discretionary function exception in Minnesota

2025Holmquist, 425 N.W.2d at 231 (“[I]n determining whether particular conduct is protected, we have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly and have focused on the purpose underlying the exception.”). 12 It is worth contrasting the scope and purpose of the discretionary-function exception with the scope and purpose of the distinct common-law doctrine of official immunity, a doctrine that is not at issue in this appeal.

2025Generally, a municipality must “produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments.” Steinke, 525 N.W.2d at 175 ; Angell v. Hennepin County Reg’l Rail Auth., 578 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 1998) (concluding municipality was not immune from liability 14 In Holmquist, we explained that the discretionary-function exception be interpreted no more broadly than necessary to serve the separation of powers concerns underlying the exception. 425 N.W.2d at 231 . 15 In Terwilliger, we obse

2025Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 23 (observing that determining whether an act of government involves the exercise of discretion “has been subject to enigmatic application and occasional breakdown”); 17 Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 718–19 (“Courts have consistently encountered difficulty in applying the discretionary function exception.”).

2025Although questions remain about whether the failure to take those steps “was negligent and whether it caused [Minor Doe’s] injuries, such a claim is not precluded at the outset under the discretionary function exception.” Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 723 .

2025Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 23 (observing that determining whether an act of government involves the exercise of discretion “has been subject to enigmatic application and occasional breakdown”); 17 Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 718–19 (“Courts have consistently encountered difficulty in applying the discretionary function exception.”).

2025To the extent those opinions suggest hiring decisions are necessarily and categorically subject to the discretionary-function exception, they are not good law. 30 cannot be characterized as “discretionary.” Snyder, 441 N.W.2d at 787 (suggesting that a decision to issue a permit that was explicitly not allowed under a municipal zoning ordinance was not subject to the discretionary-function exception); Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 24 ; see also id. at 27 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of discretionary immunity does not apply where specific standards of conduct as set forth in statutes, regulat

2025Jepsen, 966 N.W.2d at 488–89; Terwilliger v. Hennepin County, 561 N.W.2d 909, 912 (Minn. 1997) (observing that “the legislature did not intend the discretionary function exception to swallow the general rule of allowing recovery for those injuries negligently inflicted in the performance of government operations”).

2025Generally, a municipality must “produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments.” Steinke, 525 N.W.2d at 175 ; Angell v. Hennepin County Reg’l Rail Auth., 578 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 1998) (concluding municipality was not immune from liability 14 In Holmquist, we explained that the discretionary-function exception be interpreted no more broadly than necessary to serve the separation of powers concerns underlying the exception. 425 N.W.2d at 231 . 15 In Terwilliger, we obse

2025Watson, 553 N.W.2d at 412 . 12 If there is a single consistent thread in our jurisprudence on the discretionary- function exception to municipal tort liability, it is this: “The critical inquiry is whether the conduct involved a balancing of policy objectives.” Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1994).

2025Generally, a municipality must “produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments.” Steinke, 525 N.W.2d at 175 ; Angell v. Hennepin County Reg’l Rail Auth., 578 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 1998) (concluding municipality was not immune from liability 14 In Holmquist, we explained that the discretionary-function exception be interpreted no more broadly than necessary to serve the separation of powers concerns underlying the exception. 425 N.W.2d at 231 . 15 In Terwilliger, we obse

2024See Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 178 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Minn. 1970) (granting judgment for city on appeal, reasoning that a Minneapolis city employee’s act in “issuing the building permit in a doubtful case involved an exercise of discretion” because the employee “had to make a judgment as to whether plans submitted in support of the application for the permit constituted a permissible use of the property in the area involved”); see also Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389, 392-93 (Minn. 1984) (affirming that, “as a matter of law[,] . . . the city was not liable” under the discretionary-funct

1988See Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.1984) (city council’s decision to make land improvements was protected by the discretionary function exception because it involved planning and policy judgments qualifying as discretionary acts).

2006Thus, in Holmquist v. State, 409 N.W.2d 243, 247-48 (Minn.App. 1987), rev'd, 425 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. 1988), the court of appeals determined that the abrupt narrowing of the width of the shoulder on a road constituted a pitfall, trap, or snare, giving rise to a duty to warn, and that the discretionary function exception under the State Tort Claims Act was not applicable because the state had created this dangerous condition.

2006Thus, in Holmquist v. State, 409 N.W.2d 243, 247-48 (Minn.App. 1987), rev’d, 425 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. 1988), the court of appeals determined that the abrupt narrowing of the width of the shoulder on a road constituted a pitfall, trap, or snare, giving rise to a duty to warn, and that the discretionary function exception under the State Tort Claims Act was not applicable because the state had created this dangerous condition.

