case falls within rule in Kansas

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1990In his opinion, the trial judge stated: “After a finding of the lack of probable cause within the contents of the affidavit, the next step is whether the case falls within the exception to the exclusionary rule created by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

1990In his opinion, the trial judge stated: “After a finding of the lack of probable cause within the contents of the affidavit, the next step is whether the case falls within the exception to the exclusionary rule created by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 82 L.

1984Phillips contends that because it would not be obligated to refund increased prices to purchasers on gas it used where the increased rates were disapproved, this case falls within the rule of Columbian Fuel Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 176 Kan. 433 , 271 P.2d 773 (1954), which denied payment of interest on an amount due from a gas purchaser under an interim order of the Kansas Corporation Commission.

1984Phillips contends that because it would not be obligated to refund increased prices to purchasers on gas it used where the increased rates were disapproved, this case falls within the rule of Columbian Fuel Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 176 Kan. 433 , 271 P.2d 773 (1954), which denied payment of interest on an amount due from a gas purchaser under an interim order of the Kansas Corporation Commission.

1973Appellant points out that in Rose we commented “. . . it may be stated as a general rule that what may or may not constitute a nuisance in a particular case depends upon many things, such as the type of neighborhood, the nature of the thing or wrong complained of, its proximity to those alleging injury or damage, its frequency, continuity or duration, the damage or annoyance resulting, and that each case must of necessity depend upon the particular facts and circumstances.” (p.489.) In Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 , recovery was sought from a city on the theory that exc

1973Appellant points out that in Rose we commented “. . . it may be stated as a general rule that what may or may not constitute a nuisance in a particular case depends upon many things, such as the type of neighborhood, the nature of the thing or wrong complained of, its proximity to those alleging injury or damage, its frequency, continuity or duration, the damage or annoyance resulting, and that each case must of necessity depend upon the particular facts and circumstances.” (p.489.) In Allen v. City of Ogden, 210 Kan. 136 , 499 P. 2d 527 , recovery was sought from a city on the theory that exc

1973However, he asserts this case falls within the exception stated in Rose v. Board of Education, 184 Kan. 486 , 337 P. 2d 652 , as follows: “A well-recognized exception, however, to the general rules pertaining to immunity of a governmental instrumentality for tort liability while engaged in a governmental function, is that the doctrine of immunity does not extend to cases where the conduct of the city or, as here, a school board, results in creating or maintaining a nuisance.” (p. 489.) Succinctly stated, appellant contends that permitting students to gather on the school grounds without access

1973However, he asserts this case falls within the exception stated in Rose v. Board of Education, 184 Kan. 486 , 337 P. 2d 652 , as follows: “A well-recognized exception, however, to the general rules pertaining to immunity of a governmental instrumentality for tort liability while engaged in a governmental function, is that the doctrine of immunity does not extend to cases where the conduct of the city or, as here, a school board, results in creating or maintaining a nuisance.” (p. 489.) Succinctly stated, appellant contends that permitting students to gather on the school grounds without access

1969Upon this point we quote from Bank v. Ginty, 108 Cal. 153 , 41 Pac. 40 : “ ‘The pledge stood, therefore, as security for both notes, and the case falls within the doctrine invoked by plaintiff that where a creditor holds two notes or obligations one better secured than the other, and has collateral security for both alike, he has the right, in the absence of any modifying agreement, to have the collateral applied upon the obligation which is most precarious by reason of being least secured.

1961(G.S. 1949, 44-501; Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79 , 174 P.2d 78 ; Lessley v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 171 Kan. 197, 203 , 231 P.2d 239 .) Boeing contends that as the petition alleges that it, Boeing, had assumed full control of all motor and pedestrian traffic on the street and at the crosswalk in question, the case falls within the rule of Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434 , 312 P.2d 220 .

1961(G.S. 1949, 44-501; Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79 , 174 P.2d 78 ; Lessley v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 171 Kan. 197, 203 , 231 P.2d 239 .) Boeing contends that as the petition alleges that it, Boeing, had assumed full control of all motor and pedestrian traffic on the street and at the crosswalk in question, the case falls within the rule of Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434 , 312 P.2d 220 .

