Blakely error in Minnesota

2025As to Sanders’s second claim, the 4 In Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 301, 305 ; see also Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635, 642–43 (Minn. 2025) (explaining this aspect of Blakely and conducting a Blakely analysis under Minnesota law). 5 district court concluded that “[t]here [was] nothing to indicate that” the district court used the incorrect criminal history score at sentencing.

2025As to Sanders’s second claim, the 4 In Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 301, 305 ; see also Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635, 642–43 (Minn. 2025) (explaining this aspect of Blakely and conducting a Blakely analysis under Minnesota law). 5 district court concluded that “[t]here [was] nothing to indicate that” the district court used the incorrect criminal history score at sentencing.

2013A Blakely error is harmless if the reviewing court can “say with certainty that a jury would have found the aggravating factors used to enhance [the defendant’s] sentence had those factors been submitted to a jury in compliance with Blakely.” Dettman, 719 N.W.2d at 655 .

2013A Blakely error is harmless if the reviewing court can “say with certainty that a jury would have found the aggravating factors used to enhance [the defendant’s] sentence had those factors been submitted to a jury in compliance with Blakely.” Dettman, 719 N.W.2d at 655 .

2014A defendant’s waiver of a Blakely hearing “must be supported in the same manner as a waiver of a jury trial on the elements of the offense; knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn. 2005).

2014A defendant’s waiver of a Blakely hearing “must be supported in the same manner as a waiver of a jury trial on the elements of the offense; knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn. 2005).

2006State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W.2d 290 , 293 n. 3 (Minn.1999) (holding that the district court's failure to make findings regarding the reasonableness of prosecution costs was forfeited for appeal absent an objection at sentencing); Blondheim v. State, 573 N.W.2d 368, 368 (Minn.1998) (holding that the district court's imposition of a fine not discussed in a plea agreement was forfeited for appeal absent an objection at sentencing). [3] But we conclude that Osborne did not forfeit consideration of his Blakely claim on appeal by failing to raise it in the *442 district court.

2006State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W.2d 290 , 293 n. 3 (Minn.1999) (holding that the district court’s failure to make findings regarding the reasonableness of prosecution costs was forfeited for appeal absent an objection at sentencing); Blondheim v. State, 573 N.W.2d 368, 368 (Minn.1998) (holding that the district court’s imposition of a fine not discussed in a plea agreement was forfeited for appeal absent an objection at sentencing). 3 But we conclude that Osborne did not forfeit consideration of his Blakely claim on appeal by failing to raise it in the district court.

2005State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W.2d 290 , 293 n. 3 (Minn.1999) (reasonableness of prosecution costs); Blondheim v. State, 573 N.W.2d 368, 368-69 (Minn.1998) (mandatory minimum fine); see also State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442 , 447 n. 2 (plurality opinion), 457 n. 3 (Blatz, C.J., dissenting) (Minn.2004) (together holding that failure to raise Appren-di/Blakely challenge to sentence on appeal waived issue).

2005State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W.2d 290 , 293 n. 3 (Minn.1999) (reasonableness of prosecution costs); Blondheim v. State, 573 N.W.2d 368, 368-69 (Minn.1998) (mandatory minimum fine); see also State v. Leja, 684 N.W.2d 442 , 447 n. 2 (plurality opinion), 457 n. 3 (Blatz, C.J., dissenting) (2004) (together holding that failure to raise Apprendi/Blakely challenge to sentence on appeal waived issue).

2014But in State v. Osborne, we concluded that the defendant did not forfeit consideration of his Blakely claim by failing to raise it in the district court because the Blakely rule was announced after his sentencing hearing. 715 N.W.2d 436, 442 (Minn.2006).

2014But in State v. Osborne, we concluded that the defendant did not forfeit consideration of his Blakely claim by failing to raise it in the district court because the Blakely rule was announced after his sentencing hearing. 715 N.W.2d 436, 442 (Minn.2006).

2006Because the upward departures increased the length of Osborne’s governing sentence by 67 months, the Blakely error was necessarily prejudicial, not harmless. 8 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision and we remand to the district court for resentencing consistent with State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn.2005).

