case falls within rule (Idaho) · Go Syfert
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case falls within rule in Idaho

12 Idaho opinions name it 1 courts 1914–1986 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Ennis v. Smithgreen
wash · 1933 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
2 sentences

1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S.

1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

CaseCitedYears
Stewart v. Weiser Lumber Co. green
idaho · 1912
2 sentences

1914To our minds this case falls within the rule announced in Stewart v. Weiser Lumber Co., 21 Ida. 340 , 121 Pac. 775 , and the long line of cases from this court followed in the StewartWeiser Lumber Company ease.

1914To our minds this case falls within the rule announced in Stewart v. Weiser Lumber Co., 21 Ida. 340 , 121 Pac. 775 , and the long line of cases from this court followed in the StewartWeiser Lumber Company ease.

21914–1914
Reed v. Bliss & Van Auken Lumber Co. green
mich · 1923
2 sentences

1986But whether we treat the case as presenting a question of law or of fact or of both law and fact, I am persuaded that the result reached by the department of labor and industry should not be disturbed. [4] Clearwater Timber relied upon Reed & Bliss v. Vanduken Lumber, 225 Mich. 164 , 196 N.W. 420 (1923), and also these cases cited in the Reed & Bliss opinion: Cook v. S.S.

1986But whether we treat the case as presenting a question of law or of fact or of both law and fact, I am persuaded that the result reached by the department of labor and industry should not be disturbed. [4] Clearwater Timber relied upon Reed & Bliss v. Vanduken Lumber, 225 Mich. 164 , 196 N.W. 420 (1923), and also these cases cited in the Reed & Bliss opinion: Cook v. S.S.

11986–1986
Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co. green
· 1932
2 sentences

1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S.

1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S.

11972–1972
Cupples v. Stanfield neutral
idaho · 1922
2 sentences

1972Appellant also attacks the testimony of Clark concerning the statements made to him by the alleged agent, Miller, arguing that these statements were hearsay, and should have been excluded as incompetent evidence. 7 This case falls within the rule articulated by this Court in Hayward v. Yost: 8 “The declarations of an alleged agent made outside the presence of the alleged principal are, of themselves, incompetent to prove agency, Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho 466 , 207 P. 326 , yet where the agency has been established by independent evidence, the declarations as corroborative evidence are adm

1972Appellant also attacks the testimony of Clark concerning the statements made to him by the alleged agent, Miller, arguing that these statements were hearsay, and should have been excluded as incompetent evidence. 7 This case falls within the rule articulated by this Court in Hayward v. Yost: 8 “The declarations of an alleged agent made outside the presence of the alleged principal are, of themselves, incompetent to prove agency, Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho 466 , 207 P. 326 , yet where the agency has been established by independent evidence, the declarations as corroborative evidence are adm

11972–1972
Bell v. Washam green
gactapp · 1950
2 sentences

1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S.

1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S.

11972–1972
State v. Webster green
idaho · 1928
2 sentences

1960There was no entrapment and the requested instructions were properly refused, State v. Webster, 46 Idaho 798 , 271 P. 578 , and authorities therein cited.” Therefore, any error in failing to instruct on this' defense fully was not prejudicial.

1960There was no entrapment and the requested instructions were properly refused, State v. Webster, 46 Idaho 798 , 271 P. 578 , and authorities therein cited.” Therefore, any error in failing to instruct on this' defense fully was not prejudicial.

11960–1960
State v. Garde green
idaho · 1949
2 sentences

1960In such instance, the case falls within the rule announced in State v. Garde, 69 Idaho 209 , 205 P.2d 504, 505 , wherein the Court said: “The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff disclosed that the appellant was given the opportunity either to make a sale or refuse to do so and that he chose to sell.

1960In such instance, the case falls within the rule announced in State v. Garde, 69 Idaho 209 , 205 P.2d 504, 505 , wherein the Court said: “The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff disclosed that the appellant was given the opportunity either to make a sale or refuse to do so and that he chose to sell.

11960–1960
Cabassa v. Ramón Rivera neutral
prsupreme · 1951
1 sentence

1952Brown v. Brown, 31 Wash. 397 , 72 P. 86 , 62 L.R.A. 974 , and that a husband is bound to pay alimony to a former wife notwithstanding the fact that he has remarried.

