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27 California opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2014(Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303 (Blakely).) The Apprendi/Blakely rule has been extended to criminal fines. 2013After the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that defendant Benny Leon, Jr.’s, 11-year upper term state prison sentence for voluntary manslaughter had resulted from prejudicial Blakely error (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 403 ]), the trial court modified the sentence from 11 years to the middle term of six years. | 3 | 10 |
People v. Blackred2 sentences2007The trial court had imposed an upper term sentence of 16 years, based upon "`the nature, seriousness, and *246 circumstances of the crime.'" ( Black I, supra, at p. 1245, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740 , 113 P.3d 534 .) The Supreme Court, rejecting the defendant's Blakely challenge, held that the imposition of an upper term sentence under California's DSL was not unconstitutional, reasoning that "the upper term is the `statutory maximum' for purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis. 2007The trial court had imposed an upper term sentence of 16 years, based upon "`the nature, seriousness, and *246 circumstances of the crime.'" ( Black I, supra, at p. 1245, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740 , 113 P.3d 534 .) The Supreme Court, rejecting the defendant's Blakely challenge, held that the imposition of an upper term sentence under California's DSL was not unconstitutional, reasoning that "the upper term is the `statutory maximum' for purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis. | 3 | 8 |
People v. Sengpadychithgreen2 sentences2007(See Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 ] [Apprendi/Blakely error not “structural error” requiring automatic reversal]; People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ] [Apprendi error reviewable under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]].) Here, however, despite the severity of the assault with a firearm, which also involved an attempted robbery of the liquor store during which Velasquez went behind the counter and pointed a shotgun at on 2007(See Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 ] [Apprendi/Blakely error not “structural error” requiring automatic reversal]; People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ] [Apprendi error reviewable under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]].) Here, however, despite the severity of the assault with a firearm, which also involved an attempted robbery of the liquor store during which Velasquez went behind the counter and pointed a shotgun at on | 3 | 3 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2007(See Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 ] [Apprendi/Blakely error not “structural error” requiring automatic reversal]; People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ] [Apprendi error reviewable under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]].) Here, however, despite the severity of the assault with a firearm, which also involved an attempted robbery of the liquor store during which Velasquez went behind the counter and pointed a shotgun at on 2007(See Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 ] [Apprendi/Blakely error not “structural error” requiring automatic reversal]; People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ] [Apprendi error reviewable under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]].) Here, however, despite the severity of the assault with a firearm, which also involved an attempted robbery of the liquor store during which Velasquez went behind the counter and pointed a shotgun at on | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Roger Day, Jr.green2 sentences2014(Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [ 132 S.Ct. 2344, 2348-2349 , 183 L.Ed.2d 318 ] (Southern Union); United States v. Day (4th Cir. 2012) 700 F.3d 713, 732 (Day).) 16 Lower federal courts have held that Apprendi does not apply to restitution orders. 2013(Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [ 132 S.Ct. 2344 , 2348–2349, 183 L.Ed.2d. 318] (Southern Union); United States v. Day (4th Cir. 2012) 700 F.3d 713, 732 (Day).) Lower federal courts have held that Apprendi does not apply to restitution orders. | 2 | 2 |
Washington v. Recuencogreen2 sentences2007(See Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 ] [Apprendi/Blakely error not “structural error” requiring automatic reversal]; People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ] [Apprendi error reviewable under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]].) Here, however, despite the severity of the assault with a firearm, which also involved an attempted robbery of the liquor store during which Velasquez went behind the counter and pointed a shotgun at on 2007(See Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 ] [Apprendi/Blakely error not “structural error” requiring automatic reversal]; People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ] [Apprendi error reviewable under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ]].) Here, however, despite the severity of the assault with a firearm, which also involved an attempted robbery of the liquor store during which Velasquez went behind the counter and pointed a shotgun at on | 1 | 7 |