1961(G.S. 1949, 44-501; Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79 , 174 P.2d 78 ; Lessley v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 171 Kan. 197, 203 , 231 P.2d 239 .) Boeing contends that as the petition alleges that it, Boeing, had assumed full control of all motor and pedestrian traffic on the street and at the crosswalk in question, the case falls within the rule of Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434 , 312 P.2d 220 .

1961(G.S. 1949, 44-501; Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79 , 174 P.2d 78 ; Lessley v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 171 Kan. 197, 203 , 231 P.2d 239 .) Boeing contends that as the petition alleges that it, Boeing, had assumed full control of all motor and pedestrian traffic on the street and at the crosswalk in question, the case falls within the rule of Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434 , 312 P.2d 220 .

1961(G.S. 1949, 44-501; Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79 , 174 P.2d 78 ; Lessley v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 171 Kan. 197, 203 , 231 P.2d 239 .) Boeing contends that as the petition alleges that it, Boeing, had assumed full control of all motor and pedestrian traffic on the street and at the crosswalk in question, the case falls within the rule of Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434 , 312 P.2d 220 .

1961(G.S. 1949, 44-501; Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79 , 174 P.2d 78 ; Lessley v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 171 Kan. 197, 203 , 231 P.2d 239 .) Boeing contends that as the petition alleges that it, Boeing, had assumed full control of all motor and pedestrian traffic on the street and at the crosswalk in question, the case falls within the rule of Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434 , 312 P.2d 220 .

1958This case falls within the rule that general provisions relating to the statute of limitations, such as 60-307, supra, are not applicable to a statute creating a liability where none existed previously and which fixes the time within which the action must be brought (Rodman v. Railway Co., 65 Kan. 645 , 70 Pac. 642 ; Bohrer v. State Highway Comm., 137 Kan. 925, 927 , 22 P. 2d 470 ; Bowles v. Portelance, 145 Kan. 940 , 67 P. 2d 419 .) The trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the amended petition.

1958This case falls within the rule that general provisions relating to the statute of limitations, such as 60-307, supra, are not applicable to a statute creating a liability where none existed previously and which fixes the time within which the action must be brought (Rodman v. Railway Co., 65 Kan. 645 , 70 Pac. 642 ; Bohrer v. State Highway Comm., 137 Kan. 925, 927 , 22 P. 2d 470 ; Bowles v. Portelance, 145 Kan. 940 , 67 P. 2d 419 .) The trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the amended petition.

1958This case falls within the rule that general provisions relating to the statute of limitations, such as 60-307, supra, are not applicable to a statute creating a liability where none existed previously and which fixes the time within which the action must be brought (Rodman v. Railway Co., 65 Kan. 645 , 70 Pac. 642 ; Bohrer v. State Highway Comm., 137 Kan. 925, 927 , 22 P. 2d 470 ; Bowles v. Portelance, 145 Kan. 940 , 67 P. 2d 419 .) The trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the amended petition.

1958This case falls within the rule that general provisions relating to the statute of limitations, such as 60-307, supra, are not applicable to a statute creating a liability where none existed previously and which fixes the time within which the action must be brought (Rodman v. Railway Co., 65 Kan. 645 , 70 Pac. 642 ; Bohrer v. State Highway Comm., 137 Kan. 925, 927 , 22 P. 2d 470 ; Bowles v. Portelance, 145 Kan. 940 , 67 P. 2d 419 .) The trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the amended petition.

1958This case falls within the rule that general provisions relating to the statute of limitations, such as 60-307, supra, are not applicable to a statute creating a liability where none existed previously and which fixes the time within which the action must be brought (Rodman v. Railway Co., 65 Kan. 645 , 70 Pac. 642 ; Bohrer v. State Highway Comm., 137 Kan. 925, 927 , 22 P. 2d 470 ; Bowles v. Portelance, 145 Kan. 940 , 67 P. 2d 419 .) The trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the amended petition.