11952–1952
State ex rel. Brown v. Brown neutral
wash · 1903
2 sentences

1952Brown v. Brown, 31 Wash. 397 , 72 P. 86 , 62 L.R.A. 974 , and that a husband is bound to pay alimony to a former wife notwithstanding the fact that he has remarried.

1952Brown v. Brown, 31 Wash. 397 , 72 P. 86 , 62 L.R.A. 974 , and that a husband is bound to pay alimony to a former wife notwithstanding the fact that he has remarried.

11952–1952
Herrett v. Herrett green
wash · 1914
2 sentences

1952In the case of Herrett v. Herrett, 80 Wash. 474 , 141 P. 1158 , on page 1160, the question is discussed as follows: “It may be said that the case falls within the rule of State ex rel.

1952In the case of Herrett v. Herrett, 80 Wash. 474 , 141 P. 1158 , on page 1160, the question is discussed as follows: “It may be said that the case falls within the rule of State ex rel.

11952–1952
Humphreys v. Idaho Gold Mines Development Co. neutral
idaho · 1912
2 sentences

1949C., and the case falls within the doctrine announced in Humphreys v. Idaho Gold Mines, etc., Co., 21 Idaho 126 , 120 P. 823 , 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 817, to this effect: that if counsel, though erroneously, honestly thought the case was to be heard not on the 16th, but at a later date to be set when agreeable to all parties, and that he took reasonably prompt action when he learned that a trial had been had in his absence and without notice to him, though no request under Sec. 15-328, I.C., had been made, was evidence enough to set in action the discretion of the Court to open the default.

1949C., and the case falls within the doctrine announced in Humphreys v. Idaho Gold Mines, etc., Co., 21 Idaho 126 , 120 P. 823 , 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 817, to this effect: that if counsel, though erroneously, honestly thought the case was to be heard not on the 16th, but at a later date to be set when agreeable to all parties, and that he took reasonably prompt action when he learned that a trial had been had in his absence and without notice to him, though no request under Sec. 15-328, I.C., had been made, was evidence enough to set in action the discretion of the Court to open the default.

11949–1949
Engeman v. Taylor green
wva · 1899
1 sentence

1924Va. 669 , 33 S. E. 922 ; 1 Black on Rescission, sec. 37, pp. 92, 93; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 898, pp. 1864-1867.) This case falls within the doctrine of Pocatello Security Trust Co. v. Henry, supra, rather than that of Frank v. Davis, supra. It was not necessary for appellant to allege or prove the exact amount of the pecuniary damage resulting.

11924–1924
Morrison v. Elzy neutral
illappct · 1914
1 sentence

1923If he did not, it would seem that the case falls within the principle of Morrison v. Elzy, supra. If he did, then the ease is an authority in support of respondent’s contention.

11923–1923
Smith v. Crawford County State Bank neutral
iowa · 1894
1 sentence

1923In Smith v. Crawford County State Bank, 99 Iowa, 282 , 61 N. W. 378 , 68 N. W. 690 , it is held that, even where the mortgagor agrees -to pay a first mortgage with the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged chattels, a bank in which the proceeds are deposited is not 'bound by such agreement unless it has knowledge of it.

11923–1923
Canadian Birkbeck Investment & Savings Co. v. Williamson green
idaho · 1920
2 sentences

1922The case falls within the rule announced in the case of Canadian Birkbeck etc. Co. v. Williamson, 32 Ida. 624 , 186 Pac. 916 , as follows: “Where a contract contains an acceleration clause, positive in its terms and without any optional features in it, a default under said clause renders the entire indebtedness due and the statute of limitations runs from such default.” The question has been re-examined in the light of the very complete citation of authorities furnished in the briefs of counsel for the respective parties.

1922The case falls within the rule announced in the case of Canadian Birkbeck etc. Co. v. Williamson, 32 Ida. 624 , 186 Pac. 916 , as follows: “Where a contract contains an acceleration clause, positive in its terms and without any optional features in it, a default under said clause renders the entire indebtedness due and the statute of limitations runs from such default.” The question has been re-examined in the light of the very complete citation of authorities furnished in the briefs of counsel for the respective parties.

