discretionary function exception in Tennessee

2018See Wainscott v. State, 642 P.2d 1355, 1356 (Alaska 1982).

2003See Wainscott v. State, 642 P.2d 1355, 1356 (Alaska 1982).

2018In other words, “the discretionary function exception [will] not apply to a claim that government employees failed to comply with regulations or policies designed to guide their actions in a particular situation.” Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 1986).

2003In other words, "the discretionary function exception [will] not apply to a claim that government employees failed to comply with regulations or policies designed to guide their actions in a particular situation." Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 692 (8th Cir.1986).

2001In recognition of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, the discretionary function exception was intended to prevent the use of tort actions to second-guess what are essentially executive or legislative decisions involving social, political, economic, scientific, or professional policies or some mixture of these policies. 852 S.W.2d at 907 (citations omitted).

2001In recognition of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, the discretionary function exception was intended to prevent the use of tort actions to second-guess what are essentially executive or legislative decisions involving social, political, economic, scientific, or professional policies or some mixture of these policies. 852 S.W.2d at 907 (citations omitted).

2012Bowers, 826 S.W.2d at 430 . *** Our Supreme Court applied the planning-operational test in Limbaugh v. Coffee Medical Center, 59 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2001), to determine whether a nursing home’s failure to follow employee disciplinary guidelines was a discretionary function for which immunity was available under the TGTLA.

2010Although the distinction between decisions by governmental actors that involve “balancing policy considerations,” and those that are truly operational in nature is admittedly murky, in Bowers, the Court considered the distinction under the facts of that case and held that, “[t]here being a clear plan and policy of the State of Tennessee and City of Chattanooga to provide safe passage across an immediate street toward a child’s destination, we find that a decision left to a school bus driver on where to stop at a particular intersection is an operational act not within the discretionary functio

1996When deciding whether a particular decision is “planning” or “operational,” the courts should keep in mind the purpose of the discretionary function exception, that is, “to ‘prevent judicial “second guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.’ ” United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 , 111 S.Ct. 1267, 1273 , 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 , 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2765 , 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984)) (both cases discuss the discretionary function excep

1996When deciding whether a particular decision is “planning” or “operational,” the courts should keep in mind the purpose of the discretionary function exception, that is, “to ‘prevent judicial “second guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.’ ” United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 , 111 S.Ct. 1267, 1273 , 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 , 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2765 , 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984)) (both cases discuss the discretionary function excep

2022They “often result from assessing priorities; allocating resources; developing policies; or establishing plans, specifications, or schedules.” Id.; see Helton v. Knox Cty., 922 S.W.2d 877, 886 (Tenn. 1996) (“The discretionary function exception covers acts involving an element of judgment or choice if they are based on considerations of public policy.”).

2006Thus, the decision not to install a traffic control device was a discretionary decision for which governmental immunity should be preserved under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205 . 1 The discretionary function exception addressed in Bowers covers “acts involving an element of judgment or choice if they are based on considerations of public policy.” Helton v. Knox County, TN, 922 S.W.2d 877, 886 (Tenn.1996) (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 , 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1958 , 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988)).

2012Bowers, 826 S.W.2d at 430 . *** Our Supreme Court applied the planning-operational test in Limbaugh v. Coffee Medical Center, 59 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2001), to determine whether a nursing home’s failure to follow employee disciplinary guidelines was a discretionary function for which immunity was available under the TGTLA.

2011Our Supreme Court applied the planning-operational test in Limbaugh v. Coffee Medical Center, 59 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn.2001), to determine whether a nursing home’s failure to follow employee disciplinary guidelines was a discretionary function for which immunity was available under the TGTLA.

2024Kirby v. Macon Cnty., 892 S.W.2d 403, 409 (Tenn. 1994). 2 Mr. Roberts also raises an issue as to “[w]hether the trial court erred in finding and holding Plaintiff’s section § 29-20-205 claim was barred on the grounds of Plaintiff failing to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to actual or constructive notice.” Similar to his argument concerning the discretionary function exception, Mr. Roberts contends he is “relying upon Tenn. Code Ann. 29-20-203.” As such, we conclude there is nothing further presented for review as to the trial court’s determination concerning section 29-20-

2007Helton v. Knox County, 922 S.W.2d 877, 887 (Tenn. 1996); Kirby v. Macon County, 892 S.W.2d 403, 408 (Tenn. 1994).

2024See Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tenn. 1997) (concluding that the application of an exception listed in section 29-20-205 does not apply to a claim brought under section 29-20-204).

2024See Hawks, 960 S.W.2d at 16 (Tenn. 1997) (concluding that the application of another exception listed in section 29-20-205 does not apply to a claim brought under section 29-20-204); see also Helton, 922 S.W.2d at 885 (discussing the separability of section 29-20-203 and section 29-20-205).

2022Id. at 430 ; Brown v. Hamilton Cty., 126 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (“Decision making and the use of judgment is not synonymous with discretion for purposes of immunity.”).

2016See e.g., City of Memphis v. Shelby Cnty., 469 S.W.3d 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), perm, app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 14,2015) (concluding that an argument was waived by raising it for the first time on appeal) (citing Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983)).

2016See e.g., City of Memphis v. Shelby Cnty., 469 S.W.3d 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), perm, app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 14,2015) (concluding that an argument was waived by raising it for the first time on appeal) (citing Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983)).

2010Therefore, for the sake of judicial economy, we will “soldier on without guidance from the trial court.” Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2002Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 85 . -5- In O’Guin v. Corbin, 777 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), this Court determined that a governmental entity’s initial decision to place a traffic control device is entitled to discretionary function immunity.

1997See Doe v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 799 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

1996Kirby v. Macon County, 892 S.W.2d at 409; Fretwell v. Chaffin, 652 S.W.2d at 757 (allowing vegetation to obscure a traffic control sign); Swafford v. City of Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d at 177 (failure to finish painting lane markings).

1996Kirby v. Macon County, 892 S.W.2d at 409; Fretwell v. Chaffin, 652 S.W.2d at 757 (allowing vegetation to obscure a traffic control sign); Swafford v. City of Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d at 177 (failure to finish painting lane markings).

1996The judicial branch lacks the fact-finding ability of the legislature, and the special expertise of the executive depart-ments_ [T]he courts ... should not attempt to balance the detailed and competing elements of legislative or executive decisions.” Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Alaska, *886 669 P.2d 561, 563 (Alaska 1983). 14 The discretionary function exception covers acts involving an element of judgment or choice if they are based on considerations of public policy.

1996We would be engaging in precisely the type of policy evaluation that the discretionary function exception is designed to foreclose if we were to inquire into the wisdom of the state’s guardrail policy in this case. 669 P.2d at 564-65 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 15 .

1996Kirby v. Macon County, 892 S.W.2d at 409; Fretwell v. Chaffin, 652 S.W.2d at 757 (allowing vegetation to obscure a traffic control sign); Swafford v. City of Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d at 177 (failure to finish painting lane markings).

1996Kirby v. Macon County, 892 S.W.2d at 409; Fretwell v. Chaffin, 652 S.W.2d at 757 (allowing vegetation to obscure a traffic control sign); Swafford v. City of Chattanooga, 743 S.W.2d at 177 (failure to finish painting lane markings).

1992We have reviewed the evidence in the voluminous record in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Fly v. Cannon, 813 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990), and find no genuine factual disputes with regard to the determinative issues in the case.

1992We have reviewed the evidence in the voluminous record in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Fly v. Cannon, 813 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990), and find no genuine factual disputes with regard to the determinative issues in the case.

1992See Carlson v. State, 598 P.2d 969, 972 (Alaska 1979).