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34 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doyle v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2025On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence, 1 ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due proc 2025On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence, 1 ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due proc | 1 | 3 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2009The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal of the following charges: one count of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a); four counts of risk of irqury to a child in violation General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1); and one count of conspiracy to commit larceny in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-125 (a). 5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. 2009The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal of the following charges: one count of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a); four counts of risk of irqury to a child in violation General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1); and one count of conspiracy to commit larceny in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-125 (a). 5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Benedictgreen2 sentences2015The defendant, Adam Benedict, was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Stat- utes § 53a-73a (a) (6).1 In State v. Benedict, 136 Conn. App. 36, 50 , 43 A.3d 772 (2012), rev’d, 313 Conn. 494 , 98 A.3d 42 (2014), we reversed the judgment of convic- tion and remanded the case for a new trial as a result of our conclusion that the trial court had ‘‘deprived the defendant of any meaningful opportunity to gain the benefit of an inference adverse to the complainant’s credibility based on the pendency of her criminal charge.’’2 We further concluded that 2015The defendant, Adam Benedict, was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Stat- utes § 53a-73a (a) (6).1 In State v. Benedict, 136 Conn. App. 36, 50 , 43 A.3d 772 (2012), rev’d, 313 Conn. 494 , 98 A.3d 42 (2014), we reversed the judgment of convic- tion and remanded the case for a new trial as a result of our conclusion that the trial court had ‘‘deprived the defendant of any meaningful opportunity to gain the benefit of an inference adverse to the complainant’s credibility based on the pendency of her criminal charge.’’2 We further concluded that | 1 | 2 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences2025On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence, 1 ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due proc 2025On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence, 1 ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due proc | 1 | 1 |
State v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence, 1 ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due proc 2025On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence, 1 ‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due proc | 1 | 1 |
State v. Alvarezgreen2 sentences2023Alvarez, rendered after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (E) and (8), and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1) and (2).1 See State v. Alvarez, 209 Conn. App. 250, 252, 271 , 267 A.3d 303 (2021). 2023Alvarez, rendered after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (E) and (8), and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1) and (2).1 See State v. Alvarez, 209 Conn. App. 250, 252, 271 , 267 A.3d 303 (2021). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Paynegreen2 sentences2017See State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538, 560 , 34 A.3d 370 (2012). 3 We acknowledge that in State v. Ruffin, 316 Conn. 20 , 27–29, 110 A.3d 1225 (2015), a case decided after Payne, we used the general due process standard when considering a prosecutorial misconduct claim that implicated the fifth amendment right to remain silent. 2017See State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538, 560 , 34 A.3d 370 (2012). 3 We acknowledge that in State v. Ruffin, 316 Conn. 20 , 27–29, 110 A.3d 1225 (2015), a case decided after Payne, we used the general due process standard when considering a prosecutorial misconduct claim that implicated the fifth amendment right to remain silent. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Roblesgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Robles , 169 Conn.App. 127 , 128-29, 150 A.3d 687 (2016). 2016See State v. Robles , 169 Conn.App. 127 , 128-29, 150 A.3d 687 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Denyagreen2 sentences2014See State v. Denya, 294 Conn. 516, 524 , 986 A.2d 260 (2010). 2014See State v. Denya, 294 Conn. 516, 524 , 986 A.2d 260 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Guptagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Campfield v. Stickman, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Greenegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reynolds v. Connecticutgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reynoldsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| North Carolina v. Alfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Esposito
green
2 sentences2018On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to disclose redacted portions of the victim's mental health records following the court's in camera review of the records pursuant to State v. Esposito , 192 Conn. 166 , 471 A.2d 949 (1984), thereby violating his sixth and fourteenth amendment right to confrontation. 2018On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to disclose redacted portions of the victim's mental health records following the court's in camera review of the records pursuant to State v. Esposito , 192 Conn. 166 , 471 A.2d 949 (1984), thereby violating his sixth and fourteenth amendment right to confrontation. | 2 | 2008–2018 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict, (2) he was denied his right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impro- priety that occurred during rebuttal argument, (3) the court improperly determined that the complainant’s confidential records should not be disclosed to the defendant, (4) the court improperly permitted the state to reopen the direct examination of the complainant, (5) the court improperly allowed a video recorded forensic interview 2015On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict, (2) he was denied his right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impro- priety that occurred during rebuttal argument, (3) the court improperly determined that the complainant’s confidential records should not be disclosed to the defendant, (4) the court improperly permitted the state to reopen the direct examination of the complainant, (5) the court improperly allowed a video recorded forensic interview | 2 | 2007–2015 |
State v. Walker
green
2 sentences2025At the end of October, however, she lost her cell phone and got a new one in the beginning of November. 10 ‘‘A buccal swab involves rubbing a Q-tip like instrument along the inside of the cheek to collect epithelial cells.’’ State v. Walker, 332 Conn. 678 , 683 n.2, 212 A.3d 1244 (2019). 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 State v. Nathan S. for having subjected ‘‘a child under sixteen years of age to contact with his intimate parts in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health and morals of such child’’; and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) for having caused and permit 2025At the end of October, however, she lost her cell phone and got a new one in the beginning of November. 10 ‘‘A buccal swab involves rubbing a Q-tip like instrument along the inside of the cheek to collect epithelial cells.’’ State v. Walker, 332 Conn. 678 , 683 n.2, 212 A.3d 1244 (2019). 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 State v. Nathan S. for having subjected ‘‘a child under sixteen years of age to contact with his intimate parts in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health and morals of such child’’; and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) for having caused and permit | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Juan J.
