35 California opinions name it 3 courts 1894–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shea v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences2020Code,] § 1680].)” (Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 311, 320 , disapproved on other grounds in Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1116, fn. 2 ; see Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 575 [in medical doctor context, interpreting phrase “ ‘but is not limited to’ ” to allow discipline for unlisted conduct “which indicates an unfitness to practice medicine,” and concluding there is no unfairness to discipline respondents in so doing].) 12 C. 2020Code,] § 1680].)” (Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 311, 320 , disapproved on other grounds in Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1116, fn. 2 ; see Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 575 [in medical doctor context, interpreting phrase “ ‘but is not limited to’ ” to allow discipline for unlisted conduct “which indicates an unfitness to practice medicine,” and concluding there is no unfairness to discipline respondents in so doing].) 12 C. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Mendozagreen2 sentences2015(See People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1122 [holding that "an aider and abettor 'shares the guilt of the actual perpetrator' "].) Nothing in CALCRIM No. 400 states that the requirements for being a perpetrator and for being an aider and abettor are identical, nor would a reasonable juror have interpreted that language in such a manner. 14 The trial court instructed the jury on the intended crimes of aiding and abetting pursuant to CALCRIM No. 401 as follows: "To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. 2015(See People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1122 [holding that “an aider and abettor ‘shares the guilt of the actual perpetrator.’ [Citation.]”].) Nothing in CALCRIM No. 400 states that the requirements for being a perpetrator and for being an aider and abettor are identical, nor would a reasonable juror have interpreted that language in such a manner. | 3 | 3 |
Dhillon v. John Muir Healthgreen2 sentences2020Code,] § 1680].)” (Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 311, 320 , disapproved on other grounds in Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1116, fn. 2 ; see Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 575 [in medical doctor context, interpreting phrase “ ‘but is not limited to’ ” to allow discipline for unlisted conduct “which indicates an unfitness to practice medicine,” and concluding there is no unfairness to discipline respondents in so doing].) 12 C. 2020Code,] § 1680].)” (Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 311, 320 , disapproved on other grounds in Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1116, fn. 2 ; see Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 575 [in medical doctor context, interpreting phrase “ ‘but is not limited to’ ” to allow discipline for unlisted conduct “which indicates an unfitness to practice medicine,” and concluding there is no unfairness to discipline respondents in so doing].) 12 C. | 2 | 2 |
Justus v. Atchisongreen2 sentences2015We suggest that this introductory clause refers to a circumstance in which a final judgment may be entered as to a party all of whose claims are fully resolved such that there would be no violation of the “one final judgment rule.” (This rule is discussed, for example, in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 568 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], overruled on other grounds in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ].) That exception is not a command to accelerate entry of judgment to the very moment the trial court grants a motion for summary judgme 2015We suggest that this introductory clause refers to a circumstance in which a final judgment may be entered as to a party all of whose claims are fully resolved such that there would be no violation of the “one final judgment rule.” (This rule is discussed, for example, in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 568 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], overruled on other grounds in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ].) That exception is not a command to accelerate entry of judgment to the very moment the trial court grants a motion for summary judgme | 1 | 2 |
Miklosy v. Regents of the University of Californiagreen1 sentence2025(See People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853 [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903.) 5 defendant would be eligible for the upper term but could not receive it in the absence of aggravating factors stipulated to by the defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 329.) We respectfully disagree. “[A] proviso or clause beginning with the word ‘unless’ means an exception or condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent.” (Baggett v. Housing Authority (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 383, 389 , italics added; see Miklosy v. Regents of University of Ca | 1 | 1 |
People v. Flinnergreen1 sentence2022(See Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 748 [“[t]he lying-in-wait special circumstance [citation] includes the elements of first degree lying-in- wait murder”].) The trial court also gave the following introductory instruction based on CALCRIM No. 252: “The following crimes and allegations require a specific intent or mental state: Murder, as charged in count 1; the special circumstance of lying in wait, as alleged in Count 1; attempted murder, as charged in Count 2; and the allegation of willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted murder, as charged in Count 2. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Matthew A.green1 sentence2016(In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 592 (A.C.); In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541 (Matthew A.); In re Ali A.(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569 , 573–574 (Ali A.).) In the foregoing cases, the courts agreed that setting such a term at a disposition hearing is beyond the juvenile court’s statutory authority, but have disagreed whether a remedy is necessary. | 1 | 1 |
People v. A.C.green1 sentence2016(In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 592 (A.C.); In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541 (Matthew A.); In re Ali A.(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569 , 573–574 (Ali A.).) In the foregoing cases, the courts agreed that setting such a term at a disposition hearing is beyond the juvenile court’s statutory authority, but have disagreed whether a remedy is necessary. | 1 | 1 |
Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School Districtgreen2 sentences2013As set forth above, the introductory clause of section 56041 explicitly excepts from the reach of the statute “those pupils meeting residency requirements for school attendance specified in subdivision (a) of Section 48204.” That provision lists the exceptions to the general rule that children between the ages of six and 18 must attend school in the school district in which the residence of their parent or guardian is located. 2 (See Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School Dist. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 47, 57-58 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 ].) In accordance with *188 those exceptions, secti 2013As set forth above, the introductory clause of section 56041 explicitly excepts from the reach of the statute “those pupils meeting residency requirements for school attendance specified in subdivision (a) of Section 48204.” That provision lists the exceptions to the general rule that children between the ages of six and 18 must attend school in the school district in which the residence of their parent or guardian is located. 2 (See Katz v. Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union High School Dist. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 47, 57-58 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 546 ].) In accordance with *188 those exceptions, secti | 1 | 1 |
In Re CHred2 sentences2012As previously discussed, subdivision (c)(1)(E) applies to the matters listed in sections 65901 and 65903, which concern actions of the “board of zoning adjustment,” “zoning administrator” (§ 65901), and “board of appeals” (§ 65903)—none of which constitute a “legislative body.” “It is a settled principle of statutory construction that courts should ‘strive to give meaning to every word in a statute and to avoid constructions that render words, phrases, or clauses superfluous.’ [Citations.] We harmonize statutory provisions, if possible, giving each provision full effect.” (In re CM. (2011) 53 2012As previously discussed, subdivision (c)(1)(E) applies to the matters listed in sections 65901 and 65903, which concern actions of the “board of zoning adjustment,” “zoning administrator” (§ 65901), and “board of appeals” (§ 65903)—none of which constitute a “legislative body.” “It is a settled principle of statutory construction that courts should ‘strive to give meaning to every word in a statute and to avoid constructions that render words, phrases, or clauses superfluous.’ [Citations.] We harmonize statutory provisions, if possible, giving each provision full effect.” (In re CM. (2011) 53 | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2010Co. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 434, 448 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ] (State Farm): “California law governs certain internal affairs of a foreign corporation if more than half of the corporation’s voting stock is held by California residents, and the corporation conducts a majority of its business in the state (as measured by assets, payroll, and sales).” 20 We would add only this introductory clause to that sentence from State Farm: “After a certain amount of time has passed, California law governs certain internal affairs of a foreign corporation if . . . .” Pinpointing that amount of t 2010Co. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 434, 448 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 56 ] (State Farm): “California law governs certain internal affairs of a foreign corporation if more than half of the corporation’s voting stock is held by California residents, and the corporation conducts a majority of its business in the state (as measured by assets, payroll, and sales).” 20 We would add only this introductory clause to that sentence from State Farm: “After a certain amount of time has passed, California law governs certain internal affairs of a foreign corporation if . . . .” Pinpointing that amount of t | 1 | 1 |
Woodbury v. Brown-Dempseygreen2 sentences2009(Woodbury v. Brown-Dempsey (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 421, 433 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 124 ].) The Legislature was concerned with affording certain information and protection to homeowners, and there is nothing in Civil Code section 912 (or anywhere else, as far as we can see) that permits a builder to choose not to provide that information and protection. 2009(Woodbury v. Brown-Dempsey (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 421, 433 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 124 ].) The Legislature was concerned with affording certain information and protection to homeowners, and there is nothing in Civil Code section 912 (or anywhere else, as far as we can see) that permits a builder to choose not to provide that information and protection. | 1 | 1 |
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF RIVERSIDE CTY. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2008In fact, we specifically stated that, “The introductory clause of Public Resources Code section 21167.6 [notwithstanding any other provision of law] simply cannot be used to blot out the entire statutory framework for service of process, insofar as the statute does not provide alternate rules . . . .” (Board of Supervisors, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 840, fn. 7 .) Here, CEQA does not provide alternate rules for service of the summons, and so does not “blot out” the service of summons rule contained in the SMA. | 1 | 1 |
Committee for a Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Resouces Control Boardgreen2 sentences2007Citizens’s argument misapprehends the definition of “project.” Under CEQA, “project” “refers to the underlying activity which may be subject to approval by one or more governmental agencies; it does not refer to each of the several approvals sequentially issued by different agencies.” (Committee for a Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 847, 863 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 723 ], italics added; see also Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (c).) “This definition ensures that the action reviewed Under CEQA is not the approval itself but the development or other activities th 2007Citizens’s argument misapprehends the definition of “project.” Under CEQA, “project” “refers to the underlying activity which may be subject to approval by one or more governmental agencies; it does not refer to each of the several approvals sequentially issued by different agencies.” (Committee for a Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 847, 863 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 723 ], italics added; see also Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (c).) “This definition ensures that the action reviewed Under CEQA is not the approval itself but the development or other activities th | 1 | 1 |
| Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Scogginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pedro T.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Nasalgagreen | 1 | 1 |
| City and County of San Francisco v. Farrellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Floresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kesselgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Malengo v. Municipal Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Barrick
red
2 sentences2015(People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 128 .) Defendant argues that Penal Code section 1170.18 explicitly applies to violations of Penal Code section 487, through the introductory clause of Penal Code section 490.2, so “logically” it must apply to lesser included offenses of Penal Code section 487, including Vehicle Code section 10851.{AOB 8} We disagree. 2015(People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 128 .) Defendant argues that Penal Code section 1170.18 explicitly applies to violations of Penal Code section 487, through the introductory clause of Penal Code section 490.2, so “logically” it must apply to lesser included offenses of Penal Code section 487, including Vehicle Code section 10851. | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Gillis v. Dental Board
green
2 sentences2020Code,] § 1680].)” (Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 311, 320 , disapproved on other grounds in Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1116, fn. 2 ; see Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 575 [in medical doctor context, interpreting phrase “ ‘but is not limited to’ ” to allow discipline for unlisted conduct “which indicates an unfitness to practice medicine,” and concluding there is no unfairness to discipline respondents in so doing].) 12 C. 2020Code,] § 1680].)” (Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 311, 320 , disapproved on other grounds in Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1116, fn. 2 ; see Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 575 [in medical doctor context, interpreting phrase “ ‘but is not limited to’ ” to allow discipline for unlisted conduct “which indicates an unfitness to practice medicine,” and concluding there is no unfairness to discipline respondents in so doing].) 12 C. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Ochoa v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2015We suggest that this introductory clause refers to a circumstance in which a final judgment may be entered as to a party all of whose claims are fully resolved such that there would be no violation of the “one final judgment rule.” (This rule is discussed, for example, in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 568 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], overruled on other grounds in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ].) That exception is not a command to accelerate entry of judgment to the very moment the trial court grants a motion for summary judgme 2015We suggest that this introductory clause refers to a circumstance in which a final judgment may be entered as to a party all of whose claims are fully resolved such that there would be no violation of the “one final judgment rule.” (This rule is discussed, for example, in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 568 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], overruled on other grounds in Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ].) That exception is not a command to accelerate entry of judgment to the very moment the trial court grants a motion for summary judgme | 2 | 2015–2015 |
In Re JW
green
1 sentence2026(In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200 , 209 [“the expression of one thing in a statute ordinarily implies the exclusion of other things”].) Davis’s second claim of error suggests the judge made a mistake of fact in believing he had not yet served sufficient time in custody to satisfy a hypothetical 23- or 24-year prison term that was part of a plea offer that Davis was precluded from accepting. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Baggett v. Housing Authority
green
1 sentence2025(See People v. Eaton (Mar. 14, 2025, C096853 [nonpub. opn.], review granted May 14, 2025, S289903.) 5 defendant would be eligible for the upper term but could not receive it in the absence of aggravating factors stipulated to by the defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 329.) We respectfully disagree. “[A] proviso or clause beginning with the word ‘unless’ means an exception or condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent.” (Baggett v. Housing Authority (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 383, 389 , italics added; see Miklosy v. Regents of University of Ca | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Wende
green
2 sentences2022Counsel protests, though, that his chosen course of action is compelled by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 ; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444 (Feggans); and Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 496 . 2022Counsel protests, though, that his chosen course of action is compelled by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 ; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444 (Feggans); and Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 496 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Chlad
green
1 sentence2022Indeed, in this case, counsel could have kept to his short statement of appealability by simply adding an introductory clause: “Although there is authority finding a similar order nonappealable (People v. Chlad (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1719 ), this court should decline to follow that authority and permit the appeal to proceed as one taken from an order after judgment affecting substantial rights.” 10 to cite applicable authority is all the more unfortunate when done in an appeal where, as here, an attorney knows the adverse party will not be making an appearance. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Serrano
