12 Idaho opinions name it 1 courts 1914–1986 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ennis v. Smithgreen2 sentences1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S. 1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Weiser Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1914To our minds this case falls within the rule announced in Stewart v. Weiser Lumber Co., 21 Ida. 340 , 121 Pac. 775 , and the long line of cases from this court followed in the StewartWeiser Lumber Company ease. 1914To our minds this case falls within the rule announced in Stewart v. Weiser Lumber Co., 21 Ida. 340 , 121 Pac. 775 , and the long line of cases from this court followed in the StewartWeiser Lumber Company ease. | 2 | 1914–1914 |
Reed v. Bliss & Van Auken Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1986But whether we treat the case as presenting a question of law or of fact or of both law and fact, I am persuaded that the result reached by the department of labor and industry should not be disturbed. [4] Clearwater Timber relied upon Reed & Bliss v. Vanduken Lumber, 225 Mich. 164 , 196 N.W. 420 (1923), and also these cases cited in the Reed & Bliss opinion: Cook v. S.S. 1986But whether we treat the case as presenting a question of law or of fact or of both law and fact, I am persuaded that the result reached by the department of labor and industry should not be disturbed. [4] Clearwater Timber relied upon Reed & Bliss v. Vanduken Lumber, 225 Mich. 164 , 196 N.W. 420 (1923), and also these cases cited in the Reed & Bliss opinion: Cook v. S.S. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S. 1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Cupples v. Stanfield
neutral
2 sentences1972Appellant also attacks the testimony of Clark concerning the statements made to him by the alleged agent, Miller, arguing that these statements were hearsay, and should have been excluded as incompetent evidence. 7 This case falls within the rule articulated by this Court in Hayward v. Yost: 8 “The declarations of an alleged agent made outside the presence of the alleged principal are, of themselves, incompetent to prove agency, Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho 466 , 207 P. 326 , yet where the agency has been established by independent evidence, the declarations as corroborative evidence are adm 1972Appellant also attacks the testimony of Clark concerning the statements made to him by the alleged agent, Miller, arguing that these statements were hearsay, and should have been excluded as incompetent evidence. 7 This case falls within the rule articulated by this Court in Hayward v. Yost: 8 “The declarations of an alleged agent made outside the presence of the alleged principal are, of themselves, incompetent to prove agency, Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho 466 , 207 P. 326 , yet where the agency has been established by independent evidence, the declarations as corroborative evidence are adm | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Bell v. Washam
green
2 sentences1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S. 1972Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616 , 17 P.2d 349 ; see also Ennis v. Smith, 171 Wash. 126 , 18 P.2d 1 ; Bell v. Washam, 82 Ga.App. 63 , 60 S.E.2d 408 ; 3 C.J.S. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
State v. Webster
green
2 sentences1960There was no entrapment and the requested instructions were properly refused, State v. Webster, 46 Idaho 798 , 271 P. 578 , and authorities therein cited.” Therefore, any error in failing to instruct on this' defense fully was not prejudicial. 1960There was no entrapment and the requested instructions were properly refused, State v. Webster, 46 Idaho 798 , 271 P. 578 , and authorities therein cited.” Therefore, any error in failing to instruct on this' defense fully was not prejudicial. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
State v. Garde
green
2 sentences1960In such instance, the case falls within the rule announced in State v. Garde, 69 Idaho 209 , 205 P.2d 504, 505 , wherein the Court said: “The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff disclosed that the appellant was given the opportunity either to make a sale or refuse to do so and that he chose to sell. 1960In such instance, the case falls within the rule announced in State v. Garde, 69 Idaho 209 , 205 P.2d 504, 505 , wherein the Court said: “The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff disclosed that the appellant was given the opportunity either to make a sale or refuse to do so and that he chose to sell. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Cabassa v. Ramón Rivera
neutral
1 sentence1952Brown v. Brown, 31 Wash. 397 , 72 P. 86 , 62 L.R.A. 974 , and that a husband is bound to pay alimony to a former wife notwithstanding the fact that he has remarried. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
State ex rel. Brown v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences1952Brown v. Brown, 31 Wash. 397 , 72 P. 86 , 62 L.R.A. 974 , and that a husband is bound to pay alimony to a former wife notwithstanding the fact that he has remarried. 1952Brown v. Brown, 31 Wash. 397 , 72 P. 86 , 62 L.R.A. 974 , and that a husband is bound to pay alimony to a former wife notwithstanding the fact that he has remarried. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Herrett v. Herrett
green
2 sentences1952In the case of Herrett v. Herrett, 80 Wash. 474 , 141 P. 1158 , on page 1160, the question is discussed as follows: “It may be said that the case falls within the rule of State ex rel. 1952In the case of Herrett v. Herrett, 80 Wash. 474 , 141 P. 1158 , on page 1160, the question is discussed as follows: “It may be said that the case falls within the rule of State ex rel. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Humphreys v. Idaho Gold Mines Development Co.
