classification claim in Missouri

1990State v. Jensen, 318 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Mo. banc 1958); Franklin, supra, at 876 .

1945Courtney v. Ocean Accident Guaranty Corporation, 346 Mo. 703 , 142 S.W.2d 858 ; but it is well settled that verdicts may not be based on conjecture and speculation.

1945Courtney v. Ocean Accident Guaranty Corporation, 346 Mo. 703 , 142 S.W.2d 858 ; but it is well settled that verdicts may not be based on conjecture and speculation.

1937But absent "evidence" of an exhibition for classification, then the classification of the claim, if and when allowed, will be governed, so far as the time element is concerned, by the time of the exhibition for allowance and presentment of the claim in the probate court. [Pfeiffer v. Suss, 73 Mo. 245 , 249-250.] *Page 787 It seems to be clear, therefore, that when proper regard is had for the distinction between the allowance and the classification of a claim, the jurisdiction of the probate court to entertain a claim with a view to its allowance is not to be defeated by the absence of any sho

1914The attorney can institute an independent suit in the circuit court if he chooses to do so. [Nichols v. Reyburn, Admr., 55 Mo. App. 1 .] And the remarks of the court on page 8 of that decision that the statute, by making no provision for the classification of such a claim, “seems to preclude the idea of a suit by the claimant in the probate court.” In other words, where, in the matter of an estate pending for settlement in the probate court, the administrator’s. attorney moves the court to allow an attorney’s fee as a part of the administration expenses, and in exercise of the power of the pro

1914It is not one of the ‘ ‘ demands ’ ’ spoken of by the statute, because section 190 makes no provision for its classification. [Nichols v. Reyburn, 55 Mo. App. 1 , l. c. 8.] It is there said: • “The very fact that all demands exhibited in the probate court must be classified, and that the statute makes no provision for the classification of such a claim, seems to preclude the idea of suit by the claimant in the probate court.” Again, if an attorney’s fee for services rendered in the administration of an estate is a “demand” within the statutory meaning, then an attorney would have to present hi

1914This court has said, not once, but many times, that-no man is compelled to stand on a right given him by law. [Henderson v. Koenig, supra; Williams v. Railroad, 153 Mo. l. c. 519; Fulkerson v. Lynn, 64 Mo. App. 649 .] Whatever this right may be, he may waive it if he chooses so to do, and without agreement or consideration, and lacking the essentials of an estoppel the waiver may be held to be valid and binding.