2006Because the upward departures increased the length of Osborne’s governing sentence by 67 months, the Blakely error was necessarily prejudicial, not harmless. 8 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision and we remand to the district court for resentencing consistent with State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn.2005).

2005Id. at 163. “[C]ustody status points are established by the court’s own records” and are “based on the fact that a person has one or more prior convictions.” Id.

2005We rejected this argument in State v. Brooks, 690 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Minn.App.2004) (concluding that no purpose would be served by requiring a jury to make a finding of fact regarding the existence of a custody-status point and construing Blakely as recognizing that a jury need not make such a determination), review granted (Minn. Mar. 15, 2005).

2025See State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878 , 883–84 (Minn. 2014) (declining to decide whether a forfeiture or plain error standard applies to a Blakely claim because the same relief resulted under either standard).

2025See State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878 , 883–84 (Minn. 2014) (declining to decide whether a forfeiture or plain error standard applies to a Blakely claim because the same relief resulted under either standard).

2009E.g., State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 24 (Minn.2006) (stating that impaneling a jury was “necessary ... to vindicate [defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of aggravating sentencing factors”); State v. Thompson, 720 N.W.2d 820, 827 (Minn.2006) (stating that after waiver of jury, the district court “engaged in judicial fact-finding and found several aggravating factors”); State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn.2005) (stating that use of an offender-related factor or its similarity to traditional sentencing judgments did not insulate the departure from the Appren-di/Blakel

2009E.g., State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 24 (Minn.2006) (stating that impaneling a jury was "necessary... to vindicate [defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of aggravating sentencing factors"); State v. Thompson, 720 N.W.2d 820, 827 (Minn. 2006) (stating that after waiver of jury, the district court "engaged in judicial fact-finding and found several aggravating factors"); State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn.2005) (stating that use of an offender-related factor or its similarity to traditional sentencing judgments did not insulate the departure from the Apprendi/Blakely

2025As to Sanders’s second claim, the 4 In Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 301, 305 ; see also Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635, 642–43 (Minn. 2025) (explaining this aspect of Blakely and conducting a Blakely analysis under Minnesota law). 5 district court concluded that “[t]here [was] nothing to indicate that” the district court used the incorrect criminal history score at sentencing.

2025As to Sanders’s second claim, the 4 In Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 301, 305 ; see also Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635, 642–43 (Minn. 2025) (explaining this aspect of Blakely and conducting a Blakely analysis under Minnesota law). 5 district court concluded that “[t]here [was] nothing to indicate that” the district court used the incorrect criminal history score at sentencing.

2025In Mckenzie v. State, we held that a district court does not violate Blakely when it imposes a life sentence without the possibility of release after a jury finds a defendant guilty of first- degree premeditated murder. 713 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. 2006).

2025In Mckenzie v. State, we held that a district court does not violate Blakely when it imposes a life sentence without the possibility of release after a jury finds a defendant guilty of first- degree premeditated murder. 713 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. 2006).

2016See id. at 738 ; Grossman, 636 N.W.2d at 548 ; Jones, 659 N.W.2d at 753-54 (ordering postconviction court to modify defendant’s sentence for criminal sexual conduct to include a conditional-release term that was supported by jury verdict so long as the final sentence did not exceed the maximum presumptive sentence under law).

2016See id. at 738 ; Grossman, 636 N.W.2d at 548 ; Jones, 659 N.W.2d at 753-54 (ordering postconviction court to modify defendant’s sentence for criminal sexual conduct to include a conditional-release term that was supported by jury verdict so long as the final sentence did not exceed the maximum presumptive sentence under law).

2016More specifically, the supreme court decision in State v. Hankerson authorized the retrospective use of a sentencing jury after finding a Blakely violation, and in doing so it carefully considered but rejected Han-kerson’s argument that a resentencing hearing would constitute a violation of Hankerson’s right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. 723 N.W.2d 232, 240 (Minn.2006).

2016More specifically, the supreme court decision in State v. Hankerson authorized the retrospective use of a sentencing jury after finding a Blakely violation, and in doing so it carefully considered but rejected Han-kerson’s argument that a resentencing hearing would constitute a violation of Hankerson’s right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. 723 N.W.2d 232, 240 (Minn.2006).