1996Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6 (1994), provides that a municipality is immune from tort liability for "[a]ny claim based upon the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused." In determining whether particular government activity is protected by statutory immunity, we have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly and have focused on its underlying purpose — to preserve the separation of powers by preventing courts from passing judgment "on policy decisions entrusted to coordinate

1996Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6 (1994), provides that a municipality is immune from tort liability for “[a]ny claim based upon the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused.” In determining whether particular government activity is protected by statutory immunity, we have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly and have focused on its underlying purpose'— to preserve the separation of powers by preventing courts from passing judgment “on policy decisions entrusted to coordinate

2025This means that the municipality must produce evidence of “how it made the decision for which it claims immunity.” Conlin v. City of Saint Paul, 605 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Minn. 2000).

2025Paul, 605 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. 2000). 1 On appeal, Holper does not challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the city on her implied-breach-of-contract claim. 2 The discretionary-function exception to municipal tort liability under Minn. Stat. § 466.03 , subd. 6, is referred to as both “statutory immunity” and “discretionary immunity.” Christopherson v. City of Albert Lea, 623 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. App. 2001).

2025Generally, a municipality must “produce evidence its conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments.” Steinke, 525 N.W.2d at 175 ; Angell v. Hennepin County Reg’l Rail Auth., 578 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 1998) (concluding municipality was not immune from liability 14 In Holmquist, we explained that the discretionary-function exception be interpreted no more broadly than necessary to serve the separation of powers concerns underlying the exception. 425 N.W.2d at 231 . 15 In Terwilliger, we obse

2025This type of blanket rule runs counter to our repeated caution that the discretionary- function exception is construed narrowly to avoid precluding Minnesotans from recovering for injuries caused by municipalities’ tortious conduct unless necessary to avoid judicial branch interference with policymaking activities best left to the legislative or executive branch. 18 See, e.g., Angell, 578 N.W.2d at 346 ; Holmquist, 425 N.W.2d at 231 .

1996Id. at 722 (citing Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1185 (E.D.Pa.1978)).

1988The distinction between policy-making decisions and scientific or professional decisions was again discussed in Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D.Penn.1978).

1996For example, in Silver v. City of Minneapolis, 284 Minn. 266 , 170 N.W.2d 206 (1969), the court had determined that deployment of police to control civil unrest was a policy decision protected by the discretionary function exception.

1996For example, in Silver v. City of Minneapolis, 284 Minn. 266 , 170 N.W.2d 206 (1969), the court had determined that deployment of police to control civil unrest was a policy decision protected by the discretionary function exception.

2025Watson, 553 N.W.2d at 412 . 12 If there is a single consistent thread in our jurisprudence on the discretionary- function exception to municipal tort liability, it is this: “The critical inquiry is whether the conduct involved a balancing of policy objectives.” Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1994).

2025This statutory immunity for discretionary functions is designed to “prevent the courts from conducting an after-the-fact review which second-guesses certain policy-making activities that are legislative or executive in nature.” Watson, 553 N.W.2d at 412 (quotation omitted); see Doe 601 by Doe 601 v. Best Acad., 17 N.W.3d 464, 476 (Minn. 2025) (stating the discretionary-function exception to liability serves the purpose of “protecting legislative and executive branch prerogatives in making public policy”).

2025Gleason II, 582 N.W.2d at 219 (stating that the discretionary-function exception analysis must start by identifying the precise government conduct being challenged in the underlying tort claim); Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 722–23 (focusing on three discrete acts related to placing signage at the terminus of a speed zone). 35 Second, Best Academy argues that it cannot be held responsible for failing to obtain information under a hiring policy because it made an independent policy decision to contract out some of the steps in the hiring process—including contacting references and gathering applicatio

2006Similarly, in Gleason v. Metro Council Transit Operations , we said: We have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly — protecting only those activities which require the balancing of policy objectives, "involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments." [ Zank v. Larson, 552 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn.1996)] (quoting Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn.1994)). 582 N.W.2d 216 , 219 n. 5 (Minn.1998).

2006Similarly, in Gleason v. Metro Council Transit Operations , we said: We have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly — protecting only those activities which require the balancing of policy objectives, "involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments." [ Zank v. Larson, 552 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn.1996)] (quoting Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn.1994)). 582 N.W.2d 216 , 219 n. 5 (Minn.1998).

2006Similarly, in Gleason v. Metro Council Transit Operations, we said: We have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly — protecting only those activities which require the balancing of policy objectives, “involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments.” [Zank v. Larson, 552 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn.1996)] (quoting Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn.1994)). 582 N.W.2d 216 , 219 ,n. 5 (Minn.1998).

1996Dahlheimer v. City of Dayton, 441 N.W.2d 534 (Minn.App.1989), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).

1991Dahlheimer at 538-39 (quoting Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Minn.1988)).

1991Justice Scalia agreed with the Court’s rejection of the planning/operational dichotomy, but expressed his view that "the level at which the decision is made is often relevant to the discretionary function inquiry.” Id. — U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1280 (Scalia, J., concurring (emphasis in original)).

