; Matter of McCarthy v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Niskayuna, 283 AD2d 857, 858 [2001]).

2016(See Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224 [1980]; accord Lenihan v City of New York, 58 NY2d 679 [1982]; cf. Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801 [2003] [declining to apply four-month statute of limitations because the relief sought is not obtained under article 78].) Regardless of the statute of limitations period applied, the 1996 Opinion is untimely.

1990(See, Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224 [1980]; Lenihan v City of New York, 58 NY2d 679 [1982].) However, since the reason to apply the shorter limitation period of CPLR 217 to actions that could be commenced as article 78 proceedings (not permit the form of the action to extend the limitation period) is not pertinent on the issue of venue, there is no reason to apply the venue provisions applicable to such proceedings to these actions.

2025Applying the statute of limitations in CPLR 217 (1), which requires petitioners to bring article 78 claims within four months after a determination becomes "final and binding," the Appellate Division explained that the DOE's decision became final when Mr. Dourdounas was informed of it in July 2017 ( id. at 466).

2025Applying the statute of limitations in CPLR 217 (1), which requires petitioners to bring article 78 claims within four months after a determination becomes "final and binding," the Appellate Division explained that the DOE's decision became final when Mr. Dourdounas was informed of it in July 2017 ( id. at 466 ).

2021We thus address the substance of petitioner's contentions ( see Matter of Jackson v Fischer , 67 AD3d 1207, 1208 [3d Dept 2009]), which we review de novo ( see generally Matter of Medina v Graham , 71 AD3d 1598, 1598 [4th Dept 2010]; Matter of Brown v Coughlin , 210 AD2d 1006 , 1006 [4th Dept 1994]).

2014Auth., 100 AD3d 407 , 408 [1st Dept 2012]; see also Matter of Nieves v Martinez, 285 AD2d 410, 410-411 [1st Dept 2001]).

2011The petitioners’ alleged communications with the respondents’ counsel after June 18, 2009, including any alleged requests for further administrative review, did not extend or toll the statute of limitations (see Gertler v Goodgold, 66 NY2d 946, 948 [1985]; Matter of Lubin v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 974, 976 [1983], cert denied 469 US 823 [1984]; Matter of Surton Constr.

2011The petitioners’ alleged communications with the respondents’ counsel after June 18, 2009, including any alleged requests for further administrative review, did not extend or toll the statute of limitations (see Gertler v Goodgold, 66 NY2d 946, 948 [1985]; Matter of Lubin v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 974, 976 [1983], cert denied 469 US 823 [1984]; Matter of Surton Constr.

2011Moreover, while declaratory judgment actions are normally governed by a six-year limitations period (see CPLR 213 [1]; Stein v Garfield Regency Condominium, 65 AD3d 1126 [2009]), the one-year period of Highway Law § 205 (2), as the more specific statute, controls (see Matter of Brusco v Braun, 84 NY2d at 681).

2011Assoc., Inc. v Spitzer, 44 AD3d 592, 593 [2007]).

2010Auth., 280 AD2d 324, 325 [1st Dept 2001].) 5 Therefore, this petition, initiated on May 5, 2010, falls within the four-month statute of limitations under CPLR 217 (1).