7 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1983–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 658605green2 sentences1996That is just the “type of policy-bound decision” that the federal and state governments “intended to insulate from judicial scrutiny through the discretionary function exception.” C.R.S. by D.B.S. v. United States, supra, 11 F.3d at 797. 1996That is just the "type of policy-bound decision" that the federal and state governments "intended to insulate from judicial scrutiny through the discretionary function exception." C.R.S. by D.B.S. v. United States, supra, 11 F. 3d at 797. | 1 | 1 |
Prescott v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996Id. at 797; see also Lockett v. United States, 938 F. 2d 630 (6th Cir.1991) (affirming dismissal of claim challenging EPA response to PCB contamination as negligent); Prescott v. United States, 858 F.Supp. 1461, 1468 (D.Nev. 1994) (dismissing suit alleging negligence by Atomic Energy Commission in setting level of authorized radiation exposure because the levels “were the product of extensive analysis ... and clearly involved the weighing and balancing of a number of social, economic and political considerations based on then available scientific and medical data”). 1996Id. at 797; see also Lockett v. United States, 938 F. 2d 630 (6th Cir.1991) (affirming dismissal of claim challenging EPA response to PCB contamination as negligent); Prescott v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 1461, 1468 (D.Nev. 1994) (dismissing suit alleging negligence by Atomic Energy Commission in setting level of authorized radiation exposure because the levels "were the product of extensive analysis ... and clearly *310 involved the weighing and balancing of a number of social, economic and political considerations based on then available scientific and medical data"). | 1 | 1 |
Lockett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996Id. at 797; see also Lockett v. United States, 938 F. 2d 630 (6th Cir.1991) (affirming dismissal of claim challenging EPA response to PCB contamination as negligent); Prescott v. United States, 858 F.Supp. 1461, 1468 (D.Nev. 1994) (dismissing suit alleging negligence by Atomic Energy Commission in setting level of authorized radiation exposure because the levels “were the product of extensive analysis ... and clearly involved the weighing and balancing of a number of social, economic and political considerations based on then available scientific and medical data”). 1996Id. at 797; see also Lockett v. United States, 938 F. 2d 630 (6th Cir.1991) (affirming dismissal of claim challenging EPA response to PCB contamination as negligent); Prescott v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 1461, 1468 (D.Nev. 1994) (dismissing suit alleging negligence by Atomic Energy Commission in setting level of authorized radiation exposure because the levels "were the product of extensive analysis ... and clearly *310 involved the weighing and balancing of a number of social, economic and political considerations based on then available scientific and medical data"). | 1 | 1 |
Danuta Jurzec v. American Motors Corporationgreen1 sentence1994See Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1988), holding that the Postal Service could claim the discretionary function exception to the federal government’s waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Township of Southamptongreen1 sentence1985As previously noted, the Act specifically immunizes public entities and employees “for an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Johnson v. Township of Southampton, 157 N.J.Super. 518 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 485 (1978); Aebi v. Monmouth County Highway Department, 148 N.J.Super. 430 (App.Div.1977). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Township of Southamptongreen1 sentence1985As previously noted, the Act specifically immunizes public entities and employees “for an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Johnson v. Township of Southampton, 157 N.J.Super. 518 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 485 (1978); Aebi v. Monmouth County Highway Department, 148 N.J.Super. 430 (App.Div.1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Costa v. Josey
green
2 sentences1996We note, however, that the applicability is particularly questionable since the Task Force Comment indicates that "[p]resumably this activity would be considered discretionary under existing law but it is desirable to make the immunity explicit," comment to N.J.S.A. 59:7, and our Supreme Court has held that "the discretionary function immunity should be limited to actual policymaking" rather than operational decisions, Costa v. Josey, 83 N.J. 49, 60 , 415 A. 2d 337 (1980). 1996We note, however, that the applicability is particularly questionable since the Task Force Comment indicates that "[p]resumably this activity would be considered discretionary under existing law but it is desirable to make the immunity explicit," comment to N.J.S.A. 59:7, and our Supreme Court has held that "the discretionary function immunity should be limited to actual policymaking" rather than operational decisions, Costa v. Josey, 83 N.J. 49, 60 , 415 A. 2d 337 (1980). | 3 | 1983–1996 |
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
green
2 sentences2004Boyle, supra, 487 U.S. at 510-11 , 108 S.Ct. at 2517-18 , 101 L.Ed. 2d at 456-57 . 2004Boyle, supra, 487 U.S. at 510-11 , 108 S.Ct. at 2517-18 , 101 L.Ed. 2d at 456-57 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Mary Carley v. Wheeled Coach
green
2 sentences2004Carley, supra, 991 F. 2d at 1121 . *888 The Boyle Court rejected the Feres-Stencel doctrine as a basis for government contractor immunity; instead, it rested its decision in the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. 2004Carley, supra, 991 F. 2d at 1121 . *888 The Boyle Court rejected the Feres-Stencel doctrine as a basis for government contractor immunity; instead, it rested its decision in the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Nicholson v. United Technologies Corp.
green
2 sentences1994Put differently, under Boyle , for the military contractor defense to apply, government officials ultimately must remain the agents of decision. [ Id. at 630 .] *533 The court rejected the manufacturer's assertion that the government made a discretionary decision not to warn persons in the position of ship workers of the dangers they faced from coming in contact with asbestos: [Appellant], however, omits a crucial distinction between the discretionary function exception and the military contractor defense. 1994Stripped to its essentials, the military contractor's defense under Boyle is to claim, "The Government made me do it." Boyle displaces state law only when the Government, making a discretionary, safety-related military procurement decision contrary to the requirements of state law, incorporates this decision into a military contractor's contractual obligations, thereby limiting the contractor's ability to accommodate safety in a different fashion. [ Id. at 632 .] Ultimately, although "not impressed" with the manufacturer's arguments opposing summary judgment, the court remanded for reconsidera | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Aebi v. Monmouth County Highway Dept.
green
1 sentence1985As previously noted, the Act specifically immunizes public entities and employees “for an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices.” N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Johnson v. Township of Southampton, 157 N.J.Super. 518 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 485 (1978); Aebi v. Monmouth County Highway Department, 148 N.J.Super. 430 (App.Div.1977). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.