case for an evidentiary hearing in Illinois

2018In our analysis, we repeatedly noted that (1) the borrowers had filed affidavits denying receipt of a grace period notice, (2) the bank did not contend that notice was mailed, and (3) the only basis for finding such a notice was the pro se answer “in which [the borrower] supposedly admitted an unstated allegation by failing to deny it.” Adeyiga, 2014 IL App (1st) 131252, ¶ 107 .

2018In our analysis, we repeatedly noted that (1) the borrowers had filed affidavits denying receipt of a grace period notice, (2) the bank did *397 not contend that notice was mailed, and (3) the only basis for finding such a notice was the pro se answer "in which [the borrower] supposedly admitted an unstated allegation by failing to deny it." Adeyiga , 2014 IL App (1st) 131252 , ¶ 107, 390 Ill.Dec. 431 , 29 N.E.3d 60 .

2016Id. at 135 , 886 N.E.2d at 1009-10 ; see also People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 22 , 989 N.E.2d 192 ("Bew and Massaro demonstrate that where, as here, the defendant's claim of ineffectiveness is based on counsel's failure to file a suppression motion, the record will fre- - 27 - quently be incomplete or inadequate to evaluate that claim because the record was not created for that purpose."). ¶ 106 In another case the majority cites, Campbell, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on an alleged omission by defense counsel: the failure to inter- view some witnesse

2016Id. at 135 , 886 N.E.2d at 1009-10 ; see also People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 22 , 989 N.E.2d 192 ("Bew and Massaro demonstrate that where, as here, the defendant's claim of ineffectiveness is based on counsel's failure to file a suppression motion, the record will fre- - 27 - quently be incomplete or inadequate to evaluate that claim because the record was not created for that purpose."). ¶ 106 In another case the majority cites, Campbell, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on an alleged omission by defense counsel: the failure to inter- view some witnesse

2016Superior Coal I ¶ 176 Union Pacific argues that even though, in Superior Coal I, Superior Coal insisted to the supreme court that it was merely a “department,” “branch,” “agent,” or “instrumentality” of Chicago and North Western (Superior Coal I, 377 Ill. at 283-84 ), the supreme court was unconvinced and said: “[T]he separate corporate existence of the two companies has been established and long preserved in the present case, and each corporation has obviously secured substantial economic benefits from its separate existence.” Id. at 291 . ¶ 177 Read in isolation, that sentence does indeed ap

2016Superior Coal I ¶ 176 Union Pacific argues that even though, in Superior Coal I, Superior Coal insisted to the supreme court that it was merely a “department,” “branch,” “agent,” or “instrumentality” of Chicago and North Western (Superior Coal I, 377 Ill. at 283-84 ), the supreme court was unconvinced and said: “[T]he separate corporate existence of the two companies has been established and long preserved in the present case, and each corporation has obviously secured substantial economic benefits from its separate existence.” Id. at 291 . ¶ 177 Read in isolation, that sentence does indeed ap

2016Campbell, 780 F.3d at 772 .

2016Campbell, 780 F.3d at 772 .

2015App. 3d at 323-24 , 822 N.E.2d at 925-26 . ¶ 10 Young concluded the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective and his plea was not voluntary and, therefore, reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.

2015App. 3d at 323-24 , 822 N.E.2d at 925-26 . ¶ 10 Young concluded the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective and his plea was not voluntary and, therefore, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.

2006People v. Sanchez, 131 Ill. 2d 417 (1989).

2006People v. Sanchez, 131 Ill. 2d 417 (1989).

2004Graham , 130 Ill.

2004Graham, 130 Ill.

2001Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404 .

2001Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 442-43 .

1990In re Marriage of Pitulla (1986), 141 Ill.

1990In re Marriage of Pituita (1986), 141 Ill.

2025Id. at 311 (citing People v. Bumpers, 229 Ill. 2d 632 (2008)).

2025Id. at 311 (citing People v. Bumpers, 229 Ill. 2d 632 (2008)).

2023However, if there is any question as to the scope of the agreement that took place, this court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing as to the scope of the agreement that took place. - 62 - No. 1-22-0322 ¶ 167 In Starks, 106 Ill. 2d 441 , our supreme court reviewed whether the defendant entered into a pretrial agreement with the State wherein the charges would be dismissed if he passed a polygraph test.

2023The court granted the husband’s motion, and the wife asked the court for a “reopening of the case for an evidentiary hearing on all aspects of the case.” Id. at 649-50 .

2021Goldfarb v. Bautista Concrete, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 172968, ¶ 20 , 126 N.E.3d 516 . ¶ 46 Nicholas D. asserts the appeal was filed to delay, harass, and increase attorney fees and costs because, even if petitioners were successful on appeal, the result would be to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing which would presumably cost them many times more than the attorney fees already awarded by the circuit court.

2021Goldfarb v. Bautista Concrete, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 172968, ¶ 20 , 126 N.E.3d 516 . ¶ 46 Nicholas D. asserts the appeal was filed to delay, harass, and increase attorney fees and costs because, even if petitioners were successful on appeal, the result would be to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing which would presumably cost them many times more than the attorney fees already awarded by the circuit court.

2020The Donelson court found (1) “competing evidence” as to when the plaintiff knew of his classification as a sexual predator and (2) “unresolved questions about IDOC’s claim of prejudice.” Donelson, 2018 IL App (3d) 170426, ¶¶ 12-13 .

2018In our analysis, we repeatedly noted that (1) the borrowers had filed affidavits denying receipt of a grace period notice, (2) the bank did *397 not contend that notice was mailed, and (3) the only basis for finding such a notice was the pro se answer "in which [the borrower] supposedly admitted an unstated allegation by failing to deny it." Adeyiga , 2014 IL App (1st) 131252 , ¶ 107, 390 Ill.Dec. 431 , 29 N.E.3d 60 .

1990Lorenzi.’ In fact, Mrs. Lorenzi’s verified petition does allege fraud. *** It is apparent from both the petition and answers thereto that the matters at issue were dehors the record and could not be determined by the court’s examination of the records in the case. *** Where, as here, however, the facts are controverted, the proof should be presented at an orderly hearing by examination of witnesses, under oath, subject to cross-examination. [Citations].” (Lorenzi, 84 Ill.

1984The appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing ( 112 Ill.

1973The court said: “[W]e think that the deliberate bypassing of counsel .of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case.” The Henry case was cited in People v. Dowling, 51 Ill.2d 370, 373 , 282 N.E.2d 696 , Like Henry, the Dowling case concerned a search and seizure question.

1973The court said: “[W]e think that the deliberate bypassing of counsel .of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case.” The Henry case was cited in People v. Dowling, 51 Ill.2d 370, 373 , 282 N.E.2d 696 , Like Henry, the Dowling case concerned a search and seizure question.