section 1983 qualified immunity in Massachusetts

2008See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 46-48, 49 (1989) (Federal system of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [1982] applied to actions under Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.

1997See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) (establishing qualified immunity standard under 42 U.S.C. §1983 ); See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (qualified immunity allows a defendant to move for summary judgment on the ground that, based on “clearly established” rights, he could reasonably have believed his acts to be lawful).

2008See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43, 46-48, 49 (1989) (Federal system of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [1982] applied to actions under Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.

1999The Court of Appeals concluded that the Legislature intended to exclude vicarious liability under the MCRA because it modeled the statute after 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and presumably was aware that a year earlier, in Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the Supreme Court had construed § 1983 as excluding vicarious liability. 9 The Court of Appeals in Lyons reasoned that the Supreme Judicial Court had held in Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass, at 823, that the MCRA is “coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . except that the Federal statute requires State a

2003Contrast Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Commrs. of Springfield, supra at 33-34; Cady v. Marcella, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 334, 339 (2000).

1999Maddocks, supra. In Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Springfield, supra at 31, which dealt with an immunity defense under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , this court distinguished between immunity from liability and immunity from suit, holding that only orders denying immunity from suit enjoy the benefit of the present execution rule.

2020In determining questions of qualified and absolute immunity under § 1983, the Supreme Court reads the statute "in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).

1988In Chicopee Lions Club v. District Attorney for the Hampden Dist., 396 Mass. 244, 248 (1985), we said that Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976), required us to focus on the nature of the official behavior challenged (the functional nature of the activities) rather than solely on the defendant’s status or position.

1989See Jordan v. Sinsheimer, 403 Mass. 586, 588-589 (1988).

1989See Jordan v. Sinsheimer, 403 Mass. 586, 588-589 (1988).

2020As explained in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-340 (1986): "[The] initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts.

2020As explained in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-340 (1986): "[The] initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts.

2003See Davis v. Scherer, supra, at 196 n.14 (law creates discretionary authority for purposes of § 1983 qualified immunity whenever it “fails to specify the precise action that the official must take in each instance”).

2003Contrast Breault v. Chairman of the Bd. of Fire Commrs. of Springfield, supra at 33-34; Cady v. Marcella, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 334, 339 (2000).

1999See Hopper v. Callahan, 408 Mass. 621, 624 (1990) (interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment motion asserting immunity); Matthews v. Rakiey, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1995).

1999See Hopper v. Callahan, 408 Mass. 621, 624 (1990) (interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment motion asserting immunity); Matthews v. Rakiey, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 490, 493 (1995).

1999The Court of Appeals concluded that the Legislature intended to exclude vicarious liability under the MCRA because it modeled the statute after 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and presumably was aware that a year earlier, in Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the Supreme Court had construed § 1983 as excluding vicarious liability. 9 The Court of Appeals in Lyons reasoned that the Supreme Judicial Court had held in Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass, at 823, that the MCRA is “coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . except that the Federal statute requires State a

1997See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) (establishing qualified immunity standard under 42 U.S.C. §1983 ); See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (qualified immunity allows a defendant to move for summary judgment on the ground that, based on “clearly established” rights, he could reasonably have believed his acts to be lawful).

1996See, e.g., Martino v. Hogan, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 710, 720 (1994), further app. rev. den. 419 Mass. 1106 (1995) (implying that if plaintiff had a cause of action based directly on the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, rather than only on the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act or 42 U.S.C. §1983 , qualified immunity would probably be a defense to that action, as well).

1988In Chicopee Lions Club v. District Attorney for the Hampden Dist., 396 Mass. 244, 248 (1985), we said that Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976), required us to focus on the nature of the official behavior challenged (the functional nature of the activities) rather than solely on the defendant’s status or position.

1985See, e.g., Marrero v. Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.

1985See, e.g.,McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1984) (district attorney absolutely immune in § 1983 suit for allegedly coercive use of prosecutorial power in offering to drop criminal charges in exchange for civil settlement); Siano v. Justices of Mass., 698 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), *249 cert, denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983) (absolute immunity in § 1983 action for prosecutor who allegedly allowed the use of forged evidence against plaintiff).