1958This case falls within the rule that general provisions relating to the statute of limitations, such as 60-307, supra, are not applicable to a statute creating a liability where none existed previously and which fixes the time within which the action must be brought (Rodman v. Railway Co., 65 Kan. 645 , 70 Pac. 642 ; Bohrer v. State Highway Comm., 137 Kan. 925, 927 , 22 P. 2d 470 ; Bowles v. Portelance, 145 Kan. 940 , 67 P. 2d 419 .) The trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the amended petition.

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1947(Fair v. Golden Rule Refining Co., 134 Kan. 623, 624 , 7 P. 2d 70 .) It is of no consequence that if we were triers of fact we might hold that the case falls within the rule of Cox v. Refining Co.,, 108 Kan. 320 , 195 Pac. 863 , and later eases of that sort.” (p. 705.) See, also, Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383 , 103 P. 2d 818 ; also Rubins v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 499 , 163 P. 2d 364 , and Bull v. Patti Const. Co., 152 Kan. 618 , 106 P. 2d 690 .

1940Lindley argues that this case falls within the rule announced in the case of Campbell v. Ramsey, 150 Kan. 368 , 92 P. 2d 819 , with reference to the voters who were helped mark their ballots when they did not have any physical defect.

1940Lindley argues that this case falls within the rule announced in the case of Campbell v. Ramsey, 150 Kan. 368 , 92 P. 2d 819 , with reference to the voters who were helped mark their ballots when they did not have any physical defect.

1938L. 187.) We have concluded that this case falls within the rule laid down in Sigler v. Sigler, 98 Kan. 524 , 158 Pac. 864 .

1938L. 187.) We have concluded that this case falls within the rule laid down in Sigler v. Sigler, 98 Kan. 524 , 158 Pac. 864 .

1933It seems clear to me that this case falls within this rule and the authorities cited in its support in Beldon v. Hooper, 115 Kan. 678 , 224 Pac. 34 , syl. ¶ 1.

1933It seems clear to me that this case falls within this rule and the authorities cited in its support in Beldon v. Hooper, 115 Kan. 678 , 224 Pac. 34 , syl. ¶ 1.

1929Under these circumstances the case falls within the rule declared in City of Sedan v. Church, 29 Kan. 190 , where this court said: “Trial courts are invested with a very large and extended discretion in the granting of new trials; and new trials ought to be granted whenever, in the opinion of the trial court, the party asking for the new trial has not in all probability had a reasonably fair trial, and has not in all probability obtained or received substantial justice, although it might be difficult for the trial court or the parties to state the grounds for such new trial upon paper so plain

1929If 2.) See, also, Klopfenstein v. Traction Co., 109 Kan. 351 , 198 Pac. 930 ; Hughes v. Vossler, 110 Kan. 279, 281 , 203 Pac. 1107 ; Stille v. Stille, 115 Kan. 420 , 223 Pac. 281 .

1929If 2.) See, also, Klopfenstein v. Traction Co., 109 Kan. 351 , 198 Pac. 930 ; Hughes v. Vossler, 110 Kan. 279, 281 , 203 Pac. 1107 ; Stille v. Stille, 115 Kan. 420 , 223 Pac. 281 .

1929If 2.) See, also, Klopfenstein v. Traction Co., 109 Kan. 351 , 198 Pac. 930 ; Hughes v. Vossler, 110 Kan. 279, 281 , 203 Pac. 1107 ; Stille v. Stille, 115 Kan. 420 , 223 Pac. 281 .

1929If 2.) See, also, Klopfenstein v. Traction Co., 109 Kan. 351 , 198 Pac. 930 ; Hughes v. Vossler, 110 Kan. 279, 281 , 203 Pac. 1107 ; Stille v. Stille, 115 Kan. 420 , 223 Pac. 281 .

