case falls within rule in Kentucky

1972Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 344 S.W.2d 407 (1961); Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 389 S.W.2d 907 (1965).

1965See Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 ; Combs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 626 ; Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 344 S. W.2d 407 ; Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 ; Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52 , 111 S.W.2d 445 .

1938“But it is suggested that this case falls within the rule announced in Farmers’ Bank of Somerset v. Board of Supervisors of Pulaski County, 225 Ky. 246 , 8 S. W. (2d) 401 .

1938“But it is suggested that this case falls within the rule announced in Farmers’ Bank of Somerset v. Board of Supervisors of Pulaski County, 225 Ky. 246 , 8 S. W. (2d) 401 .

1931We therefore conclude that this case falls within the rule laid down in Anderson v. Hall’s Adm’r, 80 Ky. 91 , and McClelland’s Ex’r v. McCleland, etc., 132 Ky. 284 , 116 S. W. 730 .

1913We therefore conclude that this case falls within the rule laid down in Anderson v. Hall’s Admr., 80 Ky., 91 , and McClelland’s Ex’r. v. McClelland, &c, 132 Ky., 284 .

1931We therefore conclude that this case falls within the rule laid down in Anderson v. Hall’s Adm’r, 80 Ky. 91 , and McClelland’s Ex’r v. McCleland, etc., 132 Ky. 284 , 116 S. W. 730 .

1931We therefore conclude that this case falls within the rule laid down in Anderson v. Hall’s Adm’r, 80 Ky. 91 , and McClelland’s Ex’r v. McCleland, etc., 132 Ky. 284 , 116 S. W. 730 .

2012He contends that this case falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine described in A.C. v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.3d 319 (Ky.App.2010).

1972Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 344 S.W.2d 407 (1961); Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 389 S.W.2d 907 (1965).

1971“To the extent only that Grimes v. Goodlett and Adams, supra, and our other cases following and cited herein might be taken to indicate views inconsistent herewith, they shall be considered modified.” This case falls within the rule of Hudson v. Owens, supra. On the basis of all of the evidence the board was not convinced that the cerebral hemorrhage sustained by the employee was caused by any work-connected event.

1971“To the extent only that Grimes v. Goodlett and Adams, supra, and our other cases following and cited herein might be taken to indicate views inconsistent herewith, they shall be considered modified.” This case falls within the rule of Hudson v. Owens, supra. On the basis of all of the evidence the board was not convinced that the cerebral hemorrhage sustained by the employee was caused by any work-connected event.

1965See Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 ; Combs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 626 ; Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 344 S. W.2d 407 ; Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 ; Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52 , 111 S.W.2d 445 .

1965See Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 ; Combs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 626 ; Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 344 S. W.2d 407 ; Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 ; Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52 , 111 S.W.2d 445 .

1965See Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 ; Combs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 626 ; Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 344 S. W.2d 407 ; Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 ; Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52 , 111 S.W.2d 445 .

1965See Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 ; Combs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 626 ; Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 344 S.W.2d 407 ; Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 ; Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52 , 111 S.W.2d 445 .

1965See Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 ; Combs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 626 ; Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 344 S. W.2d 407 ; Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 ; Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52 , 111 S.W.2d 445 .

1965See Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 ; Combs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 378 S.W.2d 626 ; Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 344 S.W.2d 407 ; Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 ; Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52 , 111 S.W.2d 445 .

1960In that respect the case falls within the rule stated in Elswick v. Elswick, 1927, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S.W. 1070 , and Moore v. Bugg’s Ex’r, 1958, 274 Ky. 135 , 118 S.W.2d 185, 189 , which decisions, though involving rescission rather than specific performance, rest upon the same principle, to wit, that the recovery of property conveyed in consideration of future support must depend on a breach that is real and substantial.

1960In that respect the case falls within the rule stated in Elswick v. Elswick, 1927, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S.W. 1070 , and Moore v. Bugg’s Ex’r, 1958, 274 Ky. 135 , 118 S.W.2d 185, 189 , which decisions, though involving rescission rather than specific performance, rest upon the same principle, to wit, that the recovery of property conveyed in consideration of future support must depend on a breach that is real and substantial.