United States v. Bookergreen2 sentences2007Quoting United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. *881 220, 268, 125 S.Ct. 738, 769 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621, 665 , the People argue that in reviewing claims of Blakely error, appellate courts must apply "ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below." We agree, but what the People fail to recognize is that the futility exception to the requirement of an objection in the trial court is one such "ordinary prudential doctrine." Thus, defendant did not forfeit his claim of Blakely error because making a Blakely objection in the trial court at the time of his s 2007Quoting United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. *881 220, 268, 125 S.Ct. 738, 769 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621, 665 , the People argue that in reviewing claims of Blakely error, appellate courts must apply "ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below." We agree, but what the People fail to recognize is that the futility exception to the requirement of an objection in the trial court is one such "ordinary prudential doctrine." Thus, defendant did not forfeit his claim of Blakely error because making a Blakely objection in the trial court at the time of his s | 1 | 2 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2007Merits of Blakely challenge In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ( Apprendi), the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a law that permitted an enhancement that could have resulted in potentially double the maximum sentence for possession of a firearm in the event that the judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that a hate crime had been committed. 2007Merits of Blakely challenge In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ( Apprendi), the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a law that permitted an enhancement that could have resulted in potentially double the maximum sentence for possession of a firearm in the event that the judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that a hate crime had been committed. | 1 | 2 |
Hankerson v. Stategreen2 sentences2009It concluded the retrial was “not a second prosecution,” but rather a “sentencing proceeding on remand — a continuation of a single prosecution.” (State v. Sawatzky (2005) 339 Or. 689, 696-697 [ 125 P.3d 722, 726 ]; see also Hankerson v. State (Minn. 2006) 723 N.W.2d 232, 241, fn. 5 .) Defendant has not identified, nor have we found, a single decision holding that aggravating factors must be retried together with all the elements of the underlying offenses to which they attach. 2009It concluded the retrial was "not a second prosecution," but rather a "sentencing proceeding on remand—a continuation of a single prosecution." ( State v. Sawatzky (2005) 339 Or. 689, 696-697 [ 125 P.3d 722, 726 ]; see also Hankerson v. State (Minn. 2006) 723 N.W.2d 232, 241, fn. 5 .) Defendant has not identified, nor have we found, a single decision holding that aggravating factors must be retried together with all the elements of the underlying offenses to which they attach. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sawatzkygreen2 sentences2009It concluded the retrial was “not a second prosecution,” but rather a “sentencing proceeding on remand — a continuation of a single prosecution.” (State v. Sawatzky (2005) 339 Or. 689, 696-697 [ 125 P.3d 722, 726 ]; see also Hankerson v. State (Minn. 2006) 723 N.W.2d 232, 241, fn. 5 .) Defendant has not identified, nor have we found, a single decision holding that aggravating factors must be retried together with all the elements of the underlying offenses to which they attach. 2009It concluded the retrial was “not a second prosecution,” but rather a “sentencing proceeding on remand — a continuation of a single prosecution.” (State v. Sawatzky (2005) 339 Or. 689, 696-697 [ 125 P.3d 722, 726 ]; see also Hankerson v. State (Minn. 2006) 723 N.W.2d 232, 241, fn. 5 .) Defendant has not identified, nor have we found, a single decision holding that aggravating factors must be retried together with all the elements of the underlying offenses to which they attach. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ringgreen2 sentences2009(State v. Ring (2003) 204 Ariz. 534, 550-551 [ 65 P.3d 915, 931-932 ].) Arizona’s high court observed that, while completing trial before the same judge or jury “is ideal, a defendant holds no absolute right to such an arrangement.” (Id,., 65 P.3d at p. 932 .) Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed a judgment due to Blakely error but rejected a claim that double jeopardy barred retrial of the sentencing enhancement. 2009(State v. Ring (2003) 204 Ariz. 534, 550-551 [ 65 P.3d 915, 931-932 ].) Arizona’s high court observed that, while completing trial before the same judge or jury “is ideal, a defendant holds no absolute right to such an arrangement.” (Id,., 65 P.3d at p. 932 .) Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed a judgment due to Blakely error but rejected a claim that double jeopardy barred retrial of the sentencing enhancement. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hillgreen2 sentences2008(See Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 221-222 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , *48 2553] (Recuenco); People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ].) These cases are inapposite to the question of whether the error can be forfeited by a defendant’s failure to object. 5 To the extent that People v. Hill (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1103 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 891 ], is inconsistent with this opinion, we disapprove it. 6 Under circumstances, like those in the present case, in which the law is in a state of flux and the scope of the defendant’s Si 2008(See Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 221-222 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , *48 2553] (Recuenco); People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 ].) These cases are inapposite to the question of whether the error can be forfeited by a defendant’s failure to object. 5 To the extent that People v. Hill (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1103 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 891 ], is inconsistent with this opinion, we disapprove it. 6 Under circumstances, like those in the present case, in which the law is in a state of flux and the scope of the defendant’s Si | 1 | 1 |