neutral
2 sentences1949C., and the case falls within the doctrine announced in Humphreys v. Idaho Gold Mines, etc., Co., 21 Idaho 126 , 120 P. 823 , 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 817, to this effect: that if counsel, though erroneously, honestly thought the case was to be heard not on the 16th, but at a later date to be set when agreeable to all parties, and that he took reasonably prompt action when he learned that a trial had been had in his absence and without notice to him, though no request under Sec. 15-328, I.C., had been made, was evidence enough to set in action the discretion of the Court to open the default. 1949C., and the case falls within the doctrine announced in Humphreys v. Idaho Gold Mines, etc., Co., 21 Idaho 126 , 120 P. 823 , 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 817, to this effect: that if counsel, though erroneously, honestly thought the case was to be heard not on the 16th, but at a later date to be set when agreeable to all parties, and that he took reasonably prompt action when he learned that a trial had been had in his absence and without notice to him, though no request under Sec. 15-328, I.C., had been made, was evidence enough to set in action the discretion of the Court to open the default. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Engeman v. Taylor
green
1 sentence1924Va. 669 , 33 S. E. 922 ; 1 Black on Rescission, sec. 37, pp. 92, 93; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 898, pp. 1864-1867.) This case falls within the doctrine of Pocatello Security Trust Co. v. Henry, supra, rather than that of Frank v. Davis, supra. It was not necessary for appellant to allege or prove the exact amount of the pecuniary damage resulting. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Morrison v. Elzy
neutral
1 sentence1923If he did not, it would seem that the case falls within the principle of Morrison v. Elzy, supra. If he did, then the ease is an authority in support of respondent’s contention. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Smith v. Crawford County State Bank
neutral
1 sentence1923In Smith v. Crawford County State Bank, 99 Iowa, 282 , 61 N. W. 378 , 68 N. W. 690 , it is held that, even where the mortgagor agrees -to pay a first mortgage with the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged chattels, a bank in which the proceeds are deposited is not 'bound by such agreement unless it has knowledge of it. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Canadian Birkbeck Investment & Savings Co. v. Williamson
green
2 sentences1922The case falls within the rule announced in the case of Canadian Birkbeck etc. Co. v. Williamson, 32 Ida. 624 , 186 Pac. 916 , as follows: “Where a contract contains an acceleration clause, positive in its terms and without any optional features in it, a default under said clause renders the entire indebtedness due and the statute of limitations runs from such default.” The question has been re-examined in the light of the very complete citation of authorities furnished in the briefs of counsel for the respective parties. 1922The case falls within the rule announced in the case of Canadian Birkbeck etc. Co. v. Williamson, 32 Ida. 624 , 186 Pac. 916 , as follows: “Where a contract contains an acceleration clause, positive in its terms and without any optional features in it, a default under said clause renders the entire indebtedness due and the statute of limitations runs from such default.” The question has been re-examined in the light of the very complete citation of authorities furnished in the briefs of counsel for the respective parties. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Maney v. Idaho Construction Co.
neutral
2 sentences1920In principle the case falls within the rule stated by this court in Smith, v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Ida. 407 , 150 Pac. 25 , and quoted with approval in Maney v. Idaho Construction Co., 30 Ida. 111, at 117 , 163 Pac. 297 , as follows: “In the contract here under consideration it was not stipulated that the estimates of the engineer should be final, binding or conclusive upon the parties; therefore, the allegations of fraud in the complaint were immaterial and the estimates of the engineer were subject to attack for inaccuracy, and it was proper for the trial court to consider all the 1920In principle the case falls within the rule stated by this court in Smith, v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Ida. 407 , 150 Pac. 25 , and quoted with approval in Maney v. Idaho Construction Co., 30 Ida. 111, at 117 , 163 Pac. 297 , as follows: “In the contract here under consideration it was not stipulated that the estimates of the engineer should be final, binding or conclusive upon the parties; therefore, the allegations of fraud in the complaint were immaterial and the estimates of the engineer were subject to attack for inaccuracy, and it was proper for the trial court to consider all the | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Smith v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1920In principle the case falls within the rule stated by this court in Smith, v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Ida. 407 , 150 Pac. 25 , and quoted with approval in Maney v. Idaho Construction Co., 30 Ida. 111, at 117 , 163 Pac. 297 , as follows: “In the contract here under consideration it was not stipulated that the estimates of the engineer should be final, binding or conclusive upon the parties; therefore, the allegations of fraud in the complaint were immaterial and the estimates of the engineer were subject to attack for inaccuracy, and it was proper for the trial court to consider all the 1920In principle the case falls within the rule stated by this court in Smith, v. Faris-Kesl Construction Co., 27 Ida. 407 , 150 Pac. 25 , and quoted with approval in Maney v. Idaho Construction Co., 30 Ida. 111, at 117 , 163 Pac. 297 , as follows: “In the contract here under consideration it was not stipulated that the estimates of the engineer should be final, binding or conclusive upon the parties; therefore, the allegations of fraud in the complaint were immaterial and the estimates of the engineer were subject to attack for inaccuracy, and it was proper for the trial court to consider all the | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Allgeyer v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1918The case falls within the rule laid down in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. ed. 832.) In that case it is said that the liberty mentioned in the fourteenth amendment means “not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn'his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that pur 1918Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 , 38 Sup. Ct. 399, it is said: “In Allgeyer v. Louisiana [supra], we held a Louisiana statute invalid which undertook to restrict the right of a citizen while within that state to place insurance upon property located there by contract made and to be performed beyond its borders. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
New York Life Insurance v. Dodge
green
1 sentence1918Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 , 38 Sup. Ct. 399, it is said: “In Allgeyer v. Louisiana [supra], we held a Louisiana statute invalid which undertook to restrict the right of a citizen while within that state to place insurance upon property located there by contract made and to be performed beyond its borders. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.