green
2 sentences2025The court, relying on State v. Juan J., 344 Conn. 1, 22 , 276 A.3d 935 (2022), stated, ‘‘certainly, this evidence does go towards that particular issue.’’ Alternatively, relying on § 4-5 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, the court concluded that the evidence, which amounted to other sexual misconduct, was admissible to prove that the defendant had a propensity to engage in sexual misconduct. 2025The court, relying on State v. Juan J., 344 Conn. 1, 22 , 276 A.3d 935 (2022), stated, ‘‘certainly, this evidence does go towards that particular issue.’’ Alternatively, relying on § 4-5 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, the court concluded that the evidence, which amounted to other sexual misconduct, was admissible to prove that the defendant had a propensity to engage in sexual misconduct. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Tinsley
green
2 sentences2022Relying on the Appellate Court’s decision in State v. Tinsley, 197 Conn. App. 302 , 232 A.3d 86 (2020), rev’d, 340 Conn. 425 , 264 A.3d 560 (2021), the defendant asserts that, as charged in the information, it is not possible to commit the offenses of sexual assault in the first and fourth degrees without having already committed risk of injury to a child and, therefore, that risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of both sexual assault charges, as described in the information. 2022Relying on the Appellate Court’s decision in State v. Tinsley, 197 Conn. App. 302 , 232 A.3d 86 (2020), rev’d, 340 Conn. 425 , 264 A.3d 560 (2021), the defendant asserts that, as charged in the information, it is not possible to commit the offenses of sexual assault in the first and fourth degrees without having already committed risk of injury to a child and, therefore, that risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of both sexual assault charges, as described in the information. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Porter v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2022The jury found him not guilty of that charge. 2 The defendant also claims that the court improperly admitted scientific evidence generated by a DNA analysis software without first conducting a hearing pursuant to State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 80-90, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998), and that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety during closing arguments. 2022The jury found him not guilty of that charge. 2 The defendant also claims that the court improperly admitted scientific evidence generated by a DNA analysis software without first conducting a hearing pursuant to State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 80-90, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998), and that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety during closing arguments. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Connecticut v. Porter
green
2 sentences2022The jury found him not guilty of that charge. 2 The defendant also claims that the court improperly admitted scientific evidence generated by a DNA analysis software without first conducting a hearing pursuant to State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 80-90, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998), and that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety during closing arguments. 2022The jury found him not guilty of that charge. 2 The defendant also claims that the court improperly admitted scientific evidence generated by a DNA analysis software without first conducting a hearing pursuant to State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 80-90, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998), and that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety during closing arguments. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Tinsley
green
2 sentences2022Relying on the Appellate Court’s decision in State v. Tinsley, 197 Conn. App. 302 , 232 A.3d 86 (2020), rev’d, 340 Conn. 425 , 264 A.3d 560 (2021), the defendant asserts that, as charged in the information, it is not possible to commit the offenses of sexual assault in the first and fourth degrees without having already committed risk of injury to a child and, therefore, that risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of both sexual assault charges, as described in the information. 2022Relying on the Appellate Court’s decision in State v. Tinsley, 197 Conn. App. 302 , 232 A.3d 86 (2020), rev’d, 340 Conn. 425 , 264 A.3d 560 (2021), the defendant asserts that, as charged in the information, it is not possible to commit the offenses of sexual assault in the first and fourth degrees without having already committed risk of injury to a child and, therefore, that risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of both sexual assault charges, as described in the information. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Ruiz
green
