Blakely exception in New Jersey

2005Cf. State v. McMillan, 373 N.J.Super. 27, 28 , 860 A. 2d 484 (App.Div.2004) (holding that an extended term as a persistent offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 is within the Blakely exception and reaffirming our pre- Blakely decision in State v. Dixon, 346 N.J.Super. 126, 139-41 , 787 A. 2d 211 (App.Div.2001), certif. denied, 172 N.J. 181 , 796 A. 2d 898 (2002)).

2005Cf. State v. McMillan, 373 N.J.Super. 27, 28 , 860 A. 2d 484 (App.Div.2004) (holding that an extended term as a persistent offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 is within the Blakely exception and reaffirming our pre- Blakely decision in State v. Dixon, 346 N.J.Super. 126, 139-41 , 787 A. 2d 211 (App.Div.2001), certif. denied, 172 N.J. 181 , 796 A. 2d 898 (2002)).

2005Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2537 , 159 L.Ed. 2d 403, 413 (2004); State v. Natale, 373 N.J.Super. 226, 236 , 861 A. 2d 148 (App.Div.2005).

2004To the extent the other aggravating factors were related to the offense because defendant did not have a record and they cannot be said to be subject to Blakely's exception permitting the judge to make fact-finding relating to prior convictions, 542 U.S. at ___ , 124 S.Ct. at 2536 ; see also, e.g., State v. Dixon, 346 N.J.Super. 126, 140 , 787 A.2d 211, 221 (App.Div.2001) (persistent offender statute upheld) certif. denied, 172 N.J. 181 , 796 A. 2d 898 (2002), the sentence in this case was concurrent and far shorter than the sentence for murder with its thirty-year parole ineligibility term.

2006People v. Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d 61, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51 , 833 N.E.2d 194, 198 (2005) (holding that no Sixth Amendment violation was committed when court found fact of defendant’s two prior convictions, conferring statutory persistent-offender status on defendant); see also State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118 , 110 P.3d 192, 202 (2005) (observing Blakely’s exception that permits judges to find existence of prior convictions).

2006People v. Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d 61, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51 , 833 N.E.2d 194, 198 (2005) (holding that no Sixth Amendment violation was committed when court found fact of defendant’s two prior convictions, conferring statutory persistent-offender status on defendant); see also State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118 , 110 P.3d 192, 202 (2005) (observing Blakely’s exception that permits judges to find existence of prior convictions).

2006People v. Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d 61, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51 , 833 N.E.2d 194, 198 (2005) (holding that no Sixth Amendment violation was committed when court found fact of defendant’s two prior convictions, conferring statutory persistent-offender status on defendant); see also State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118 , 110 P.3d 192, 202 (2005) (observing Blakely’s exception that permits judges to find existence of prior convictions).

2006People v. Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d 61, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51 , 833 N.E.2d 194, 198 (2005) (holding that no Sixth Amendment violation was committed when court found fact of defendant’s two prior convictions, conferring statutory persistent-offender status on defendant); see also State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118 , 110 P.3d 192, 202 (2005) (observing Blakely’s exception that permits judges to find existence of prior convictions).

2005Any constitutional doubt regarding the parole disqualifiers in this case was resolved by Harris, supra. 5 We note that courts of other states have affirmed the constitutionality of judicial imposition of consecutive sentences after Apprendi, supra, Blakely, supra, and Booker, supra. See, e.g., Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 686 (Ind.2005) (concluding that imposition of consecutive terms does not run afoul of Blakely rule because Indiana "statutes do not erect any target or presumption concerning concurrent or consecutive sentences”); see also People v. Black, 35 Cal.4th 1238 , 29 Cal.Rptr.3d

2005Any constitutional doubt regarding the parole disqualifiers in this case was resolved by Harris, supra. 5 We note that courts of other states have affirmed the constitutionality of judicial imposition of consecutive sentences after Apprendi, supra, Blakely, supra, and Booker, supra. See, e.g., Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 686 (Ind.2005) (concluding that imposition of consecutive terms does not run afoul of Blakely rule because Indiana "statutes do not erect any target or presumption concerning concurrent or consecutive sentences”); see also People v. Black, 35 Cal.4th 1238 , 29 Cal.Rptr.3d

2005Any constitutional doubt regarding the parole disqualifiers in this case was resolved by Harris, supra. 5 We note that courts of other states have affirmed the constitutionality of judicial imposition of consecutive sentences after Apprendi, supra, Blakely, supra, and Booker, supra. See, e.g., Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 686 (Ind.2005) (concluding that imposition of consecutive terms does not run afoul of Blakely rule because Indiana "statutes do not erect any target or presumption concerning concurrent or consecutive sentences”); see also People v. Black, 35 Cal.4th 1238 , 29 Cal.Rptr.3d

2004See Carson v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (holding that aggravating circumstances derivative of defendant's criminal history do not implicate the Blakely analysis).

2004See Carson v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (holding that aggravating circumstances derivative of defendant's criminal history do not implicate the Blakely analysis).