11922–1922
Maney v. Idaho Construction Co. neutral
idaho · 1917
2 sentences

1920In principle the case falls within the rule stated by this court in Smith, v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Ida. 407 , 150 Pac. 25 , and quoted with approval in Maney v. Idaho Construction Co., 30 Ida. 111, at 117 , 163 Pac. 297 , as follows: “In the contract here under consideration it was not stipulated that the estimates of the engineer should be final, binding or conclusive upon the parties; therefore, the allegations of fraud in the complaint were immaterial and the estimates of the engineer were subject to attack for inaccuracy, and it was proper for the trial court to consider all the

1920In principle the case falls within the rule stated by this court in Smith, v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Ida. 407 , 150 Pac. 25 , and quoted with approval in Maney v. Idaho Construction Co., 30 Ida. 111, at 117 , 163 Pac. 297 , as follows: “In the contract here under consideration it was not stipulated that the estimates of the engineer should be final, binding or conclusive upon the parties; therefore, the allegations of fraud in the complaint were immaterial and the estimates of the engineer were subject to attack for inaccuracy, and it was proper for the trial court to consider all the

11920–1920
Smith v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co. green
idaho · 1915
2 sentences

1920In principle the case falls within the rule stated by this court in Smith, v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Ida. 407 , 150 Pac. 25 , and quoted with approval in Maney v. Idaho Construction Co., 30 Ida. 111, at 117 , 163 Pac. 297 , as follows: “In the contract here under consideration it was not stipulated that the estimates of the engineer should be final, binding or conclusive upon the parties; therefore, the allegations of fraud in the complaint were immaterial and the estimates of the engineer were subject to attack for inaccuracy, and it was proper for the trial court to consider all the

1920In principle the case falls within the rule stated by this court in Smith, v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Ida. 407 , 150 Pac. 25 , and quoted with approval in Maney v. Idaho Construction Co., 30 Ida. 111, at 117 , 163 Pac. 297 , as follows: “In the contract here under consideration it was not stipulated that the estimates of the engineer should be final, binding or conclusive upon the parties; therefore, the allegations of fraud in the complaint were immaterial and the estimates of the engineer were subject to attack for inaccuracy, and it was proper for the trial court to consider all the

11920–1920
Allgeyer v. Louisiana green
scotus · 1897
2 sentences

1918The case falls within the rule laid down in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. ed. 832.) In that case it is said that the liberty mentioned in the fourteenth amendment means “not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn'his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that pur

1918Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 , 38 Sup. Ct. 399, it is said: “In Allgeyer v. Louisiana [supra], we held a Louisiana statute invalid which undertook to restrict the right of a citizen while within that state to place insurance upon property located there by contract made and to be performed beyond its borders.

11918–1918
New York Life Insurance v. Dodge green
scotus · 1918
1 sentence

1918Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 , 38 Sup. Ct. 399, it is said: “In Allgeyer v. Louisiana [supra], we held a Louisiana statute invalid which undertook to restrict the right of a citizen while within that state to place insurance upon property located there by contract made and to be performed beyond its borders.

11918–1918

Where else courts name it

NY 143 (1837–2026) WA 92 (1893–2018) CA 68 (1888–2025) IL 64 (1864–2025) MO 60 (1879–2025) GA 56 (1889–2022) TX 51 (1901–2016) KY 46 (1911–2012) MA 45 (1853–2015) PA 40 (1812–2021) MI 37 (1885–2019) KS 36 (1889–1990) IA 35 (1864–2019) MN 33 (1862–1987) FL 33 (1893–2026) LA 33 (1892–2007) NE 29 (1877–2003) IN 26 (1881–1998) AL 23 (1885–2013) MD 23 (1850–2017) OK 23 (1904–1988) WI 20 (1867–2018) NC 18 (1883–2012) AR 17 (1878–1995) MS 16 (1843–1997) CO 14 (1897–1996) VT 13 (1853–2023) SC 13 (1895–1970) VA 13 (1886–2025) ID 12 (1914–1986) OR 11 (1858–2015) TN 10 (1906–2015) MT 10 (1930–2006) ME 7 (1865–2016) ND 7 (1893–1993) NJ 7 (1898–2020) CT 6 (1874–2018) AZ 6 (1916–2005) OH 6 (1877–2006) UT 5 (1913–2013) NM 5 (1925–1995) WV 5 (1911–1981) HI 4 (1922–2025) DE 4 (1931–1983) WY 4 (1906–1983) SD 4 (1904–1929) AK 3 (1990–2023) DC 2 (1894–1974) RI 2 (1978–1990)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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