1991Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's rejection of the planning/operational dichotomy, but expressed his view that "the level at which the decision is made is often relevant to the discretionary function inquiry." Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1280 (Scalia, J., concurring (emphasis in original)).

1990Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 693 (8th Cir.1986).

1988Blessing reinforces the notion that determining whether the discretionary function exception applies depends on whether the challenged governmental action involves a balancing of policy with political, economic, and social considerations or, alternatively, whether it involved merely a professional or scientific judgment. *721 The distinction between a plaintiff challenging a policy itself (which is barred by discretionary immunity) and challenging government conduct pursuant to a policy (which may or may not be barred) was recently addressed in Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.

1988See Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir.1974). 1 In applying the planning-operational level distinction to the State’s activity in the present case, then, we must be mindful that the ultimate question is whether the challenged conduct involves policymaking decisions entrusted to government agencies which the legislature intended, through the discretionary function exception, to protect from judicial second-guessing.

1988For example, in Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3rd Cir.1974), the court stated that in order “[t]o determine the applicability of the discretionary function exception * * *, we must analyze not merely whether judgment was exercised but also whether the nature of the judgment called for policy considerations.” Id. at 1064 .

2025Paul, 605 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. 2000). 1 On appeal, Holper does not challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the city on her implied-breach-of-contract claim. 2 The discretionary-function exception to municipal tort liability under Minn. Stat. § 466.03 , subd. 6, is referred to as both “statutory immunity” and “discretionary immunity.” Christopherson v. City of Albert Lea, 623 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. App. 2001).

2025To the extent those opinions suggest hiring decisions are necessarily and categorically subject to the discretionary-function exception, they are not good law. 30 cannot be characterized as “discretionary.” Snyder, 441 N.W.2d at 787 (suggesting that a decision to issue a permit that was explicitly not allowed under a municipal zoning ordinance was not subject to the discretionary-function exception); Cairl, 323 N.W.2d at 24 ; see also id. at 27 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of discretionary immunity does not apply where specific standards of conduct as set forth in statutes, regulat

2025Snyder, 441 N.W.2d at 787 (noting that conduct that violates a municipality’s adopted policy is not protected from tort liability under the discretionary-function exception). 33 political, social, or financial considerations.

2025Appellant Minor Doe 601 (Minor Doe), by and through his mother and natural guardian, Mother Doe 601 (Mother Doe), brought several tort claims against multiple parties—including a claim for negligent hiring against respondent Best Academy—after 2 his teacher, defendant Aaron Hjermstad, sexually assaulted him. 1 Best Academy sought summary judgment on Minor Doe’s claim under the discretionary-function exception to municipal tort liability set forth in Minn. Stat. § 466.03 , subd. 6 (2024). 2 To invoke the discretionary-function exception, a municipality bears the burden of proving that the condu

2024See Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 178 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Minn. 1970) (granting judgment for city on appeal, reasoning that a Minneapolis city employee’s act in “issuing the building permit in a doubtful case involved an exercise of discretion” because the employee “had to make a judgment as to whether plans submitted in support of the application for the permit constituted a permissible use of the property in the area involved”); see also Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389, 392-93 (Minn. 1984) (affirming that, “as a matter of law[,] . . . the city was not liable” under the discretionary-funct

2006Likewise in Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth , the court of appeals determined that the discretionary function exception to state liability was not applicable where the state created a dangerous condition on its roads that gave rise to a duty to warn. [3] 411 N.W.2d 917, 922-23 (Minn.App.1987), aff'd on other grounds, 422 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn.1988).

2006Likewise in Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth, the court of appeals determined that the discretionary function exception to state liability was not applicable where the state created a dangerous condition on its roads that gave rise to a duty to warn. 3 411 N.W.2d 917, 922-23 (Minn.App.1987), affd on other grounds, 422 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn.1988).

2002The Woehrles rely on Invest Cast, Inc. v. City of Blaine, 471 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn.App.1991), review denied (Minn. Aug. 1, 1991) and argue that how firefighters fight a fire is not within the discretionary-function exception to municipal liability.

2002In Invest Cast, this court reversed a summary-judgment ruling in favor of the fire department; we stated that “the implementation of an established policy in a particular fact situation is not within the discretionary function exception.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2000See Sota Foods, Inc. v. Larson-Peterson & Assocs., Inc., 497 N.W.2d 276 (Minn.App.1993), wherein the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment in favor of an engineering firm performing services on behalf of a municipality where the engineering firm claimed it was protected from suit under the doctrine of discretionary function immunity.

2000See Sota Foods, Inc. v. Larson-Peterson & Assocs., Inc., 497 N.W.2d 276 (Minn.App.1993), wherein the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment in favor of an engineering firm performing services on behalf of a municipality where the engineering firm claimed it was protected from suit under the doctrine of discretionary function immunity.