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16 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2019The court then remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine “(1) whether due process tolled the statute of limitations so as to give [the petitioner] a reasonable opportunity after the expiration of the limitations period to present his claim in a meaningful time and manner; and (2) if so, whether [the petitioner’s] filing of the post-conviction petition . . . was within the reasonable opportunity afforded by the due process tolling.” Id. at 471 . 2013This court concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without conducting a hearing to make determinations similar to those outlined in Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001), reversed the trial court’s judgment, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the timeliness of the petition. | 5 | 11 |
Hines v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Tracey Pendergrass, 1997 WL 760724 , at *7-9 (relying on Hines v. State, 27 Tenn. 597, 602 (1848)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. MacKeygreen2 sentences1989In conjunction with the trial court's finding that petitioner's complaint had been waived, the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals found: "The petitioner seeks to set aside convictions unrelated to those challenged in his first petition on the grounds that `no mention whatever was made [by the trial court] of the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself' and that there was a failure, in the prior convictions, to advise him of his `constitutional right against self-incrimination.' See State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1977). 1989In conjunction with the trial court’s finding that petitioner’s complaint had been waived, the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals found: “The petitioner seeks to set aside convictions unrelated to those challenged in his first petition on the grounds that ‘no mention whatever was made [by the trial court] of the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself’ and that there was a failure, in the prior convictions, to advise him of his ‘constitutional right against self-incrimination.’ See State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn.1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barish v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 955 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Crittenden v. State
green
1 sentence2010The supreme court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue because “[t]o summarily terminate his claim without further inquiry would be an ‘abridgement of both direct and post-conviction avenues of appeal-without ever reaching the merits of the ... case ... [and] would be patently unfair.’” Id. (quoting Crittenden v. State, 978 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1998)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Sands v. State
green
1 sentence1996The issue for our determination is whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the petitioner should be relieved, pursuant to our decisions in Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (1992) and Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn.1995), of the consequences of the expiration of the three-year limitations period applicable to post-conviction petitions. 1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals did err, and therefore reverse its judgment and dismiss the petition | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Burford v. State
green
1 sentence1996The issue for our determination is whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the petitioner should be relieved, pursuant to our decisions in Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (1992) and Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn.1995), of the consequences of the expiration of the three-year limitations period applicable to post-conviction petitions. 1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals did err, and therefore reverse its judgment and dismiss the petition | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Willie Jackson v. United States
green
2 sentences1970Bustillo v. United States, 5 Cir., 421 F.2d 131 , 132 and Jackson v. United States, 5 Cir., 394 F.2d 114 , cited in the majority opinion, involve statutory federal rules of criminal procedure imposing definite time limitations within which exceptions to Grand Jurors on account of their disqualifications and indictments returned by allegedly invalid Grand Juries may be raised, and providing that unless raised within the prescribed time such objections are waived. 1970Bustillo v. United States, 5 Cir., 421 F. 2d 131 , 132 and Jackson v. United States, 5 Cir., 394 F.2d 114 , cited in the majority opinion, involve statutory federal rules of criminal procedure imposing definite time limitations within which exceptions to Grand Jurors on account of their disqualifications and indictments returned by allegedly invalid Grand Juries may be raised, and providing that unless raised within the prescribed time such objections are waived. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Fernando P. Bustillo v. United States
neutral
2 sentences1970Bustillo v. United States, 5 Cir., 421 F.2d 131 , 132 and Jackson v. United States, 5 Cir., 394 F.2d 114 , cited in the majority opinion, involve statutory federal rules of criminal procedure imposing definite time limitations within which exceptions to Grand Jurors on account of their disqualifications and indictments returned by allegedly invalid Grand Juries may be raised, and providing that unless raised within the prescribed time such objections are waived. 1970Bustillo v. United States, 5 Cir., 421 F. 2d 131 , 132 and Jackson v. United States, 5 Cir., 394 F.2d 114 , cited in the majority opinion, involve statutory federal rules of criminal procedure imposing definite time limitations within which exceptions to Grand Jurors on account of their disqualifications and indictments returned by allegedly invalid Grand Juries may be raised, and providing that unless raised within the prescribed time such objections are waived. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.