case falls within rule in California

1956In the case of Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345 [ 47 P. 113, 598 , 56 Am.St.Rep. 106 ] . . ., this court refused to extend the rule of the turntable cases to a pond of water, and characterized that rule as an exceptionally harsh rule of liability.” ’ ” There are several elements to the doctrine of attractive nuisance in this state.

1956In the case of Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345 [ 47 P. 113, 598 , 56 Am.St.Rep. 106 ] . . ., this court refused to extend the rule of the turntable cases to a pond of water, and characterized that rule as an exceptionally harsh rule of liability.” ’ ” There are several elements to the doctrine of attractive nuisance in this state.

2018(Gonzalez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 163 , citing Vick v. DaCorsi (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 206 , 210–211.) Pep Boys argues that this case falls within that exception to the general rule, and that the trial court correctly relied upon McDaniel v. Asuncion (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1201 (McDaniel).

2018(Gonzalez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 163 , citing Vick v. DaCorsi (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 206 , 210–211.) Pep Boys argues that this case falls within that exception to the general rule, and that the trial court correctly relied upon McDaniel v. Asuncion (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1201 (McDaniel).

2018(Gonzalez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 163 , citing Vick v. DaCorsi (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 206 , 210–211.) Pep Boys argues that this case falls within that exception to the general rule, and that the trial court correctly relied upon McDaniel v. Asuncion (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1201 (McDaniel).

2018(Gonzalez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 163 , citing Vick v. DaCorsi (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 206 , 210–211.) Pep Boys argues that this case falls within that exception to the general rule, and that the trial court correctly relied upon McDaniel v. Asuncion (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1201 (McDaniel).

2018(Gonzalez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 163 , citing Vick v. DaCorsi (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 206 , 210–211.) Pep Boys argues that this case falls within that exception to the general rule, and that the trial court correctly relied upon McDaniel v. Asuncion (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1201 (McDaniel).

2018(Gonzalez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 163 , citing Vick v. DaCorsi (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 206 , 210–211.) Pep Boys argues that this case falls within that exception to the general rule, and that the trial court correctly relied upon McDaniel v. Asuncion (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1201 (McDaniel).

1988Accordingly, we are not convinced that this case falls within the exception suggested by In re Brendan P. Finally, father cites Greene v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 307 [ 231 P.2d 821 ], for the proposition that between courts of concurrent jurisdiction the court first acquiring it exercises exclusive jurisdiction.

1988Accordingly, we are not convinced that this case falls within the exception suggested by In re Brendan P. Finally, father cites Greene v. Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 307 [ 231 P.2d 821 ], for the proposition that between courts of concurrent jurisdiction the court first acquiring it exercises exclusive jurisdiction.

2025The “law of the case” rule will be disregarded when necessary to avoid an “unjust decision.” (Searle, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 435 .) Thus, “a court is not absolutely precluded by the law of the case from reconsidering questions decided upon a former appeal.

2024That narrow exception exists where “the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman.” (Flowers, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1001 .) This exception, however, is “principally limited to situations in which the plaintiff can invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., when a layperson ‘is able to say as a matter of common knowledge and observation that the consequences of professional treatment were not such as ordinarily would have followed if due care had been exercised.’ The classic example, of course, is the X-ray revealing a scalpel left in th

2024In the portion of the brief discussing the need for an accomplice instruction, defendant contends “the prosecutor improperly invoked the prestige of his office to vouch for Rodriguez’s otherwise abysmal credibility [citation], and [an accomplice] instruction likely would have negated that.” 21 Defendant cites United States v. Weatherspoon (2005) 410 F.3d 1142 to establish that no admonition may overcome misconduct “affect[ing] the jury’s ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly,” but the Ninth Circuit in fact held that the curative instructions given in that case “did not delive

2024In the portion of the brief discussing the need for an accomplice instruction, defendant contends “the prosecutor improperly invoked the prestige of his office to vouch for Rodriguez’s otherwise abysmal credibility [citation], and [an accomplice] instruction likely would have negated that.” 21 Defendant cites United States v. Weatherspoon (2005) 410 F.3d 1142 to establish that no admonition may overcome misconduct “affect[ing] the jury’s ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly,” but the Ninth Circuit in fact held that the curative instructions given in that case “did not delive

2024“It is well settled that making a timely and specific objection at trial, and requesting the jury be admonished (if jury is not waived), is a necessary prerequisite to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal. [Citations.] ‘The primary purpose of the requirement that a defendant object at trial to 41 argument constituting prosecutorial misconduct is to give the trial court an opportunity, through admonition of the jury, to correct any error and mitigate any prejudice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328 .) Defendant contends this case falls within an ex

2016(County of Los Angeles, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 998–1000.) This case falls within the rule of County of Los Angeles.

