discretionary function exception in Georgia

2024See generally OCGA § 12-2-1 (creating DNR). 9 OCGA § 50-21-24 (2). 10 OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 11 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996) (“Whether to buy copier paper from a particular vendor, and in which colors, are decisions that might be affected by all three factors, but they are not policy decisions.”). 6 the exception to apply, the discretionary function or duty must be one that requires a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of actions based upon the applicable factors.”12 In Berkovitz v. United St

2024See generally OCGA § 12-2-1 (creating DNR). 9 OCGA § 50-21-24 (2). 10 OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 11 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996) (“Whether to buy copier paper from a particular vendor, and in which colors, are decisions that might be affected by all three factors, but they are not policy decisions.”). 6 the exception to apply, the discretionary function or duty must be one that requires a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of actions based upon the applicable factors.”12 In Berkovitz v. United St

2024In relevant part, the [United States] Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act is to prevent judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort, and that, for that reason, when properly construed, the exception protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.18 17 Brantley v. Dept. of Human Resources, 271 Ga. 679, 682-683 ( 523 SE2d 571 ) (1999) 18 Id. (citing United St

2024In relevant part, the [United States] Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act is to prevent judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort, and that, for that reason, when properly construed, the exception protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.18 17 Brantley v. Dept. of Human Resources, 271 Ga. 679, 682-683 ( 523 SE2d 571 ) (1999) 18 Id. (citing United St

2024See generally OCGA § 12-2-1 (creating DNR). 9 OCGA § 50-21-24 (2). 10 OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 11 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996) (“Whether to buy copier paper from a particular vendor, and in which colors, are decisions that might be affected by all three factors, but they are not policy decisions.”). 6 the exception to apply, the discretionary function or duty must be one that requires a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of actions based upon the applicable factors.”12 In Berkovitz v. United St

2024See generally OCGA § 12-2-1 (creating DNR). 9 OCGA § 50-21-24 (2). 10 OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 11 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996) (“Whether to buy copier paper from a particular vendor, and in which colors, are decisions that might be affected by all three factors, but they are not policy decisions.”). 6 the exception to apply, the discretionary function or duty must be one that requires a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of actions based upon the applicable factors.”12 In Berkovitz v. United St

2024In relevant part, the [United States] Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act is to prevent judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort, and that, for that reason, when properly construed, the exception protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.18 17 Brantley v. Dept. of Human Resources, 271 Ga. 679, 682-683 ( 523 SE2d 571 ) (1999) 18 Id. (citing United St

2024In relevant part, the [United States] Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act is to prevent judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort, and that, for that reason, when properly construed, the exception protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.18 17 Brantley v. Dept. of Human Resources, 271 Ga. 679, 682-683 ( 523 SE2d 571 ) (1999) 18 Id. (citing United St

2024See generally OCGA § 12-2-1 (creating DNR). 9 OCGA § 50-21-24 (2). 10 OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 11 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996) (“Whether to buy copier paper from a particular vendor, and in which colors, are decisions that might be affected by all three factors, but they are not policy decisions.”). 6 the exception to apply, the discretionary function or duty must be one that requires a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of actions based upon the applicable factors.”12 In Berkovitz v. United St

2024See generally OCGA § 12-2-1 (creating DNR). 9 OCGA § 50-21-24 (2). 10 OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 11 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996) (“Whether to buy copier paper from a particular vendor, and in which colors, are decisions that might be affected by all three factors, but they are not policy decisions.”). 6 the exception to apply, the discretionary function or duty must be one that requires a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of actions based upon the applicable factors.”12 In Berkovitz v. United St

2024When to open the intersection, and whether to open it without traffic lights are operational decisions[.]”). 28 See Ga. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Finch, 269 Ga. App. 791, 794 (2) ( 605 SE2d 414 ) (2004) (holding that decisions which “necessarily require consideration of numerous factors and the exercise of deliberation and judgment [are] precisely the types of administrative action the discretionary function exception seeks to shield from judicial second-guessing.”). 29 See OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 30 Shelton v. Iowa, 644 NW2d 27, 30 (II) (Iowa 2002) (“The substances used in forming the tr

2024When to open the intersection, and whether to open it without traffic lights are operational decisions[.]”). 28 See Ga. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Finch, 269 Ga. App. 791, 794 (2) ( 605 SE2d 414 ) (2004) (holding that decisions which “necessarily require consideration of numerous factors and the exercise of deliberation and judgment [are] precisely the types of administrative action the discretionary function exception seeks to shield from judicial second-guessing.”). 29 See OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 30 Shelton v. Iowa, 644 NW2d 27, 30 (II) (Iowa 2002) (“The substances used in forming the tr

2013(Citations omitted.) Murray v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 284 Ga. App. 263, 265 (2) ( 644 SE2d 290 ) (2007). 5 The GDOT based its motion to dismiss on three exceptions under the GTCA–the discretionary function exception, the licensing exception, and the design exception, set forth respectively in OCGA § 50-21-24 (2), (9) and (10).

