case falls within rule in Missouri

1976Relying upon State v. Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74 (Mo.1968), and State v. Mitchell, 491 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. banc 1973), the State insists that the evidence in this case falls within the exception of common scheme or design.

1975Relying upon State v. Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74 (Mo.1968), and State v. Mitchell, 491 S.W.2d 292 (Mo.banc 1973), the State insists that the evidence in this case falls within the exception of common scheme or design.

1976Relying upon State v. Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74 (Mo.1968), and State v. Mitchell, 491 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. banc 1973), the State insists that the evidence in this case falls within the exception of common scheme or design.

1975Relying upon State v. Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74 (Mo.1968), and State v. Mitchell, 491 S.W.2d 292 (Mo.banc 1973), the State insists that the evidence in this case falls within the exception of common scheme or design.

1932Co., 305 Mo. 619 , 267 S.W. 907 , and other cases following it.

1932Co., 305 Mo. 619 , 267 S.W. 907 , and other cases following it.

1904This case falls within the rule laid down in Mechem on Public Office and Officers, sec. 332: “If payment of the salary or other compensation be made by the government in good faith to the officer de facto while he is still in possession of the office, the government can not be compelled to pay it a second time to the officer de jxore when he has recovered the office, at least when the officer de facto held by color of title.” In State v. Walbridge, 153 Mo. 194 , the court distinguished - a case of this kind from one where there had been no intrusion into the office and no de facto officer and

1903Chapman v. Walbridge, 153 Mo. 194 .

1892Riggins v. O'Brien, 34 Mo. App. 613 .” We concur fully in what Judge Thompson says and only add that in this case the record recites the existence of the necessary fact, and it is not necessary to invoke the presumption of right acting.

1890Riggins v. O'Brien, 34 Mo. App. 613 .

2025“As 4 a general rule, moot cases must be dismissed.” Friends of the San Luis, 312 S.W.3d at 484 .

1991In his first ground appellant asserts that juror Flippo’s special visit to the scene of the parties’ accident and subsequent communication of his investigations to the jury after its first vote during deliberations, constitute independent acts of misconduct outside his duty as juror. 4 In support of his position, appellant distinguishes the case sub judice from the Supreme Court decisions in Baumle v. Smith, 420 S.W.2d 341 (Mo.1967) and State ex rel.

1990“To hold that the activity in this case falls within the exception would be to hold that all the construction work is per se inherently dangerous.” Hofstetter, 724 S.W.2d at 531 .

1985Plaintiffs argument that this case falls within an exception to the statute of frauds enunciated in Ryan Equipment Company v. Fichen, 423 S.W.2d 63 (Mo.App.1967) and Carvitto v. Ryle, 495 S.W.2d 109 (Mo.App.1973) misses the mark.

1985Plaintiffs argument that this case falls within an exception to the statute of frauds enunciated in Ryan Equipment Company v. Fichen, 423 S.W.2d 63 (Mo.App.1967) and Carvitto v. Ryle, 495 S.W.2d 109 (Mo.App.1973) misses the mark.

1979Schweitzer v. Greene, supra. Appellant first claims that this case falls within an exception to the general rule because the dismissed union may be vicariously liable for Finley’s acts.

1978Their exclusive reliance for that contention is Lucas v. Beco Homes, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 417 (Mo.App.1973).

1976As stated in Part XII of the opinion in State v. Johnson, supra, “the case falls within an exception recognized in State v. Wiley, 522 S.W.2d 281, 290 [16, 17] (Mo. banc 1975).

1970State v. Kornegger, 363 Mo. 968 , 255 S.W. 2d 765, 768 , quoted with approval in State v. Smith, Mo.Sup., 431 S.W.2d 74, 79 .

1970State v. Kornegger, 363 Mo. 968 , 255 S.W. 2d 765, 768 , quoted with approval in State v. Smith, Mo.Sup., 431 S.W.2d 74, 79 .

1970Next, in Portell v. Pevely Dairy Co., Mo., 388 S.W.2d 790 , Portell sued Pevely and its driver, Bannon, for injuries received in a collision between Pevely’s truck and plaintiff’s automobile.

1968But this case falls within the exception to that rule; here “ * * * the evidence has shown such an occurrence [leaving the sponge in plaintiff’s back] * * * as the lay juror can determine would not likely happen in the exercise of ordinary care and skill.” Rauschelbach v. Benincasa, Mo., 372 S.W.2d 120 , l.c. 124[5].

1968See also: Hart v. Steele, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 927, 932 [8, 9]; Hasemeier v. Smith, supra; Williams v. Chamberlain, Mo., 316 S.W.2d 505, 511 .

1968See also: Hart v. Steele, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 927, 932 [8, 9]; Hasemeier v. Smith, supra; Williams v. Chamberlain, Mo., 316 S.W.2d 505, 511 .

1960The case of White v. Bevier Coal Co., 364 Mo. 313 , 261 S.W.2d 81 , loc. cit. 82, was one to determine the extent of defendant’s easement and whether it included the right to build a road.

1960The case of White v. Bevier Coal Co., 364 Mo. 313 , 261 S.W.2d 81 , loc. cit. 82, was one to determine the extent of defendant’s easement and whether it included the right to build a road.