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34 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1967–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Press v. County of Monroegreen2 sentences1993In Solnick v Whalen ( 49 NY2d 224, 229 ) we noted that that six-year limitation does not 'automatically or necessarily govern[ ] all such actions.’ Rather we pointed out that if an examination of the substance of the relationship out of which the claim arises 'reveals that the rights of the parties sought to be stabilized in an action for declaratory relief are, or have been, open to resolution through a form of proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided, then that period limits the time for commencement of the declaratory judgment action.’ (Id., at 229-230; see 1986Accordingly, the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [1]) applies rather than the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217 since the constitutional challenge to the regulation could not be properly reviewed in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see, Press v County of Monroe, supra, p 701; Matter of Emery v LeFevre, supra). | 2 | 3 |
Sucato v. Town Board of Bostongreen2 sentences2012Board, the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217 applies” (Matter of Sucato v Town Bd. of Boston, 187 AD2d 1045 [1992]), thus rendering the petition timely filed. 2012“Because the petition seeks to review the determination of the Town Board, the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217 applies” (Matter of Sucato v Town Bd. of Boston, 187 AD2d 1045 [1992]), not the shorter limitations period set forth in Town Law § 274-b (9) (see Matter of Young Dev., Inc. v Town of W. | 1 | 5 |
Zupa v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Southoldgreen2 sentences2023"Th[is] reasonable time requirement for a prompt demand should be measured by CPLR 217 (1)'s four-month limitations period, and thus, a demand should be made no more than four months after the right to make the demand arises" ( Matter of Zupa v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Southold , 64 AD3d 723, 725 [2d Dept 2009] [citations omitted]). 2010The timeliness of the demand is measured by the four-month limitation period in CPLR 217 (1) so that the demand for payment should have been made no more than four months after the right to make the demand arose (see CPLR 217 [1]; Matter of Zupa v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Southold, 64 AD3d 723 [2009]). | 1 | 2 |
Violet Realty, Inc. v. City of Buffalo Planning Boardgreen2 sentences2012We further conclude that Supreme Court properly held that the Board’s denial of the application for a special use permit was illegal, arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion (see generally Matter of Violet Realty, Inc. v City of Buffalo Planning Bd., 20 AD3d 901, 902 , lv denied 5 NY3d 713 ). 2012We further conclude that Supreme Court properly held that the Board’s denial of the application for a special use permit was illegal, arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion (see generally Matter of Violet Realty, Inc. v City of Buffalo Planning Bd., 20 AD3d 901, 902 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 713 [2005]). | 1 | 2 |
Engert v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2009Rather, because this proceeding is premised upon the refusal of a zoning board of appeals to hear and determine an appeal concerning a building permit application, CPLR 217 (l)’s four-month limitations period is applicable (cf. Engert v Phillips, 150 AD2d 752, 753 [1989]). 1997The Supreme Court correctly concluded that the applicable limitations period in this case was the four-month period in CPLR 217 and not the 30-day period in Town Law § 274-b (see, Islip Town Code § 68-272; see also, Matter of Sucato v Town Bd., 187 AD2d 1045 ; Engert v Phillips, 150 AD2d 752 ). | 1 | 2 |
De Milio v. Borghardgreen2 sentences1994The nature of the proceeding (i.e., the writs) is important when determining the proper measurement of section 217’s four-month limitation period (Matter of De Milio v Borghard, 55 NY2d 216 ). 1983They did not toll the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217 that ran from that date (see Matter of De Milio v Borghard, 55 NY2d 216, 221-222; Matter of Trivedi v State Bd. of Law Examiners, 86 ÁD2d 719; Matter of Fiore v Board of Educ. | 1 | 2 |
Buttita v. Greenwich House Cooperative Apartments, Inc.green1 sentence2024Apts., Inc., 11 AD3d 250, 251 [1st Dept 2004] [plaintiffs’ allegation “that the board acted in bad faith by treating them differently from other withdrawing shareholders . . . [was] barred by the four-month limitations period of CPLR 217 which plainly applies to defendant corporation”]). | 1 | 1 |