Ring v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2007It concluded that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Id. at p. 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 .) This principle, the court explained, derives from two constitutional rights, namely, the right to trial by jury, and the prohibition against depriving a person of liberty without due process of law. ( Id. at pp. 476-477, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; see also Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 603-609 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 .) In Blakely, sup 2007It concluded that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Id. at p. 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 .) This principle, the court explained, derives from two constitutional rights, namely, the right to trial by jury, and the prohibition against depriving a person of liberty without due process of law. ( Id. at pp. 476-477, 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; see also Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 603-609 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 .) In Blakely, sup | 1 | 1 |
People v. Birksgreen2 sentences2007Under these circumstances, defendant's Blakely challenge was not forfeited. ( People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 116, fn. 6 , 77 *245 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073 ; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703-704 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 789 P.2d 887 .) Any doubt concerning the possible forfeiture of defendant's Blakely challenge was laid to rest by our Supreme Court recently in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 , 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ( Sandoval) . 2007Under these circumstances, defendant's Blakely challenge was not forfeited. ( People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 116, fn. 6 , 77 *245 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073 ; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703-704 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 789 P.2d 887 .) Any doubt concerning the possible forfeiture of defendant's Blakely challenge was laid to rest by our Supreme Court recently in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 , 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ( Sandoval) . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Scottgreen2 sentences2007(See ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 [ Apprendi/Blakely error not "structural error" requiring automatic reversal]; see People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 [ Apprendi error reviewable under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ].) Here, however, despite the severity of the assault with a firearm, which also involved an attempted robbery of the liquor store during which Velasquez went behind the counter and pointed a shotgun at one of the sto 2007(See ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 [ Apprendi/Blakely error not "structural error" requiring automatic reversal]; see People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851 , 27 P.3d 739 [ Apprendi error reviewable under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 ].) Here, however, despite the severity of the assault with a firearm, which also involved an attempted robbery of the liquor store during which Velasquez went behind the counter and pointed a shotgun at one of the sto | 1 | 1 |
| Crawford v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Torogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Neder v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Juan Sanchez-Cervantes, AKA Hugo Quirox, Quiroc, Quiroz, Quiroz Trejo, and Quiroz Tapiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Guiuangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Municipal Court (Ahnemann)green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cunningham v. California
green
2 sentences2007The jury's verdict of guilty on an offense authorizes the judge to sentence a defendant to any of the three terms specified by statute as the potential punishments for that offense, as long as the judge exercises his or her discretion in a reasonable manner that is consistent with the requirements and guidelines contained in statutes and court rules." ( Black I, supra, at pp. 1257-1258, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740 , 113 P.3d 534 .) The defendant hi Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S.___, 127 S.Ct. 856 , received an upper term sentence of 16 years under California's DSL, the sentencing judge having found six ag 2007The jury's verdict of guilty on an offense authorizes the judge to sentence a defendant to any of the three terms specified by statute as the potential punishments for that offense, as long as the judge exercises his or her discretion in a reasonable manner that is consistent with the requirements and guidelines contained in statutes and court rules." ( Black I, supra, at pp. 1257-1258, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740 , 113 P.3d 534 .) The defendant hi Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S.___, 127 S.Ct. 856 , received an upper term sentence of 16 years under California's DSL, the sentencing judge having found six ag | 4 | 2007–2007 |
Southern Union Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences2014(Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [ 132 S.Ct. 2344, 2348-2349 , 183 L.Ed.2d 318 ] (Southern Union); United States v. Day (4th Cir. 2012) 700 F.3d 713, 732 (Day).) 16 Lower federal courts have held that Apprendi does not apply to restitution orders. 2014(Southern Union Co. v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [ 132 S.Ct. 2344, 2348-2349 , 183 L.Ed.2d 318 ] (Southern Union); United States v. Day (4th Cir. 2012) 700 F.3d 713, 732 (Day).) 16 Lower federal courts have held that Apprendi does not apply to restitution orders. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
People v. Sandoval
red
