discretionary function immunity in Oregon

1995The discretionary function immunity would not, however, necessarily insulate the agency from liability for the negligent performance by its employees of certain tasks related to such a decision—for example, determining the extent of the actual disrepair in each section and the kinds of hazards that existed as a result.” 290 Or at 15 .

1981The discretionary function immunity would not, however, necessarily insulate the agency from liability for the negligent performance by its employes of certain tasks related to such a decision — for example, determining the extent of the actual disrepair in each section and the kinds of hazards that existed as a result.” 290 Or at 14-15 .

1979See Daugherty v. State Highway Commission, [supra]; Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or 485 , 475 P2d 78 (1970); Mayse v. Coos County, 35 Or App 779 , 583 P2d 7 (1978); Jones v. Chehalem Park and Rec.

1979See Daugherty v. State Highway Commission, [supra]; Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or 485 , 475 P2d 78 (1970); Mayse v. Coos County, 35 Or App 779 , 583 P2d 7 (1978); Jones v. Chehalem Park and Rec.

1979See Daugherty v. State Highway Commission, [supra]; Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or 485 , 475 P2d 78 (1970); Mayse v. Coos County, 35 Or App 779 , 583 P2d 7 (1978); Jones v. Chehalem Park and Rec.

1979See Daugherty v. State Highway Commission, [supra]; Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or 485 , 475 P2d 78 (1970); Mayse v. Coos County, 35 Or App 779 , 583 P2d 7 (1978); Jones v. Chehalem Park and Rec.

2016As this court explained in McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or 433, 437 , 578 P2d 1259 (1978), *653 “insofar as an official action involves both the determination of facts and simple cause-and-effect relationships and also the assessment of costs and benefits, the evaluation of relative effectiveness and risks, and a choice among competing goals and priorities, an official has ‘discretion’ to the extent that he has been delegated responsibility for the latter kind of value judgment.” The accepted rationale for providing discretionary-function immunity—separation of powers of coordinate branches of gov

2016As this court explained in McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or 433, 437 , 578 P2d 1259 (1978), *653 “insofar as an official action involves both the determination of facts and simple cause-and-effect relationships and also the assessment of costs and benefits, the evaluation of relative effectiveness and risks, and a choice among competing goals and priorities, an official has ‘discretion’ to the extent that he has been delegated responsibility for the latter kind of value judgment.” The accepted rationale for providing discretionary-function immunity—separation of powers of coordinate branches of gov

2016Discretionary-function immunity does not extend to “routine decisions made by employees in the course of their day-to-day activities, even though the decision involves a choice among two or more courses of action.” Lowrimore v. Dimmitt, 310 Or 291, 296 , 797 P2d 1027 (1990).

2016Discretionary-function immunity does not extend to “routine decisions made by employees in the course of their day-to-day activities, even though the decision involves a choice among two or more courses of action.” Lowrimore v. Dimmitt, 310 Or 291, 296 , 797 P2d 1027 (1990).

2016Id. at 363-72 .

2016Id. at 363-72 .

1979Gallison v. City of Portland, 37 Or App 145 , 586 P2d 393 , rev den, 285 Or 319 (1978). "*** The perimeters of the discretionary function immunity afforded governmental agents and their principals are rather well settled in the area of road and street design and maintenance.

1979Gallison v. City of Portland, 37 Or App 145 , 586 P2d 393 , rev den, 285 Or 319 (1978). "*** The perimeters of the discretionary function immunity afforded governmental agents and their principals are rather well settled in the area of road and street design and maintenance.

2016As this court explained in McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or 433, 437 , 578 P2d 1259 (1978), Cite as 359 Or 644 (2016) 653 “insofar as an official action involves both the determina- tion of facts and simple cause-and-effect relationships and also the assessment of costs and benefits, the evaluation of relative effectiveness and risks, and a choice among com- peting goals and priorities, an official has ‘discretion’ to the extent that he has been delegated responsibility for the lat- ter kind of value judgment.” The accepted rationale for providing discretionary- function immunity—separation of powe

2002On review, the Oregon Supreme Court held that, although the act permits public bodies to be sued in tort “for monetary damages as well as to be subject to actions for injunctions,” 327 Or at 7 , ORS 30.265(3)(c) provides public bodies with discretionary function immunity only from claims of monetary liability, id. at 8 .

2002On review, the Oregon Supreme Court held that, although the act permits public bodies to be sued in tort “for monetary damages as well as to be subject to actions for injunctions,” 327 Or at 7 , ORS 30.265(3)(c) provides public bodies with discretionary function immunity only from claims of monetary liability, id. at 8 .

1999Because of that conclusion, it did not need to consider the grounds on which we held that the defendant's actions were immune. [8] As the Supreme Court commented in Miller , we must avoid interpreting the discretionary function exception in a way that would "swallow up the concept of discretion by holding a public body liable whenever it is found not to have actually satisfied its tort duty." 297 Or. at 320 , 686 P.2d 324 .

1999As the Supreme Court commented in Miller , we must avoid interpreting the discretionary function exception in a way that would “swallow up the concept of discretion by holding a public body liable whenever it is found not to have actually satisfied its tort duty.” 297 Or at 320 .

1998It then reviewed the elements of a discretionary function immunity defense as set out in this court’s case law and concluded that the District’s choice to adopt certain mitigation measures and reject others, rather than to move the compost operation elsewhere, was “the essence of immunized discretion.” 146 Or App at 235 .