Shakuntala Devi Tika Gopaul v. New York City Employees' Retirement Systemgreen1 sentence2023In certain instances, the commencement of a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 constitutes a demand ( see Matter of Butkowski v Kiefer , 140 AD3d 1755, 1756 [4th Dept 2016]; Matter of Gopaul v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. , 122 AD3d 848, 849 [2d Dept 2014]). | 1 | 1 |
Butkowski v. Kiefergreen1 sentence2023In certain instances, the commencement of a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 constitutes a demand ( see Matter of Butkowski v Kiefer , 140 AD3d 1755, 1756 [4th Dept 2016]; Matter of Gopaul v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. , 122 AD3d 848, 849 [2d Dept 2014]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Crowell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Queensburygreen1 sentence2018Thus, the four month period of CPLR § 217(1) does not apply to an Article 78 proceeding challenging a variance granted by a town zoning board ( Crowell v Zoning Board , 151 AD3d 1247, 1249 [3d Dept 2017]). | 1 | 1 |
Barbolini v. Conneliegreen1 sentence2009School Dist., 265 AD2d at 839 ; Matter of Barbolini v Connelie, 68 AD2d 949, 950 [1979]; Matter of Devens v Gokey, 12 AD2d at 137 ). | 1 | 1 |
Springut v. Don & Bob Restaurants of America, Inc.green1 sentence2004Assuming plaintiffs’ third cause of action, alleging that the board acted in bad faith by treating them differently from other withdrawing shareholders (see 40 W. 67th St. v Pullman, 100 NY2d 147, 157-158 [2003]; Barbour v Knecht, 296 AD2d 218, 224 [2002]), is not subject to the defense of ratification, that cause of action, as well as the first two, is barred by the four-month limitations period of CPLR 217 which plainly applies to defendant corporation (see CPLR 7802 [a]; see also Matter of Springut v Don & Bob Rests., 57 AD2d 302, 304-305 [1977]; Matter of Uranian Phalanstery 1st N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
40 West 67th Street v. Pullmangreen1 sentence2004Assuming plaintiffs’ third cause of action, alleging that the board acted in bad faith by treating them differently from other withdrawing shareholders (see 40 W. 67th St. v Pullman, 100 NY2d 147, 157-158 [2003]; Barbour v Knecht, 296 AD2d 218, 224 [2002]), is not subject to the defense of ratification, that cause of action, as well as the first two, is barred by the four-month limitations period of CPLR 217 which plainly applies to defendant corporation (see CPLR 7802 [a]; see also Matter of Springut v Don & Bob Rests., 57 AD2d 302, 304-305 [1977]; Matter of Uranian Phalanstery 1st N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
Barbour v. Knechtgreen1 sentence2004Assuming plaintiffs’ third cause of action, alleging that the board acted in bad faith by treating them differently from other withdrawing shareholders (see 40 W. 67th St. v Pullman, 100 NY2d 147, 157-158 [2003]; Barbour v Knecht, 296 AD2d 218, 224 [2002]), is not subject to the defense of ratification, that cause of action, as well as the first two, is barred by the four-month limitations period of CPLR 217 which plainly applies to defendant corporation (see CPLR 7802 [a]; see also Matter of Springut v Don & Bob Rests., 57 AD2d 302, 304-305 [1977]; Matter of Uranian Phalanstery 1st N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
| MATTER OF TRIZEC W., INC. v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albanygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Solnick v. Whalen
green
2 sentences1993In Solnick v Whalen ( 49 NY2d 224, 229 ) we noted that that six-year limitation does not 'automatically or necessarily govern[ ] all such actions.’ Rather we pointed out that if an examination of the substance of the relationship out of which the claim arises 'reveals that the rights of the parties sought to be stabilized in an action for declaratory relief are, or have been, open to resolution through a form of proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided, then that period limits the time for commencement of the declaratory judgment action.’ (Id., at 229-230; see 1988The Judicial Hearing Officer properly determined that the town’s grant of a permit to defendants was subject to review in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see, Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Oaks, 55 AD2d 809 ; Mobil Oil Corp. v City of Syracuse, 52 AD2d 731 ) and that, insofar as the petition seeks to review the town’s grant of the permit, it is barred by the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217, applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 202 ; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229 ; De Francisco v Michel, 103 AD2d 1044 ). | 5 | 1986–1993 |