2015However, as in Ortiz, “[w]e next inquire whether the error in denying defendant’s motion for severance was prejudicial so as to require reversal of the conviction.” (Ortiz, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 45 .) Before we proceed to that analysis, we pause to reject respondent’s apparent contention that this case falls within an exception to the Ortiz requirement, as found in People v. Hernandez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 936 and People v. Wickliffe (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 37 .

2015However, as in Ortiz, “[w]e next inquire whether the error in denying defendant’s motion for severance was prejudicial so as to require reversal of the conviction.” (Ortiz, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 45 .) Before we proceed to that analysis, we pause to reject respondent’s apparent contention that this case falls within an exception to the Ortiz requirement, as found in People v. Hernandez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 936 and People v. Wickliffe (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 37 .

2015However, as in Ortiz, “[w]e next inquire whether the error in denying defendant’s motion for severance was prejudicial so as to require reversal of the conviction.” (Ortiz, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 45 .) Before we proceed to that analysis, we pause to reject respondent’s apparent contention that this case falls within an exception to the Ortiz requirement, as found in People v. Hernandez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 936 and People v. Wickliffe (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 37 .

2013(People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423 .) However, “[a] unanimity instruction is required only if the jurors could otherwise disagree which act a defendant committed and yet convict him of the crime charged. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “‘“[W]here the acts were substantially identical in nature, so that any juror believing one act took place would inexorably believe all acts took place, the instruction is not necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 932 .) It is also well-established that a unanimity instruction is not required w

2013(People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 100 ; People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 875 ; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 .) “The continuous course of conduct exception arises in two contexts. [Citations.] ‘The first is when the acts are so closely connected that they form part of one and the same transaction, and thus one offense. [Citation.] The second is when . . . the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jenkins (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 287, 299 .) The exception applies “when the

2013(People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 100 ; People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 875 ; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 .) “The continuous course of conduct exception arises in two contexts. [Citations.] ‘The first is when the acts are so closely connected that they form part of one and the same transaction, and thus one offense. [Citation.] The second is when . . . the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jenkins (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 287, 299 .) The exception applies “when the

2013(People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423 .) However, “[a] unanimity instruction is required only if the jurors could otherwise disagree which act a defendant committed and yet convict him of the crime charged. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “‘“[W]here the acts were substantially identical in nature, so that any juror believing one act took place would inexorably believe all acts took place, the instruction is not necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 932 .) It is also well-established that a unanimity instruction is not required w

2013So, in other words, if your behavior and your statements, when looked at in their totality and context, are threatening, and it’s done for the purpose of dissuading an officer, that also can be a crime.” This case falls within the exception described above: The acts described by the prosecutor were “ ‘so closely connected in time as to form part of one transaction,’ ” appellant “ ‘tender[ed] the same defense or defenses to each act’ ” and “ ‘there [was] no reasonable basis for the jury to distinguish between them. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Bui, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1010–1011.) Some o

2013(People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 100 ; People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 875 ; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 .) “The continuous course of conduct exception arises in two contexts. [Citations.] ‘The first is when the acts are so closely connected that they form part of one and the same transaction, and thus one offense. [Citation.] The second is when . . . the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jenkins (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 287, 299 .) The exception applies “when the

1991Thus, this case falls within the rule applied in cases such as Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 62 *506 Cal.2d at page 526: “ ‘When it is proved that defendant assaulted decedent with a dangerous weapon in a manner endangering life and resulting in death and the jury concludes that the evidence did not create in their minds a reasonable doubt whether defendant’s act may have been justified or its criminal character mitigated by the influence of passion (e.g., of terror, People v. Logan 175 Cal. 45, 48 , 49 . . .) then no further proof of malice or of intent to kill is required to support a ve