2015Holley argues that the district court made three errors in its jury instructions: (1) when it instructed the jury during testimony that evidence was “being offered for the purpose of assisting you in determining whether the defendant had actual possession or constructive possession” of a firearm for the sentencing enhancement, it implied that possession had been established and the jury was merely to determine the type of 8 possession; (2) when it instructed the jury to consider the Royster factors in determining whether Holley possessed a firearm, it asked the jury to reach a legal conclusion

2015Holley argues that the district court made three errors in its jury instructions: (1) when it instructed the jury during testimony that evidence was “being offered for the purpose of assisting you in determining whether the defendant had actual possession or constructive possession” of a firearm for the sentencing enhancement, it implied that possession had been established and the jury was merely to determine the type of 8 possession; (2) when it instructed the jury to consider the Royster factors in determining whether Holley possessed a firearm, it asked the jury to reach a legal conclusion

2014Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington, a criminal defendant has a right to a jury trial on facts used by a district court to support an upward sentencing departure. 542 U.S. at 303 , 124 S. Ct. at 2537 ; State v. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Minn. 2004) (applying Blakely in Minnesota).

2014Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington, a criminal defendant has a right to a jury trial on facts used by a district court to support an upward sentencing departure. 542 U.S. at 303 , 124 S. Ct. at 2537 ; State v. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Minn. 2004) (applying Blakely in Minnesota).

2014See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966).

2014See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966).

2013See id. at 579.

2013See id. at 579.

2011But several state and federal courts have addressed the issue and have uniformly held that Blakely and Apprendi are inapplicable to restitution orders because “restitution statutes do not set a maximum restitution amount that can be ordered.” People v. Smith, 181 P.3d 324, 327 (Colo.Ct.App.2007); see United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 404 (1st Cir.2006) (stating that “[t]he statutory restitution scheme is materially different from the sentencing regimens at issue in Blakely ”); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118 (2d Cir.2006) (concluding that the Blakely principle requiring jur

2011But several state and federal courts have addressed the issue and have uniformly held that Blakely and Apprendi are inapplicable to restitution orders because “restitution statutes do not set a maximum restitution amount that can be ordered.” People v. Smith, 181 P.3d 324, 327 (Colo.Ct.App.2007); see United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 404 (1st Cir.2006) (stating that “[t]he statutory restitution scheme is materially different from the sentencing regimens at issue in Blakely ”); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118 (2d Cir.2006) (concluding that the Blakely principle requiring jur

2011But several state and federal courts have addressed the issue and have uniformly held that Blakely and Apprendi are inapplicable to restitution orders because “restitution statutes do not set a maximum restitution amount that can be ordered.” People v. Smith, 181 P.3d 324, 327 (Colo.Ct.App.2007); see United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 404 (1st Cir.2006) (stating that “[t]he statutory restitution scheme is materially different from the sentencing regimens at issue in Blakely ”); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118 (2d Cir.2006) (concluding that the Blakely principle requiring jur

2011But several state and federal courts have addressed the issue and have uniformly held that Blakely and Apprendi are inapplicable to restitution orders because “restitution statutes do not set a maximum restitution amount that can be ordered.” People v. Smith, 181 P.3d 324, 327 (Colo.Ct.App.2007); see United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 404 (1st Cir.2006) (stating that “[t]he statutory restitution scheme is materially different from the sentencing regimens at issue in Blakely ”); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118 (2d Cir.2006) (concluding that the Blakely principle requiring jur

2011But several state and federal courts have addressed the issue and have uniformly held that Blakely and Apprendi are inapplicable to restitution orders because “restitution statutes do not set a maximum restitution amount that can be ordered.” People v. Smith, 181 P.3d 324, 327 (Colo.Ct.App.2007); see United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 404 (1st Cir.2006) (stating that “[t]he statutory restitution scheme is materially different from the sentencing regimens at issue in Blakely ”); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118 (2d Cir.2006) (concluding that the Blakely principle requiring jur