2 sentences2020State v. Ruiz, 124 Conn. App. 118 , 119-20, 3 A.3d 1021 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 908 , 10 A.3d 525 (2010). 4 Ivers testified before the first habeas court that he asked Casale to be cocounsel because of Casale’s criminal trial experience. 5 The petitioner also argues that viewing Ivers’ decision not to present Mantell’s testimony as a reasonable strategic decision is inconsistent with Casale’s testimony at the first habeas proceeding that he did not recall if Ivers’ decision not to present Mantell’s testimony was strategic and that if Ivers were to have presented Mantell’s testimony at the Ja 2020State v. Ruiz, 124 Conn. App. 118 , 119-20, 3 A.3d 1021 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 908 , 10 A.3d 525 (2010). 4 Ivers testified before the first habeas court that he asked Casale to be cocounsel because of Casale’s criminal trial experience. 5 The petitioner also argues that viewing Ivers’ decision not to present Mantell’s testimony as a reasonable strategic decision is inconsistent with Casale’s testimony at the first habeas proceeding that he did not recall if Ivers’ decision not to present Mantell’s testimony was strategic and that if Ivers were to have presented Mantell’s testimony at the Ja | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Ruiz
green
2 sentences2020State v. Ruiz, 124 Conn. App. 118 , 119-20, 3 A.3d 1021 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 908 , 10 A.3d 525 (2010). 4 Ivers testified before the first habeas court that he asked Casale to be cocounsel because of Casale’s criminal trial experience. 5 The petitioner also argues that viewing Ivers’ decision not to present Mantell’s testimony as a reasonable strategic decision is inconsistent with Casale’s testimony at the first habeas proceeding that he did not recall if Ivers’ decision not to present Mantell’s testimony was strategic and that if Ivers were to have presented Mantell’s testimony at the Ja 2020State v. Ruiz, 124 Conn. App. 118 , 119-20, 3 A.3d 1021 , cert. denied, 299 Conn. 908 , 10 A.3d 525 (2010). 4 Ivers testified before the first habeas court that he asked Casale to be cocounsel because of Casale’s criminal trial experience. 5 The petitioner also argues that viewing Ivers’ decision not to present Mantell’s testimony as a reasonable strategic decision is inconsistent with Casale’s testimony at the first habeas proceeding that he did not recall if Ivers’ decision not to present Mantell’s testimony was strategic and that if Ivers were to have presented Mantell’s testimony at the Ja | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Cancel
green
2 sentences2019This court's opinion in the petitioner's direct appeal in State v. Cancel , 149 Conn. App. 86 , 87 A.3d 618 , cert. denied, 311 Conn. 954 , 97 A.3d 985 (2014), sets forth the following facts: "The jury reasonably could have found the following facts with respect to the charges in the first case, which involved the victim, J. 1 J was eleven years of age in February, 2009, and resided with her uncle. 2019This court's opinion in the petitioner's direct appeal in State v. Cancel , 149 Conn. App. 86 , 87 A.3d 618 , cert. denied, 311 Conn. 954 , 97 A.3d 985 (2014), sets forth the following facts: "The jury reasonably could have found the following facts with respect to the charges in the first case, which involved the victim, J. 1 J was eleven years of age in February, 2009, and resided with her uncle. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Bruno
green
2 sentences2018Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to obtain records from the department and the Wheeler Clinic pertaining to the victim's mental health pursuant to State v. Esposito , supra, 192 Conn. 166 , 471 A.2d 949 , and State v. Bruno, 236 Conn. 514 , 673 A.2d 1117 (1996), arguing that the records were probative of the victim's mental capacity to know or correctly relate the truth and had the potential to show motive or bias. 2018Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to obtain records from the department and the Wheeler Clinic pertaining to the victim's mental health pursuant to State v. Esposito , supra, 192 Conn. 166 , 471 A.2d 949 , and State v. Bruno, 236 Conn. 514 , 673 A.2d 1117 (1996), arguing that the records were probative of the victim's mental capacity to know or correctly relate the truth and had the potential to show motive or bias. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Petitpas
green
1 sentence2018Following a jury trial in July, 2007, the defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), two counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 53a-71 (a) (1), and one count each of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (2), unlawful restraint in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-96 (a), risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), and risk of injury to a child in violation | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Morales
green
2 sentences2017On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) his conviction violated his right to due process under the constitution of Connecticut because the police lost potentially exculpatory evidence, in the form of a text message, in violation of State v. Morales , 232 Conn. 707 , 720, 657 A.2d 585 (1995), and (2) his conviction for both sexual assault in the second degree (counts one and three) and risk of injury to a child (counts two and four) constituted a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. 2017On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) his conviction violated his right to due process under the constitution of Connecticut because the police lost potentially exculpatory evidence, in the form of a text message, in violation of State v. Morales , 232 Conn. 707 , 720, 657 A.2d 585 (1995), and (2) his conviction for both sexual assault in the second degree (counts one and three) and risk of injury to a child (counts two and four) constituted a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Pagan v. Carey Wiping Materials Corp.