green
2 sentences2022Counsel protests, though, that his chosen course of action is compelled by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 ; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444 (Feggans); and Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 496 . 2022Counsel protests, though, that his chosen course of action is compelled by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 ; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444 (Feggans); and Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 496 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Feggans
green
1 sentence2022Counsel protests, though, that his chosen course of action is compelled by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 ; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444 (Feggans); and Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 496 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hollister Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Rico
green
1 sentence2021(Hollister Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660 , 666–667.) A transfer-out order in a juvenile dependency case “may be appealed by the transferring or receiving county and notice of appeal must be filed in the transferring county, under [California Rules of Court,] rule 8.400.”4 (Rule 5.610(j).) Rule 8.400 is the introductory rule of the juvenile appeals chapter of the court rules, Chapter 5, which specifies the proceedings to which the rules in that chapter govern; thus, appellants appealing a transfer-out order must follow the provisions of rules 8.400 through 8.416 of Ch | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Markaus
green
1 sentence2021The time to appeal in juvenile appeals is governed by rule 8.406, which provides, “a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed.”5 (Rule 8.406(a).) “ ‘[T]he making of the order’ ” has been interpreted by appellate courts to mean an oral pronouncement of the order in open court; this “marks the beginning of the time to file a notice of appeal. [Citation.]” (Adoption of Reed H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 76 , 81–82 (Reed H.); In re Markaus V. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1331 , 1337.) An exception to this rule is “ ‘where a stat | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Adoption of Reed H.
neutral
2 sentences2021The time to appeal in juvenile appeals is governed by rule 8.406, which provides, “a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed.”5 (Rule 8.406(a).) “ ‘[T]he making of the order’ ” has been interpreted by appellate courts to mean an oral pronouncement of the order in open court; this “marks the beginning of the time to file a notice of appeal. [Citation.]” (Adoption of Reed H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 76 , 81–82 (Reed H.); In re Markaus V. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1331 , 1337.) An exception to this rule is “ ‘where a stat 2021The time to appeal in juvenile appeals is governed by rule 8.406, which provides, “a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed.”5 (Rule 8.406(a).) “ ‘[T]he making of the order’ ” has been interpreted by appellate courts to mean an oral pronouncement of the order in open court; this “marks the beginning of the time to file a notice of appeal. [Citation.]” (Adoption of Reed H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 76 , 81–82 (Reed H.); In re Markaus V. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1331 , 1337.) An exception to this rule is “ ‘where a stat | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Anderson
red
1 sentence2016(Boldface omitted.) As discussed, this introductory instruction reflects the 1990 narrowing of People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104 by Proposition 115, which added both section 190.2, subdivisions (c) (codifying Anderson’s intent to kill requirement for accomplices) and (d) (modifying that intent to kill requirement for felony-murder special circumstances and allowing a finding based on reckless indifference to human life by a major participant in the qualifying felony). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Estrada
green
1 sentence2016(See People v. Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 575 .) The first sentence of CALCRIM No. 703 calls for identification of the qualifying felony. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Ali A.
green
1 sentence2016(In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 592 (A.C.); In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541 (Matthew A.); In re Ali A.(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569 , 573–574 (Ali A.).) In the foregoing cases, the courts agreed that setting such a term at a disposition hearing is beyond the juvenile court’s statutory authority, but have disagreed whether a remedy is necessary. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Norris
green
2 sentences2007Assuming defendant was even authorized to move for acquittal of a sentencing charge (see People v. Norris (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 475, 480 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ), we agree with the trial court his motion was without merit, because section 667.61 gave the prosecution the option of charging under either subdivision (d)(2) or subdivision (e)(1). 2007Assuming defendant was even authorized to move for acquittal of a sentencing charge (see People v. Norris (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 475, 480 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ), we agree with the trial court his motion was without merit, because section 667.61 gave the prosecution the option of charging under either subdivision (d)(2) or subdivision (e)(1). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Southwest Land Co. v. County of Los Angeles green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Van Nuis v. Los Angeles Soap Co. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Streeter v. Streeter green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Estate of Platt green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| In Re Application of Reineger green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Vale v. Boyle green | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Baines v. Babcock green | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.