Biondo v. New York State Board of Parole
green
2 sentences1997A determination is final and binding for the purposes of commencing the four-month limitations period of CPLR 217 when it has its impact upon the petitioner who is thereby aggrieved (see, Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 ; Mundy v Nassau County Civ. 1990Further, the deficient notice was ineffective to commence the running of the 40-day objection period (see, Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34 [c] [1]), and hence to trigger the four-month limitations period of CPLR 217 (cf., Matter of Village of Westbury v Department of Transp., 75 NY2d 62, 72-74 ; Matter of Zellweger v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 74 NY2d 404, 408 ; Matter of Biondo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 60 NY2d 832, 834 ). | 3 | 1987–1997 |
Young Development, Inc. v. Town of West Seneca
green
2 sentences2012Seneca, 91 AD3d 1350 ). 2012Seneca, 91 AD3d 1350 [2012]). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Pizzimenti v. Henn
green
2 sentences2012We further conclude that Supreme Court properly held that the Board’s denial of the application for a special use permit was illegal, arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion (see generally Matter of Violet Realty, Inc. v City of Buffalo Planning Bd., 20 AD3d 901, 902 , lv denied 5 NY3d 713 ). 2012We further conclude that Supreme Court properly held that the Board’s denial of the application for a special use permit was illegal, arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion (see generally Matter of Violet Realty, Inc. v City of Buffalo Planning Bd., 20 AD3d 901, 902 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 713 [2005]). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. McBarnette
green
2 sentences2007Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194 [1994]; Stevens v American Water Servs., Inc., 32 AD3d 1188 [2006]). 2000Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194, 201-202 ). | 2 | 2000–2007 |
Lenihan v. City of New York
green
2 sentences1987This claim raises an issue in the nature of mandamus under CPLR 7803 (3) and, accordingly, the four-month limitations period of CPLR 217 is applicable (see, e.g., Lenihan v City of New York, 58 NY2d 679, 682 ; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224 ; Langham v State of New York, 124 AD2d 405, 406 , lv denied 69 NY2d 605 ). 1986Initially, since this declaratory judgment action is brought against a governmental body and officials to resolve a dispute which could be settled by a CPLR article 78 proceeding, the four-month limitations period of CPLR 217 governs (see, Lenihan v City of New York, 58 NY2d 679, 682 ; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224 ; cf. Matter of Kovarsky v Housing & Dev. | 2 | 1986–1987 |
Matter of Fiore v. Bd. of Educ. Ret. Sys. of the City of New York
neutral
2 sentences1982Petitioner’s application for reconsideration of this administrative determination did not serve to extend the four-month limitations period (see Matter of Fiore v Board of Educ., 48 AD2d 850 , affd 39 NY2d 1016 ; Matter of Wininger v Williamson, supra). 1979It is well settled that "An application to reconsider an administrative board’s determination * * * does not extend, by the making and rejection thereof, the four-month statutory period under CPLR 217 within which to seek a review of the determination” (Matter of Fiore v Board of Educ., 48 AD2d 850 , affd 39 NY2d 1016 ). | 2 | 1979–1982 |
Fiore v. Board of Education Retirement System
neutral
2 sentences1982Petitioner’s application for reconsideration of this administrative determination did not serve to extend the four-month limitations period (see Matter of Fiore v Board of Educ., 48 AD2d 850 , affd 39 NY2d 1016 ; Matter of Wininger v Williamson, supra). 1979It is well settled that "An application to reconsider an administrative board’s determination * * * does not extend, by the making and rejection thereof, the four-month statutory period under CPLR 217 within which to seek a review of the determination” (Matter of Fiore v Board of Educ., 48 AD2d 850 , affd 39 NY2d 1016 ). | 2 | 1979–1982 |
Dandomar Co. v. Town of Pleasant Valley Town Board
green
1 sentence2018Town Bd., 86 AD3d at 91 ), or related to ongoing actions of the defendants, and, thus, were not barred by the four-month limitation period under CPLR 217(1). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Devens v. Gokey
green