2013(Citations omitted.) Murray v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 284 Ga. App. 263, 265 (2) ( 644 SE2d 290 ) (2007). 5 The GDOT based its motion to dismiss on three exceptions under the GTCA–the discretionary function exception, the licensing exception, and the design exception, set forth respectively in OCGA § 50-21-24 (2), (9) and (10).

2024When to open the intersection, and whether to open it without traffic lights are operational decisions[.]”). 28 See Ga. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Finch, 269 Ga. App. 791, 794 (2) ( 605 SE2d 414 ) (2004) (holding that decisions which “necessarily require consideration of numerous factors and the exercise of deliberation and judgment [are] precisely the types of administrative action the discretionary function exception seeks to shield from judicial second-guessing.”). 29 See OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 30 Shelton v. Iowa, 644 NW2d 27, 30 (II) (Iowa 2002) (“The substances used in forming the tr

2024When to open the intersection, and whether to open it without traffic lights are operational decisions[.]”). 28 See Ga. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Finch, 269 Ga. App. 791, 794 (2) ( 605 SE2d 414 ) (2004) (holding that decisions which “necessarily require consideration of numerous factors and the exercise of deliberation and judgment [are] precisely the types of administrative action the discretionary function exception seeks to shield from judicial second-guessing.”). 29 See OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 30 Shelton v. Iowa, 644 NW2d 27, 30 (II) (Iowa 2002) (“The substances used in forming the tr

2024See generally OCGA § 12-2-1 (creating DNR). 9 OCGA § 50-21-24 (2). 10 OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 11 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996) (“Whether to buy copier paper from a particular vendor, and in which colors, are decisions that might be affected by all three factors, but they are not policy decisions.”). 6 the exception to apply, the discretionary function or duty must be one that requires a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of actions based upon the applicable factors.”12 In Berkovitz v. United St

2024See generally OCGA § 12-2-1 (creating DNR). 9 OCGA § 50-21-24 (2). 10 OCGA § 50-21-22 (2). 11 Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6, 7 (1) ( 471 SE2d 849 ) (1996) (“Whether to buy copier paper from a particular vendor, and in which colors, are decisions that might be affected by all three factors, but they are not policy decisions.”). 6 the exception to apply, the discretionary function or duty must be one that requires a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of actions based upon the applicable factors.”12 In Berkovitz v. United St

2024As a department of the State, DNR is subject to the waiver and the exceptions set forth in the GTCA.8 One such exception to liability is for “losses resulting from [t]he exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state officer or employee, whether or not the discretion involved is abused[.]”9 A “discretionary function or duty” is statutorily defined as “a function or duty requiring a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of action based upon a consideration of

2024As a department of the State, DNR is subject to the waiver and the exceptions set forth in the GTCA.8 One such exception to liability is for “losses resulting from [t]he exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state officer or employee, whether or not the discretion involved is abused[.]”9 A “discretionary function or duty” is statutorily defined as “a function or duty requiring a state officer or employee to exercise his or her policy judgment in choosing among alternate courses of action based upon a consideration of

2024Because the record reflects that DNR had a policy of preserving the Park’s natural beauty and historical accuracy, the trial court did not err in finding that its decisions regarding what course of conduct to take were subject to policy analysis26 and thus were a policy judgment.27 The fact that the policy 24 See id. at 15-16 ; see also Shansky v. United States, 164 F3d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding the discretionary function exception in the FTCA applied to park service’s decision not to install a handrail and warning signs by an antique wooden threshold at an exit from a national monumen

2024Because the record reflects that DNR had a policy of preserving the Park’s natural beauty and historical accuracy, the trial court did not err in finding that its decisions regarding what course of conduct to take were subject to policy analysis26 and thus were a policy judgment.27 The fact that the policy 24 See id. at 15-16 ; see also Shansky v. United States, 164 F3d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding the discretionary function exception in the FTCA applied to park service’s decision not to install a handrail and warning signs by an antique wooden threshold at an exit from a national monumen