1960In that respect the case falls within the rule stated in Elswick v. Elswick, 1927, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S.W. 1070 , and Moore v. Bugg’s Ex’r, 1958, 274 Ky. 135 , 118 S.W.2d 185, 189 , which decisions, though involving rescission rather than specific performance, rest upon the same principle, to wit, that the recovery of property conveyed in consideration of future support must depend on a breach that is real and substantial.

1960In that respect the case falls within the rule stated in Elswick v. Elswick, 1927, 220 Ky. 723 , 295 S.W. 1070 , and Moore v. Bugg’s Ex’r, 1958, 274 Ky. 135 , 118 S.W.2d 185, 189 , which decisions, though involving rescission rather than specific performance, rest upon the same principle, to wit, that the recovery of property conveyed in consideration of future support must depend on a breach that is real and substantial.

1960Higgason v. Henry, Ky., 313 S.W.2d 275 .

1956Gibson v. Sellars, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 911 ; Blevins v. Riedling, 280 Ky. 335 , 158 S.W.2d 646.

1956Gibson v. Sellars, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 911 ; Blevins v. Riedling, 280 Ky. 335 , 158 S.W.2d 646.

1954We think, this case falls within the rule announced in Ellis v. Litteral, 296 Ky. 287 , 176 S.W.2d 883 , which is to the effect that when death follows soon after an injury to an able-bodied man a presumption arises that the death was caused by the injury.

1954We think, this case falls within the rule announced in Ellis v. Litteral, 296 Ky. 287 , 176 S.W.2d 883 , which is to the effect that when death follows soon after an injury to an able-bodied man a presumption arises that the death was caused by the injury.

1953Since the question of the Liberty Bank’s negligence was properly submitted to the jury and there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict the case falls within the rule laid down in Security Savings Bank of Covington Kentucky v. First National Bank of Michigan City, Indiana, 106 F.2d 542, 544 , 127 Á.L.R. 116.

1953Thus this case falls within the rule of Williams v. Johnson, 284 Ky. 23 , 143 S.W.2d 738 , 135 A.L.R. 1131 , and Board of Education of Taylor County v. Board of Education of City of Campbellsville, 292 Ky. 261 , 166 S.W.2d 295 .

1953Thus this case falls within the rule of Williams v. Johnson, 284 Ky. 23 , 143 S.W.2d 738 , 135 A.L.R. 1131 , and Board of Education of Taylor County v. Board of Education of City of Campbellsville, 292 Ky. 261 , 166 S.W.2d 295 .

1953Thus this case falls within the rule of Williams v. Johnson, 284 Ky. 23 , 143 S.W.2d 738 , 135 A.L.R. 1131 , and Board of Education of Taylor County v. Board of Education of City of Campbellsville, 292 Ky. 261 , 166 S.W.2d 295 .

1953Thus this case falls within the rule of Williams v. Johnson, 284 Ky. 23 , 143 S.W.2d 738 , 135 A.L.R. 1131 , and Board of Education of Taylor County v. Board of Education of City of Campbellsville, 292 Ky. 261 , 166 S.W.2d 295 .

1953The' Chancellor was of the opinion -4md we:think correctly so — that.this case falls- within the rule laid down in Avery & Sons v. Woodruff-& Cahill, 144 Ky. 227, 137 .

1952In our opinion this case falls within rule (a) as formulated by this court in Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v. Dale, 257 Ky. 501 , 78 S.W.2d 305 , because: (1) The condition was not inherently dangerous; (2) a license was presumably obtained from the City for the construction of the sidewalk; (3) the contrivance was constructed in a reasonably safe manner after a reasonably safe plan so as not to be an obstruction on the sidewalk; (4) the evidence reveals that the appellee exercised at least ordinary care to maintain the contrivance in a reasonably safe condition; and (5) appellee did not have actua

1952In our opinion this case falls within rule (a) as formulated by this court in Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v. Dale, 257 Ky. 501 , 78 S.W.2d 305 , because: (1) The condition was not inherently dangerous; (2) a license was presumably obtained from the City for the construction of the sidewalk; (3) the contrivance was constructed in a reasonably safe manner after a reasonably safe plan so as not to be an obstruction on the sidewalk; (4) the evidence reveals that the appellee exercised at least ordinary care to maintain the contrivance in a reasonably safe condition; and (5) appellee did not have actua