2 sentences2007Under these circumstances, defendant's Blakely challenge was not forfeited. ( People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 116, fn. 6 , 77 *245 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073 ; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703-704 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 789 P.2d 887 .) Any doubt concerning the possible forfeiture of defendant's Blakely challenge was laid to rest by our Supreme Court recently in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 , 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ( Sandoval) . 2007Under these circumstances, defendant's Blakely challenge was not forfeited. ( People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 116, fn. 6 , 77 *245 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073 ; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703-704 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 789 P.2d 887 .) Any doubt concerning the possible forfeiture of defendant's Blakely challenge was laid to rest by our Supreme Court recently in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 , 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ( Sandoval) . | 2 | 2007–2008 |
People v. Blakely
green
1 sentence2025Blakely believed the voices meant [the victim] was ‘the demon.’ Based on this evidence, Blakely contends ‘the jurors could have found that because of his delusional state, [he] had a moral imperative to rid 25 the world of [the victim], who was the devil.’ Thus, Blakely’s claim is that he suffered an insane delusion which rendered him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.” (Blakely, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 780 .) The Court of Appeal disagreed, stating: “there is no evidence in the record before us from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Blakely believed his crimes were mo | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. RETANAN
green
2 sentences2016(Retanan, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229 .) The court reasoned that because the Blakely rule “does not apply to the determination that defendant does not come within section 654 because that finding is not a factual determination made by a judge that increases the maximum statutory penalty for the particular crime or crimes,” the same analysis should apply to section 667.61. 2016(Retanan, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229 .) The court reasoned that because the Blakely rule “does not apply to the determination that defendant does not come within section 654 because that finding is not a factual determination made by a judge that increases the maximum statutory penalty for the particular crime or crimes,” the same analysis should apply to section 667.61. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Turner
green
2 sentences2007Under these circumstances, defendant's Blakely challenge was not forfeited. ( People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 116, fn. 6 , 77 *245 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073 ; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703-704 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 789 P.2d 887 .) Any doubt concerning the possible forfeiture of defendant's Blakely challenge was laid to rest by our Supreme Court recently in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 , 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ( Sandoval) . 2007Under these circumstances, defendant's Blakely challenge was not forfeited. ( People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 116, fn. 6 , 77 *245 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073 ; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703-704 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 789 P.2d 887 .) Any doubt concerning the possible forfeiture of defendant's Blakely challenge was laid to rest by our Supreme Court recently in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 , 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ( Sandoval) . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Shepard v. United States
green
2 sentences2007Specifically, he contends it was error here for the trial court to rely on the "fact" that his prior convictions were "numerous" and of "increasing seriousness." According to defendant, an assessment of the number and increasing seriousness of a defendant's prior convictions "involve[s] qualitative findings regarding the convictions which go beyond the mere fact of the prior conviction themselves]." In support of this argument, defendant cites a plurality opinion in Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13 , 125 S.Ct. 1254 , 161 L.Ed.2d 205 . 2007Specifically, he contends it was error here for the trial court to rely on the "fact" that his prior convictions were "numerous" and of "increasing seriousness." According to defendant, an assessment of the number and increasing seriousness of a defendant's prior convictions "involve[s] qualitative findings regarding the convictions which go beyond the mere fact of the prior conviction themselves]." In support of this argument, defendant cites a plurality opinion in Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13 , 125 S.Ct. 1254 , 161 L.Ed.2d 205 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Hanson
green
2 sentences2007(See Recuenco, supra , 548 U.S. at p. ____ [ 126 S.Ct. at p. 2550 ] ["If respondent is correct that Washington law does not provide for a procedure by which his jury could have made a finding pertaining to his possession of a firearm, that merely suggests that respondent will be able to demonstrate that the Blakely violation in this particular case was not harmless" (italics omitted)].) Second, the evidence on which the court based its recidivism related findings was contained in a probation report that was not presented to the jury. 9 We reject Govan's request that we consider whether to bar 2007(See Recuenco, supra , 548 U.S. at p. ____ [ 126 S.Ct. at p. 2550 ] ["If respondent is correct that Washington law does not provide for a procedure by which his jury could have made a finding pertaining to his possession of a firearm, that merely suggests that respondent will be able to demonstrate that the Blakely violation in this particular case was not harmless" (italics omitted)].) Second, the evidence on which the court based its recidivism related findings was contained in a probation report that was not presented to the jury. 9 We reject Govan's request that we consider whether to bar | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences2007I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion the error in imposing upper term sentences was not harmless. [12] As the majority explains, the trial court's error in making the factual findings upon which it based its decision to impose the upper term sentences, rather than submitting those issues to the jury, is subject to harmless error analysis. ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 [Apprendi/Blakely error not "structural error" requiring automatic reversal]; see People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 , 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 2007I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion the error in imposing upper term sentences was not harmless. [12] As the majority explains, the trial court's error in making the factual findings upon which it based its decision to impose the upper term sentences, rather than submitting those issues to the jury, is subject to harmless error analysis. ( Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 [Apprendi/Blakely error not "structural error" requiring automatic reversal]; see People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 , 109 Cal. Rptr.2d | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Marchand
green
2 sentences2007Although we nevertheless have discretion to reach the merits of his claim ( People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056 , 1061 ), we decline to exercise our discretion here. *Page 28 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 2007Although we nevertheless have discretion to reach the merits of his claim ( People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056 , 1061 ), we decline to exercise our discretion here. *Page 28 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Ali
green
2 sentences2007(See Recuenco, supra , 548 U.S. at p. ____ [ 126 S.Ct. at p. 2550 ] ["If respondent is correct that Washington law does not provide for a procedure by which his jury could have made a finding pertaining to his possession of a firearm, that merely suggests that respondent will be able to demonstrate that the Blakely violation in this particular case was not harmless" (italics omitted)].) Second, the evidence on which the court based its recidivism related findings was contained in a probation report that was not presented to the jury. 9 We reject Govan's request that we consider whether to bar 2007(See Recuenco, supra , 548 U.S. at p. ____ [ 126 S.Ct. at p. 2550 ] ["If respondent is correct that Washington law does not provide for a procedure by which his jury could have made a finding pertaining to his possession of a firearm, that merely suggests that respondent will be able to demonstrate that the Blakely violation in this particular case was not harmless" (italics omitted)].) Second, the evidence on which the court based its recidivism related findings was contained in a probation report that was not presented to the jury. 9 We reject Govan's request that we consider whether to bar | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
2 sentences2007The People rely on Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 *882 to support their argument, but that reliance is misplaced. 2007The People rely on Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 *882 to support their argument, but that reliance is misplaced. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Black
green
2 sentences2007In accord with Blakely , therefore, the middle term prescribed in California's statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum. [Citation.] Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, [citation], the DSL violates Apprendi's bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, `any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" ( Cunningham, 2007In accord with Blakely , therefore, the middle term prescribed in California's statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum. [Citation.] Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, [citation], the DSL violates Apprendi's bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, `any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" ( Cunningham, | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2007At that time, our Supreme Court's decision in Black remained good law, and the trial court was bound by it. [1] (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 , 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 .) Accordingly, a Blakely objection at the time of defendant's sentencing would have been futile. 2007At that time, our Supreme Court's decision in Black remained good law, and the trial court was bound by it. [1] (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 , 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 .) Accordingly, a Blakely objection at the time of defendant's sentencing would have been futile. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Sepulveda v. United States
green
2 sentences2005(See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ].) Defendant’s sentence was not indiscriminately “plucked out of thin air,” but rather was the product of the trial court’s careful consideration and determination “based upon discrete findings of fact established by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” (Sepulveda v. United States, supra, 330 F.3d 55, 60 .) And judges are not considered inherently less trustworthy than jurors to impose a fair sentence. 2005(See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ].) Defendant’s sentence was not indiscriminately “plucked out of thin air,” but rather was the product of the trial court’s careful consideration and determination “based upon discrete findings of fact established by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” (Sepulveda v. United States, supra, 330 F.3d 55, 60 .) And judges are not considered inherently less trustworthy than jurors to impose a fair sentence. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. Sean Lamar Sanders, A/K/A Sean Lamont Sanders green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Foucha v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.