2022Def., 230 A3d 227, 235 (III) (C) (N.J. 2020) (holding that despite duty owed to individual represented, public defenders are public employees entitled to benefit of state tort claims act that “places conditions and limits on the ability to recover damages in such settings”); Jacobi v. Holbert, 553 SW3d 246, 259 (III) (D) (3), 261 (III) (E) (Ky. 2018) (discerning “no reason to exempt public defenders from the immunity process while prosecutors and judges receive the benefit of the defense” and, additionally, concluding that facts of the case involved public defender engaging in the discretionar

2022Def., 230 A3d 227, 235 (III) (C) (N.J. 2020) (holding that despite duty owed to individual represented, public defenders are public employees entitled to benefit of state tort claims act that “places conditions and limits on the ability to recover damages in such settings”); Jacobi v. Holbert, 553 SW3d 246, 259 (III) (D) (3), 261 (III) (E) (Ky. 2018) (discerning “no reason to exempt public defenders from the immunity process while prosecutors and judges receive the benefit of the defense” and, additionally, concluding that facts of the case involved public defender engaging in the discretionar

2022Factual findings are sustained if there is evidence supporting them[.]” (punctuation omitted)). 5 Our Supreme Court has considered professional negligence claims—i.e., medical malpractice claims—against other state entities and concluded that “the decision of state employees on the type of emergency medical care to provide incarcerated juveniles does not fall within the discretionary function exception to the Georgia Tort Claims Act.” Edwards v. Dep’t of Child. & Youth Servs., 271 Ga. 890, 892 ( 525 SE2d 83 ) (2000); accord Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 473 ( 746 SE2d 89 ) (2013). 6 Compare

2022Factual findings are sustained if there is evidence supporting them[.]” (punctuation omitted)). 5 Our Supreme Court has considered professional negligence claims—i.e., medical malpractice claims—against other state entities and concluded that “the decision of state employees on the type of emergency medical care to provide incarcerated juveniles does not fall within the discretionary function exception to the Georgia Tort Claims Act.” Edwards v. Dep’t of Child. & Youth Servs., 271 Ga. 890, 892 ( 525 SE2d 83 ) (2000); accord Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 473 ( 746 SE2d 89 ) (2013). 6 Compare

2022Factual findings are sustained if there is evidence supporting them[.]” (punctuation omitted)). 5 Our Supreme Court has considered professional negligence claims—i.e., medical malpractice claims—against other state entities and concluded that “the decision of state employees on the type of emergency medical care to provide incarcerated juveniles does not fall within the discretionary function exception to the Georgia Tort Claims Act.” Edwards v. Dep’t of Child. & Youth Servs., 271 Ga. 890, 892 ( 525 SE2d 83 ) (2000); accord Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 473 ( 746 SE2d 89 ) (2013). 6 Compare

2022Def., 230 A3d 227, 235 (III) (C) (N.J. 2020) (holding that despite duty owed to individual represented, public defenders are public employees entitled to benefit of state tort claims act that “places conditions and limits on the ability to recover damages in such settings”); Jacobi v. Holbert, 553 SW3d 246, 259 (III) (D) (3), 261 (III) (E) (Ky. 2018) (discerning “no reason to exempt public defenders from the immunity process while prosecutors and judges receive the benefit of the defense” and, additionally, concluding that facts of the case involved public defender engaging in the discretionar

2022Def., 230 A3d 227, 235 (III) (C) (N.J. 2020) (holding that despite duty owed to individual represented, public defenders are public employees entitled to benefit of state tort claims act that “places conditions and limits on the ability to recover damages in such settings”); Jacobi v. Holbert, 553 SW3d 246, 259 (III) (D) (3), 261 (III) (E) (Ky. 2018) (discerning “no reason to exempt public defenders from the immunity process while prosecutors and judges receive the benefit of the defense” and, additionally, concluding that facts of the case involved public defender engaging in the discretionar

2022Def., 230 A3d 227, 235 (III) (C) (N.J. 2020) (holding that despite duty owed to individual represented, public defenders are public employees entitled to benefit of state tort claims act that “places conditions and limits on the ability to recover damages in such settings”); Jacobi v. Holbert, 553 SW3d 246, 259 (III) (D) (3), 261 (III) (E) (Ky. 2018) (discerning “no reason to exempt public defenders from the immunity process while prosecutors and judges receive the benefit of the defense” and, additionally, concluding that facts of the case involved public defender engaging in the discretionar