1929If 2.) See, also, Klopfenstein v. Traction Co., 109 Kan. 351 , 198 Pac. 930 ; Hughes v. Vossler, 110 Kan. 279, 281 , 203 Pac. 1107 ; Stille v. Stille, 115 Kan. 420 , 223 Pac. 281 .

1929If 2.) See, also, Klopfenstein v. Traction Co., 109 Kan. 351 , 198 Pac. 930 ; Hughes v. Vossler, 110 Kan. 279, 281 , 203 Pac. 1107 ; Stille v. Stille, 115 Kan. 420 , 223 Pac. 281 .

1926The case falls within the rule declared in Baldwin v. Soldiers’ Compensation Board, 117 Kan. 129 , 230 Pac. 82 , where this court said: “The evidence did not show — to the satisfaction of the trial court, at least— that plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Kansas at the time he entered the army.

1926The case falls within the rule declared in Baldwin v. Soldiers’ Compensation Board, 117 Kan. 129 , 230 Pac. 82 , where this court said: “The evidence did not show — to the satisfaction of the trial court, at least— that plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Kansas at the time he entered the army.

1923Now, as a rule, all betting or wagering contracts are considered as inconsistent with the interests of society, at variance with the/laws of morality, against public policy, and therefore void.” (Cleveland v. Wolff, 7 Kan. 184, 187 .) It is argued in behalf of the plaintiff that the case falls within the rule that competing for a premium offered by others than the competitors is not a betting transaction, but we think the argument unsound.

1922The case falls within the doctrine of The State v. Bogue, 52 Kan. 79 , 34 Pac. 410 , where it was held that evidence of declarations by the principal in the absence of the accessory before the fact was inadmissible.

1921We do not believe this case falls within the doctrine of the cases where, during rest periods or at the noon hour, workmen have sustained injuries on the premises where they are employed' — as was held in Thomas v. Manufacturing Co., 104 Kan. 432 , 179 Pac. 372 , where a seventeen-year-old girl who re-' mained on the premises where she was employed during a half-hour intermission at noon, and after eating her. lunch, was injured by falling from a truck pushed or drawn by a fellow employee.

1921We do not believe this case falls within the doctrine of the cases where, during rest periods or at the noon hour, workmen have sustained injuries on the premises where they are employed' — as was held in Thomas v. Manufacturing Co., 104 Kan. 432 , 179 Pac. 372 , where a seventeen-year-old girl who re-' mained on the premises where she was employed during a half-hour intermission at noon, and after eating her. lunch, was injured by falling from a truck pushed or drawn by a fellow employee.

1921Nor does the present case fall within the doctrine of Chance v. Coal & Mining Co., 108 Kan. 121 , 193 Pac. 889 , where it was ruled that an injury which occurs while an employee is doing what he might reasonably do at the time and place is one which arises “out of and in the course of his employment.” The words, “out of and in the course of the employment” have been uniformly held by the British courts and many American courts to be used conjunctively and not disjunctively.

1921Nor does the present case fall within the doctrine of Chance v. Coal & Mining Co., 108 Kan. 121 , 193 Pac. 889 , where it was ruled that an injury which occurs while an employee is doing what he might reasonably do at the time and place is one which arises “out of and in the course of his employment.” The words, “out of and in the course of the employment” have been uniformly held by the British courts and many American courts to be used conjunctively and not disjunctively.

1919This case falls within the rule of Ehrsam v. Brown, 76 Kan. 206 , 91 Pac. 179 , which held that where a known and. described article is sold under a contract to be executed by delivery, there is no implied warranty that it shall answer the particular purposes of the buyer.

1919This case falls within the rule of Ehrsam v. Brown, 76 Kan. 206 , 91 Pac. 179 , which held that where a known and. described article is sold under a contract to be executed by delivery, there is no implied warranty that it shall answer the particular purposes of the buyer.

1919The case falls within the principle of the decision referred to, and the facts are quite similar to those of Blocker v. Howell, 45 Okla. 610 , which is there cited.