1 sentence2009School Dist., 265 AD2d at 839 ; Matter of Barbolini v Connelie, 68 AD2d 949, 950 [1979]; Matter of Devens v Gokey, 12 AD2d at 137 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Densmore v. Altmar-Parish-Williamstown Central School District
green
1 sentence2009School Dist., 265 AD2d at 839 ; Matter of Barbolini v Connelie, 68 AD2d 949, 950 [1979]; Matter of Devens v Gokey, 12 AD2d at 137 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Stevens v. American Water Services, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2007Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194 [1994]; Stevens v American Water Servs., Inc., 32 AD3d 1188 [2006]). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
De Vita v. Reab
green
1 sentence2004Gnostic Lyceum Temple, 155 AD2d 302 [1989]). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Roufaiel v. Ithaca College
green
1 sentence1999Because the labor contract provided for mandatory arbitration of petitioner’s grievance, the four-month limitations period of CPLR 217 (1) did not begin to run until the Board refused to comply with petitioner’s demand for reinstatement following the Arbitrators’ award (compare, Roufaiel v Ithaca Coll., 241 AD2d 865, 867-868 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Diehsner v. Schenectady City School District
green
1 sentence1999On the merits, given our construction of paragraph 7.09 of the labor contract and the Arbitrators’ determination that petitioner’s discharge, was without proper reason, we conclude that the Board was required to retroactively restore petitioner to his employment, “less any amounts he received from employment or unemployment insurance benefits” (Matter of Diehsner v Schenectady City School Dist., 152 AD2d 796, 799 ), and that petitioner is entitled to judgment therefor. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| City of Rochester v. Chiarella green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Scarborough School Corp. v. Assessor of Ossining green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| City of Rochester v. Chiarella green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Emunim v. Town of Fallsburg
green
1 sentence1993It lies when taxes have been collected without jurisdiction or in violation of constitutional authority, and the taxpayer paid the tax under formal written protest or duress (Matter of Trizec W. v City of New York, 66 NY2d 807, 809 [1985]; City of Rochester v Chiarella, 86 AD2d 110 [1982], affd 58 NY2d 316 [1983]; Matter of Scarborough School Corp. v Assessor of Town of Ossining, 97 AD2d 476 [1983]). 2 The defendants argue that the Court of Appeals decision in Kahal Bnei (supra) must be read to hold that a cause of action for tax moneys had and received is subject to the four-month limitation | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Connell v. Hayden green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Trinity Syndicate Corp. v. Department of Finance neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| D.B.C.G., Inc. v. Town of Ramapo neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Edmead v. McGuire green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Raschel v. Rish green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Lily Pond Enterprises, Inc. v. City of New York green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Zellweger v. New York State Department of Social Services green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Har Enterprises v. Town of Brookhaven green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Village of Westbury v. Department of Transportation green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Industrial Liaison Committee v. Williams green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Syracuse neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oaks green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| De Francisco v. Michel neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Austin v. Board of Higher Education green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Edelman v. Axelrod green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Adkins v. City of New York green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Langham v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Kovarsky v. Housing & Development Administration green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Emery v. LeFevre green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Moore v. Board of Regents of the University neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Wininger v. Williamson neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.