2022Def., 230 A3d 227, 235 (III) (C) (N.J. 2020) (holding that despite duty owed to individual represented, public defenders are public employees entitled to benefit of state tort claims act that “places conditions and limits on the ability to recover damages in such settings”); Jacobi v. Holbert, 553 SW3d 246, 259 (III) (D) (3), 261 (III) (E) (Ky. 2018) (discerning “no reason to exempt public defenders from the immunity process while prosecutors and judges receive the benefit of the defense” and, additionally, concluding that facts of the case involved public defender engaging in the discretionar

2022Def., 230 A3d 227, 235 (III) (C) (N.J. 2020) (holding that despite duty owed to individual represented, public defenders are public employees entitled to benefit of state tort claims act that “places conditions and limits on the ability to recover damages in such settings”); Jacobi v. Holbert, 553 SW3d 246, 259 (III) (D) (3), 261 (III) (E) (Ky. 2018) (discerning “no reason to exempt public defenders from the immunity process while prosecutors and judges receive the benefit of the defense” and, additionally, concluding that facts of the case involved public defender engaging in the discretionar

2019Finally, we note that O’Donnell’s reliance on Brantley, Edwards, and Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Bulbalia, 303 Ga. App. 659 ( 694 SE2d 115 ) (2010) in support of her argument that the discretionary function exception does not apply to GMC is misapplied here.

2019Finally, we note that O’Donnell’s reliance on Brantley, Edwards, and Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Bulbalia, 303 Ga. App. 659 ( 694 SE2d 115 ) (2010) in support of her argument that the discretionary function exception does not apply to GMC is misapplied here.

2019Also, “[t]he discretionary function exception serves to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort[.]” (Citation omitted.) Spruill, 294 Ga. at 106 (2).

2019As the Supreme Court of Georgia has indicated, “for the discretionary function exception to apply, it must be shown that a state officer or employee was afforded discretion with respect to the conduct that is alleged to amount to a tort, that an exercise of the discretion afforded amounts to “a policy judgment based upon a consideration of social, political, or economic factors.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Spruill, 294 Ga. at 106 (2); see also Edwards v. Dept. of Children & Youth Svcs., 271 Ga. 890, 892 ( 525 SE2d 83 ) (2000) (expanding the exception to social, political and economic

2019See Strand v. U. S., 233 FSupp3d 446, 456-457 (III) (B) (D.

2019As the Supreme Court of Georgia has indicated, “for the discretionary function exception to apply, it must be shown that a state officer or employee was afforded discretion with respect to the conduct that is alleged to amount to a tort, that an exercise of the discretion afforded amounts to “a policy judgment based upon a consideration of social, political, or economic factors.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Spruill, 294 Ga. at 106 (2); see also Edwards v. Dept. of Children & Youth Svcs., 271 Ga. 890, 892 ( 525 SE2d 83 ) (2000) (expanding the exception to social, political and economic

2019As the Supreme Court of Georgia has indicated, “for the discretionary function exception to apply, it must be shown that a state officer or employee was afforded discretion with respect to the conduct that is alleged to amount to a tort, that an exercise of the discretion afforded amounts to “a policy judgment based upon a consideration of social, political, or economic factors.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Spruill, 294 Ga. at 106 (2); see also Edwards v. Dept. of Children & Youth Svcs., 271 Ga. 890, 892 ( 525 SE2d 83 ) (2000) (expanding the exception to social, political and economic

2013See, e.g., Earle v. State of Vermont, 910 A2d 841, 851-852 (Vt. 2006) (“We hold that the child protection decisions made in this case in response to allegations of abuse ... fall squarely within the intended scope of the discretionary function exception.”); Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 NW2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1993) (where county social worker declined to remove two-year-old child from custody of her mother, the “social worker was required to weigh the competing governmental policies of protecting the child from danger within the family and keeping the family together, a decision involving profound

2013They are therefore precisely the types of administrative action the discretionary function exception seeks to shield from judicial second-guessing.” Doss v. City of Savannah, 290 Ga. App. 670, 675 ( 660 SE2d 457 ) (2008).

2013They are therefore precisely the types of administrative action the discretionary function exception seeks to shield from judicial second-guessing.” Doss v. City of Savannah, 290 Ga. App. 670, 675 ( 660 SE2d 457 ) (2008).

2013See, e.g., Earle v. State of Vermont, 910 A2d 841, 851-852 (Vt. 2006) (“We hold that the child protection decisions made in this case in response to allegations of abuse ... fall squarely within the intended scope of the discretionary function exception.”); Olson v. Ramsey County, 509 NW2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1993) (where county social worker declined to remove two-year-old child from custody of her mother, the “social worker was required to weigh the competing governmental policies of protecting the child from danger within the family and keeping the family together, a decision involving profound