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7 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1919–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rosen v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 , 38 S.Ct. 148, 150 , 62 L.Ed. 406 (1918). 2002See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 , 38 S.Ct. 148, 150 , 62 L.Ed. 406 (1918). | 1 | 1 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.green2 sentences1998Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 311 , 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2099 (1993). 1998Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 311 , 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2099 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Stilman v. Tax Review Boardgreen2 sentences1986It is clear, however, that in order to prove a constitutional violation of this nature, “there must be a deliberate and purposeful discrimination in the application of the tax.” Stilman v. Tax Review Board, 402 Pa. 492, 493 , 166 A.2d 661, 662 (1961); see also Fisher Controls Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 476 Pa. 119 , 381 A.2d 1253 (1977). 1986It is clear, however, that in order to prove a constitutional violation of this nature, “there must be a deliberate and purposeful discrimination in the application of the tax.” Stilman v. Tax Review Board, 402 Pa. 492, 493 , 166 A.2d 661, 662 (1961); see also Fisher Controls Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 476 Pa. 119 , 381 A.2d 1253 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Fisher Controls Co. v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1986It is clear, however, that in order to prove a constitutional violation of this nature, “there must be a deliberate and purposeful discrimination in the application of the tax.” Stilman v. Tax Review Board, 402 Pa. 492, 493 , 166 A.2d 661, 662 (1961); see also Fisher Controls Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 476 Pa. 119 , 381 A.2d 1253 (1977). 1986It is clear, however, that in order to prove a constitutional violation of this nature, “there must be a deliberate and purposeful discrimination in the application of the tax.” Stilman v. Tax Review Board, 402 Pa. 492, 493 , 166 A.2d 661, 662 (1961); see also Fisher Controls Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 476 Pa. 119 , 381 A.2d 1253 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Prinkey, M., Aplt
green
1 sentence2026Id. at 763 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Martin v. Ketchum, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 523 Pa. 509 , 568 A.2d 159 (1990). 2000Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 523 Pa. 509 , 568 A.2d 159 (1990). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
DuBree v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1979This Court has, in the past, striven to categorize public servants in order to determine what, if any, immunity inheres in their offices. 1 The legislature, too, has engaged in classification of employ ees as an approach to the immunity problem. 2 Most recently, in DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540 , 393 A.2d 293 (1978), we announced we would abandon a classification analysis “in favor of rules which, though requiring case-by-case determinations, more often produce equitable results.” Id., 481 Pa. at 547 , 393 A.2d at 296 . 3 Hitherto we have not been called upon to determine whether the pub 1979This Court has, in the past, striven to categorize public servants in order to determine what, if any, immunity inheres in their offices. 1 The legislature, too, has engaged in classification of employ ees as an approach to the immunity problem. 2 Most recently, in DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540 , 393 A.2d 293 (1978), we announced we would abandon a classification analysis “in favor of rules which, though requiring case-by-case determinations, more often produce equitable results.” Id., 481 Pa. at 547 , 393 A.2d at 296 . 3 Hitherto we have not been called upon to determine whether the pub | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Searight's Estate
green
1 sentence1919The provision in question has no relevancy whatever to incidental benefits derived through the operation of a statute (Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124, 130 ; Clark’s Est., supra, p. 528 ) ; were it necessary to consider such effect but few acts of assembly could stand constitutional tests: Searight’s Est., 163 Pa. 210, 217 ; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 356 . | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Sugar Notch Borough
green
1 sentence1919The provision in question has no relevancy whatever to incidental benefits derived through the operation of a statute (Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124, 130 ; Clark’s Est., supra, p. 528 ) ; were it necessary to consider such effect but few acts of assembly could stand constitutional tests: Searight’s Est., 163 Pa. 210, 217 ; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 356 . | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Clark's Estate
green
2 sentences1919The provision in question has no relevancy whatever to incidental benefits derived through the operation of a statute (Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124, 130 ; Clark’s Est., supra, p. 528 ) ; were it necessary to consider such effect but few acts of assembly could stand constitutional tests: Searight’s Est., 163 Pa. 210, 217 ; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 356 . 1919Again, I cannot agree with Judge Frazer’s intimation that, but for the doctrine of classification, the act under consideration might infringe the provision of Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution, which forbids the passage of laws “granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege or immunity.” We held in Clark’s Est., 195 Pa. 520 , this language means exactly what it says and no more, that it only prevents an express grant of a “special or exclusive privilege or immunity” to a particular corporation or corporations; and this the present statute d | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Nolan v. Jones
green
1 sentence1919The provision in question has no relevancy whatever to incidental benefits derived through the operation of a statute (Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124, 130 ; Clark’s Est., supra, p. 528 ) ; were it necessary to consider such effect but few acts of assembly could stand constitutional tests: Searight’s Est., 163 Pa. 210, 217 ; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 356 . | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.