Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Evansgreen2 sentences2013App. 3d 306, 314 (2007)), the prosecution may fairly comment on defense counsel's characterizations of the evidence and may respond in rebuttal to statements of defense counsel that noticeably invite a response (People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 225 (2004)). 2013App. 3d 306, 314 (2007)), the prosecution may fairly comment on defense counsel’s characterizations of the evidence and may respond in rebuttal to statements of defense counsel that noticeably invite a response (People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 225 (2004)). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lovegreen2 sentences2013Let's go beat her up or something, because nobody ever makes mistakes in courtrooms, right?" Arsenio argues defense counsel pointed out the inconsistencies in Elam's testimony in a brief and neutral way and that the State's classification of defense counsel's argument as "beating her up" was improper. ¶ 110 While the prosecution may not accuse defense counsel of attempting to create reasonable doubt by confusion, misrepresentation, or deception (People v. Love, 377 Ill. 2013Let’s go beat her up or something, because nobody ever makes mistakes in courtrooms, right?” Arsenio argues defense counsel pointed out the inconsistencies in Elam’s testimony in a brief and neutral way and that the State’s classification of defense counsel’s argument as “beating her up” was improper. ¶ 110 While the prosecution may not accuse defense counsel of attempting to create reasonable doubt by confusion, misrepresentation, or deception (People v. Love, 377 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Zokoych v. Spaldinggreen1 sentence2022In deciding whether a claim is individual or derivative, a court first determines “if the ‘gravamen’ of the pleadings states injury to the plaintiff upon an individual claim as distinguished from an injury which indirectly affects the shareholders or affects them as a whole.” Zokoych v. Spalding, 36 Ill. App. 3d 654, 663 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Chicago Housing Authority
green
2 sentences1992(Davis v. Chicago Transit Authority (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 296 , 555 N.E.2d 343 .) Bilyk does not stand for the proposition that section 27 grants a blanket immunity to the CTA for injuries incurred by its passengers. 1992(Davis v. Chicago Transit Authority (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 296 , 555 N.E.2d 343 .) Bilyk does not stand for the proposition that section 27 grants a blanket immunity to the CTA for injuries incurred by its passengers. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Clark v. Jeter
green
1 sentence1990Ed. 2d at 471 , 108 S. Ct. at 1914 .) Petitioner argues that the classification which bars his claim is not substantially related to an important governmental objective and is against the public policy of the Act. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1982Since the 1964 Supreme Court decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254 , 11 L. 1982Since the 1964 Supreme Court decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254 , 11 L. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen
red
2 sentences1973On July 9, 1971, this court in Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill.2d 137 , held that an exemption from ad valorem personal property taxation on the basis of ownership of the property created a classification in violation of the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution and declared article IX-A unconstitutional. 1973On July 9, 1971, this court in Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill.2d 137 , held that an exemption from ad valorem personal property taxation on the basis of ownership of the property created a classification in violation of the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution and declared article IX-A unconstitutional. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Hunt v. County of Cook
green
1 sentence1958Plaintiff also argues that the doctrine of classification does not apply to the present case, since the act changes or amends the charter of the city of Chicago contrary to the provisions of section 34 of article IV of the Illinois constitution; that this is one of the "enumerated cases” of section 22 of article IV; and that classification is not permissible within these “enumerated cases.” In support of this theory plaintiff cites certain dictum from Hunt v. Cook County, 398 Ill. 412 , People v. Wilcox, 237 Ill. 421 , People ex rel. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
People ex rel. Stuckart v. Knopf
green
1 sentence1958Stuckart v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410 , and People ex rel. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
People v. Wilcox
green
1 sentence1958Plaintiff also argues that the doctrine of classification does not apply to the present case, since the act changes or amends the charter of the city of Chicago contrary to the provisions of section 34 of article IV of the Illinois constitution; that this is one of the "enumerated cases” of section 22 of article IV; and that classification is not permissible within these “enumerated cases.” In support of this theory plaintiff cites certain dictum from Hunt v. Cook County, 398 Ill. 412 , People v. Wilcox, 237 Ill. 421 , People ex rel. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Waughop v. Bartlett
green
1 sentence1936Co., 191 Ill. 356, 363-4 , supra; Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 128 , supra.) Appellee argues that as the probate court has the statutory duty to pass upon the validity and classification of claims, it has jurisdiction to do so, and, therefore, neither the allowance nor the classification of a claim may properly be set aside, after term time, except for fraud, accident or mistake. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Morse v. Pacific Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1936Co., 191 Ill. 356, 363-4 , supra; Waughop v. Bartlett, 165 Ill. 124, 128 , supra.) Appellee argues that as the probate court has the statutory duty to pass upon the validity and classification of claims, it has jurisdiction to do so, and, therefore, neither the allowance nor the classification of a claim may properly be set aside, after term time, except for fraud, accident or mistake. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
E. W. Bliss Co. v. United States
neutral
1 sentence1932That case went to the Supreme Court of the United States on the question of whether or not such a classification was in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and in a per curiam opinion, reported in 275 U. S. 509 , the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court on the authority of the cases therein cited, the decision being, in effect, that there was no improper or unconstitutional classification in permitting wagering on horse races and forbidding it on dog races. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Ford v. First National Bank of Stuart
green
1 sentence1928Bank, 201 Ill. 120 . | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.