1945Co. v. Yett, 293 Ky. 71 , 168 S. W. 2d 556, 558 , in the following language: “We think the facts of the case call for application of the rule pronounced in numerous decisions of this court that a servant who knowingly continues to work with inadequate assistance or inadequate tools assumes the risk attendant upon his employment, if he knows, or if it is plainly obvious to a person of ordinary prudence, that performing such work under similar circumstances will subject the servant to a severe strain and likely result in the injury complained of. * * * We have invariably held that, because a man

1945Co. v. Yett, 293 Ky. 71 , 168 S. W. 2d 556, 558 , in the following language: “We think the facts of the case call for application of the rule pronounced in numerous decisions of this court that a servant who knowingly continues to work with inadequate assistance or inadequate tools assumes the risk attendant upon his employment, if he knows, or if it is plainly obvious to a person of ordinary prudence, that performing such work under similar circumstances will subject the servant to a severe strain and likely result in the injury complained of. * * * We have invariably held that, because a man

1943We think that in composing the seventh clause the composer was group minded, to borrow a term from the American Law Institute’s Be-statement of the Law of Property (Yol. 3 “Future Interests”), and that all factors considered, the case falls within the rule expressed in the concluding paragraph of our opinion in Ford v. Jones, 223 Ky. 327 , 3 S. W. (2d) 781, 786 , in the following language: “Where, under the provisions of a will, a gift to a class is postponed until after the termination of a preceding estate, as a rule, those members of the class, and those only, take who are in existence when

1943We think that in composing the seventh clause the composer was group minded, to borrow a term from the American Law Institute’s Be-statement of the Law of Property (Yol. 3 “Future Interests”), and that all factors considered, the case falls within the rule expressed in the concluding paragraph of our opinion in Ford v. Jones, 223 Ky. 327 , 3 S. W. (2d) 781, 786 , in the following language: “Where, under the provisions of a will, a gift to a class is postponed until after the termination of a preceding estate, as a rule, those members of the class, and those only, take who are in existence when

1941It is insisted for appellant, however, that appellee and his predecessors in title acquiesced for many years in the practical location of the line along the old rail fence as claimed by appellant and that the case falls within the rule laid down in Peters v. Hendricks, 225 Ky. 722 , 9 S. W. (2d) 1076 , "and the many cases cited therein, to the effect that where a fence has long been recognized by the parties as a division line, each holding, claiming, cultivating and controlling the land up to the fence on his side for more than 15-years, the fence would be treated as the division line even th

1941It is insisted for appellant, however, that appellee and his predecessors in title acquiesced for many years in the practical location of the line along the old rail fence as claimed by appellant and that the case falls within the rule laid down in Peters v. Hendricks, 225 Ky. 722 , 9 S. W. (2d) 1076 , "and the many cases cited therein, to the effect that where a fence has long been recognized by the parties as a division line, each holding, claiming, cultivating and controlling the land up to the fence on his side for more than 15-years, the fence would be treated as the division line even th

1941In any event, we give no serious consideration to the argument that the case falls within the rule laid down in Hollon v. Campton Fuel and Light Co., 127 Ky. 266 , 105 S. W. 426 , 32 Ky. Law Rep. 178 , and other cases of similar import to the effect that if the evidence shows that an injury might have resulted from one of two or more causes, only one of which was due to defendant’s negligence, and the inference that the injury resulted from one cause is no stronger than that it resulted from the other, the plaintiff has failed to make out his case.

1941In any event, we give no serious consideration to the argument that the case falls within the rule laid down in Hollon v. Campton Fuel and Light Co., 127 Ky. 266 , 105 S. W. 426 , 32 Ky. Law Rep. 178 , and other cases of similar import to the effect that if the evidence shows that an injury might have resulted from one of two or more causes, only one of which was due to defendant’s negligence, and the inference that the injury resulted from one cause is no stronger than that it resulted from the other, the plaintiff has failed to make out his case.

1939The case falls within the rule laid down in McGill v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 114 Ky. 358 , 70 S. W. 1048 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1244 ; Ingram v. Covington, etc., R.

1939The case falls within the rule laid down in McGill v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 114 Ky. 358 , 70 S. W. 1048 , 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1244 ; Ingram v. Covington, etc., R.