introductory clause in New York

1865But the introductory clause of a will, evincing the intent of the testator to dispose of all his worldly estate, has not the effect to enlarge the estate devised, unless the words of disposition in the clause of devise are connected in terms or sense with the introductory clause, and import more than a mere description of property. ( Barheydt v. Barheydt, 20 Wend., 576 .) The words used in the introductory part of this will, are clearly nothing more than a description of the property confided to the care and administration of the executors named.

1849The language is, “ as touching such worldly estate as it hath pleased God to bless me with in this life, I do give and dispose of the same in the following manner and form.” It is fairly deducible from the decision of the court of errors in Barheydt v. Barheydt, ( 20 Wend. 576 ,) that the introductory clause of a will evincing the intent of the testator to dispose of all his worldly estate, has not the effect to enlarge the estate devised, unless the words of disposition in the clause of devise are connected* in terms or sense, with the introductory- clause, and import more than a mere descrip

1999Corp. 92 NY2d 335 ).

1999Corp. 92 NY2d 335 ).

1881Although an introductory clause of that character does not of itself enlarge a particular devise, it is very material to the inquiry concerning the purpose of the testator. (2 Preston on Estates, 206; Fox v. Phelps, 17 Wend., 393 ; Doe v. Harter, 7 Blackf., 448 ; Charter v. Otis, 41 Barb., 525 ; Harris v. Slaght, 46 id., 470, 502; Earl v. Grim, 1 Johns.

1867The • will in the case of Charter v. Otis ( 41 Barb., 525 ) contained a similar introductory clause, and it was held that a subsequént devise of -land witliout words of perpetuity conveyed a fee; but that case differs from this in important particulars.

2022Moreover, as previously set forth, as a revival statute, CPLR 214-g must be narrowly construed ( see Hopkins v Lincoln Trust Co. , 233 NY at 215 ; Besser v Squibb & Sons , 146 AD2d at 115 ).

2022Squibb & Sons , 146 AD2d 107, 116 [1st Dept 1989], affd 75 NY2d 847 [1990]).

2022We further conclude that "the plain language of the introductory clause in CPLR 214-g . . . , which states '[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary ' (emphasis added), is meant to avoid the statute of limitations that would have ordinarily been applicable to the causes of action at issue," i.e., here, the three-year period of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs' causes of action sounding in negligence as set forth in CPLR 214 (5), but does not "override the provisions" of CPLR 202, New York's "borrowing" statute ( S. H. v Diocese of Broo

2006Contrary to the further contention of defendant, the court’s alleged violation of CPL 300.10 (4) by failing to read the introductory instruction on robbery (CJI2d[NY] Introductory Charge to Robbery Penal Law 160) does not implicate the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law (cf. People v Boston, 75 NY2d 585 , 589 n 2 [1990]; People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307, 310 [1985], rearg denied 67 NY2d 647 [1986]; see also People v Michael, 48 NY2d 1 [1979]).

1989Litig. ( 597 F Supp 740 , supra ), where the court interpreted a nearly identical statute which provided that the claims of Vietnam War veterans arising out of exposure to Agent Orange would be governed by a discovery rule "[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary". [4] Recognizing that many of those asserting claims would be residents of different States and, hence, that the borrowing statute would present an impediment, the court asserted: "While the introductory clause of the statute, CPLR 214-b, states: `Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary,' the reference app

1989Litig. ( 597 F Supp 740 , supra), where the court interpreted a nearly identical statute which provided that the claims of Vietnam War veterans arising out of exposure to Agent Orange would be governed by a discovery rule "[notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary”. 4 Recognizing that many of those asserting claims would be residents of different States and, hence, that the borrowing statute would present an impediment, the court asserted: "While the introductory clause of the statute, CPLR 214-b, states: 'Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary,’ the reference appears

1957Similar expressions have been held to relate to the time of beneficial enjoyment and not to the date of vesting of the remainder (Matter of Curlett, 166 Misc. 944 , 947 and cases cited).

1901If this be true, and it has the sanction of authority (see Garrett v. Wood, 27 App. Div. 312 ), the question presented herein is narrowed, as it should be, to whether all of the additional facts alleged by way of affirmative matter constitute together a complete or partial defense to plaintiff’s alleged cause of action.

1881Although an introductory clause of that character does not of itself enlarge a particular devise, it is very material to the inquiry concerning the purpose of the testator. (2 Preston on Estates, 206; Fox v. Phelps, 17 Wend., 393 ; Doe v. Harter, 7 Blackf., 448 ; Charter v. Otis, 41 Barb., 525 ; Harris v. Slaght, 46 id., 470, 502; Earl v. Grim, 1 Johns.

1881Although an introductory clause of that character does not of itself enlarge a particular devise, it is very material to the inquiry concerning the purpose of the testator. (2 Preston on Estates, 206; Fox v. Phelps, 17 Wend., 393 ; Doe v. Harter, 7 Blackf., 448 ; Charter v. Otis, 41 Barb., 525 ; Harris v. Slaght, 46 id., 470, 502; Earl v. Grim, 1 Johns.

1881Ch., 494 ; Youngs v. Youngs, 45 N. Y., 254 .) As it shows that the testator intended to part with his whole estate, the subsequent words will, if possible, be construed so as to prevent intestacy as to any part of his property.

1881Although an introductory clause of that character does not of itself enlarge a particular devise, it is very material to the inquiry concerning the purpose of the testator. (2 Preston on Estates, 206; Fox v. Phelps, 17 Wend., 393 ; Doe v. Harter, 7 Blackf., 448 ; Charter v. Otis, 41 Barb., 525 ; Harris v. Slaght, 46 id., 470, 502; Earl v. Grim, 1 Johns.

1881Although an introductory clause of that character does not of itself enlarge a particular devise, it is very material to the inquiry concerning the purpose of the testator. (2 Preston on Estates, 206; Fox v. Phelps, 17 Wend., 393 ; Doe v. Harter, 7 Blackf., 448 ; Charter v. Otis, 41 Barb., 525 ; Harris v. Slaght, 46 id., 470, 502; Earl v. Grim, 1 Johns.

1849And in Lippett v. Hopkins, ( 1 Gallison, 454 ,) although Mr. J.