case falls within rule in Texas

1975This case falls within the rule announced in Gaston v. State, 440 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).

1975This case falls within the rule announced in Gaston v. State, 440 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).

1974Thus, the case falls within the rule announced in Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574 , 44 S.W. 1059 (1898), to the effect that when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, such evidence is in legal effect no evidence, and it will not support a verdict or judgment.” We have carefully reviewed the record and can find no evidence of actionable negligence on the part of Delta.

1974Thus, the case falls within the rule announced in Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574 , 44 S.W. 1059 (1898), to the effect that when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, such evidence is in legal effect no evidence, and it will not support a verdict or judgment.” We have carefully reviewed the record and can find no evidence of actionable negligence on the part of Delta.

1957The Court of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that if Brown & Root paid the deceased for his time in returning to Houston a holding that the injury was compensable was but a logical extension of the exception which allows compensation where the employer provides transportation for an employee in going to and returning from his place of employment, and relied, in large part, on Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission, 35 Cal. 2d 33 , 215 Pac. 2d 736 .

1957The Court of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that if Brown & Root paid the deceased for his time in returning to Houston a holding that the injury was compensable was but a logical extension of the exception which allows compensation where the employer provides transportation for an employee in going to and returning from his place of employment, and relied, in large part, on Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission, 35 Cal. 2d 33 , 215 Pac. 2d 736 .

1923R. 624 , 245 S. W. 241 ; White v. State, 93 Tex. Cr.

1923Appellant insists in his motion that the case falls within the rule laid down in Mayo v. State, 245 S. W.

1923R. 624 , 245 S. W. 241 ; White v. State, 93 Tex. Cr.

1923Rep., 241 ; White v. State, 247 S. W.

2016Southwinds relies on Amir v. International Bank of Commerce, 419 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.), to argue that this case falls within an exception to the general rule.

2016Southwinds relies on Amir v. International Bank of Commerce, 419 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.), to argue that this case falls within an exception'to the general rule.

2002Nevertheless, Continental strenuously urges that this case falls within the exception articulated in McCaslin, in which the Texas supreme court held that, despite the requirements of Rule 327, there are some types of misconduct that are “so highly prejudicial and inimical to fairness” that the burden of proving probable injury is met, prima facie at least, by simply showing the improper act and nothing more. 159 Tex. at 279, 317 S.W.2d at 921 .

1989Appellant recognizes the general rule that a proper instruction can cure the admission of improper evidence but argues this case falls within the exception of Cavender v. State, 547 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) and Ladd v. State, 629 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, pet. ref’d).

1989Appellant recognizes the general rule that a proper instruction can cure the admission of improper evidence but argues this case falls within the exception of Cavender v. State, 547 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) and Ladd v. State, 629 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, pet. ref’d).

1981He asserts that notwithstanding the courts’ holdings that Article 8307 § 5 is jurisdictional and mandatory, Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. LaCoke, 585 S.W.2d 678 (Tex.1979); New York Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Ehlinger, 593 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ), this case falls within an exception giving the court jurisdiction despite the late filing so as to avoid “a harsh and inequitable result.” What appellant would have us do is carve out a “good cause” exception to Art. 8307 § 5.

1981He asserts that notwithstanding the courts’ holdings that Article 8307 § 5 is jurisdictional and mandatory, Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. LaCoke, 585 S.W.2d 678 (Tex.1979); New York Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Ehlinger, 593 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ), this case falls within an exception giving the court jurisdiction despite the late filing so as to avoid “a harsh and inequitable result.” What appellant would have us do is carve out a “good cause” exception to Art. 8307 § 5.

1981The exception renders the general rule inapplicable to an agreement in which one person clearly undertakes to indemnify another against liability for injuries or damages caused by defects in certain premises or resulting from the maintenance or operation of a specified instrumentality as in Mitchell’s, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424 , 303 S.W.2d 775 (1957); and Houston and T.

1981The exception renders the general rule inapplicable to an agreement in which one person clearly undertakes to indemnify another against liability for injuries or damages caused by defects in certain premises or resulting from the maintenance or operation of a specified instrumentality as in Mitchell’s, Inc. v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424 , 303 S.W.2d 775 (1957); and Houston and T.

1980Furthermore, we are unpersuaded that this case falls within the exception to the four year statute of limitations set out in Hall v. Miller, 147 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1941, writ dism’d, judgment cor.) Duke asserts his right to a constructive trust, but this equitable remedy is clearly barred if not brought within four years.

1977Without reiterating all of the authorities hereinbefore discussed, we feel that they are here applicable, and this case falls within the rule in Ellwood v. Nutex Oil Co., 148 S.W .2d 862 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1941, writ ref’d n.r.e.), as follows: We think this case falls within the general rules applicable to contracts, that one who unconditionally obligates himself to do a thing possible of performance, must be held to perform it (Kingsville Cotton Oil Co. v. Dallas Waste Mills, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W. 832 ; Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 253 S.W. 908 , writ refused); and though

1977Without reiterating all of the authorities hereinbefore discussed, we feel that they are here applicable, and this case falls within the rule in Ellwood v. Nutex Oil Co., 148 S.W .2d 862 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1941, writ ref’d n.r.e.), as follows: We think this case falls within the general rules applicable to contracts, that one who unconditionally obligates himself to do a thing possible of performance, must be held to perform it (Kingsville Cotton Oil Co. v. Dallas Waste Mills, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W. 832 ; Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 253 S.W. 908 , writ refused); and though

1975We conclude that the case falls within the rule, announced in Griffin v. Stewart, supra, and other authorities above cited, that the burden is on the party pleading usury to establish that a transaction which appears legal on its face is in fact a subterfuge to cloak usury.

1971O’Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273 , 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960); Owens v. Hockett, 151 Tex. 503 , 251 S.W.2d 957 (1952); Dunn v. Deussen, 268 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1971O’Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273 , 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960); Owens v. Hockett, 151 Tex. 503 , 251 S.W.2d 957 (1952); Dunn v. Deussen, 268 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1971O’Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273 , 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960); Owens v. Hockett, 151 Tex. 503 , 251 S.W.2d 957 (1952); Dunn v. Deussen, 268 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1971O’Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273 , 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960); Owens v. Hockett, 151 Tex. 503 , 251 S.W.2d 957 (1952); Dunn v. Deussen, 268 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1971O’Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273 , 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960); Owens v. Hockett, 151 Tex. 503 , 251 S.W.2d 957 (1952); Dunn v. Deussen, 268 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1970This case falls within the rule set forth in McGarry *423 v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 597 , 200 S.W.2d 527 , and reasserted in our recent case of Dues v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 456 S.W.2d 116 , and the cases there cited as follows.

1970This case falls within the rule set forth in McGarry *423 v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 597 , 200 S.W.2d 527 , and reasserted in our recent case of Dues v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 456 S.W.2d 116 , and the cases there cited as follows.