green
1 sentence2015All sentences were to be served concurrently.’’ State v. Ruffin, supra, 144 Conn. App. 394 . 3 Judge McDonald also asserted that Byrne, the social worker, had ‘‘improperly vouched for [the victim’s] testimony’’; State v. Ruffin, supra, 144 Conn. App. 413 (McDonald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); because the prosecutor had, in her closing argument, improperly referred to the fact that Byrne testified that the victim’s allegations were supported. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Morales
green
2 sentences2014From our own calculation, it appears that the defen- dant was facing a total possible sentence of one hundred and ten years to serve if convicted on all counts and ordered to serve his sentences consecu- tively. 3 Despite the defendant’s claims that his rights were violated under both the federal and the state constitutions, he has not provided a separate analysis or claimed greater protection under the state constitution. ‘‘Because the defendant has not set forth a separate state constitutional analysis pursuant to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we . . . analy 2014From our own calculation, it appears that the defen- dant was facing a total possible sentence of one hundred and ten years to serve if convicted on all counts and ordered to serve his sentences consecu- tively. 3 Despite the defendant’s claims that his rights were violated under both the federal and the state constitutions, he has not provided a separate analysis or claimed greater protection under the state constitution. ‘‘Because the defendant has not set forth a separate state constitutional analysis pursuant to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we . . . analy | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Morales
neutral
2 sentences2014From our own calculation, it appears that the defen- dant was facing a total possible sentence of one hundred and ten years to serve if convicted on all counts and ordered to serve his sentences consecu- tively. 3 Despite the defendant’s claims that his rights were violated under both the federal and the state constitutions, he has not provided a separate analysis or claimed greater protection under the state constitution. ‘‘Because the defendant has not set forth a separate state constitutional analysis pursuant to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we . . . analy 2014From our own calculation, it appears that the defen- dant was facing a total possible sentence of one hundred and ten years to serve if convicted on all counts and ordered to serve his sentences consecu- tively. 3 Despite the defendant’s claims that his rights were violated under both the federal and the state constitutions, he has not provided a separate analysis or claimed greater protection under the state constitution. ‘‘Because the defendant has not set forth a separate state constitutional analysis pursuant to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we . . . analy | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Geisler
green
2 sentences2014From our own calculation, it appears that the defen- dant was facing a total possible sentence of one hundred and ten years to serve if convicted on all counts and ordered to serve his sentences consecu- tively. 3 Despite the defendant’s claims that his rights were violated under both the federal and the state constitutions, he has not provided a separate analysis or claimed greater protection under the state constitution. ‘‘Because the defendant has not set forth a separate state constitutional analysis pursuant to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we . . . analy 2014From our own calculation, it appears that the defen- dant was facing a total possible sentence of one hundred and ten years to serve if convicted on all counts and ordered to serve his sentences consecu- tively. 3 Despite the defendant’s claims that his rights were violated under both the federal and the state constitutions, he has not provided a separate analysis or claimed greater protection under the state constitution. ‘‘Because the defendant has not set forth a separate state constitutional analysis pursuant to State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), we . . . analy | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Fernandes
green
2 sentences2011Section 46b-127 (b) provides in relevant part: “Upon motion of a prosecutorial official and order of the court, the case of any child charged with the commission of a class C or D felony or an unclassified felony shall be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, provided such offense was committed after such child attained the age of fourteen years and the court finds ex parte that there is probable cause to believe the child has committed the act for which he is charged. ...” The state maintained that it was within its discretion t 2011Section 46b-127 (b) provides in relevant part: “Upon motion of a prosecutorial official and order of the court, the case of any child charged with the commission of a class C or D felony or an unclassified felony shall be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, provided such offense was committed after such child attained the age of fourteen years and the court finds ex parte that there is probable cause to believe the child has committed the act for which he is charged. ...” The state maintained that it was within its discretion t | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. THOMAS W.
green
2 sentences2011State v. Thomas W., 115 Conn. App. 467 , 974 A.2d 19 (2009). 2011State v. Thomas W., 115 Conn. App. 467 , 974 A.2d 19 (2009). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Fernandes
green
2 sentences2011Section 46b-127 (b) provides in relevant part: “Upon motion of a prosecutorial official and order of the court, the case of any child charged with the commission of a class C or D felony or an unclassified felony shall be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, provided such offense was committed after such child attained the age of fourteen years and the court finds ex parte that there is probable cause to believe the child has committed the act for which he is charged. ...” The state maintained that it was within its discretion t 2011Section 46b-127 (b) provides in relevant part: “Upon motion of a prosecutorial official and order of the court, the case of any child charged with the commission of a class C or D felony or an unclassified felony shall be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court, provided such offense was committed after such child attained the age of fourteen years and the court finds ex parte that there is probable cause to believe the child has committed the act for which he is charged. ...” The state maintained that it was within its discretion t | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Francis D. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Francis D. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Golding green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Alexander green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Pollitt green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Saracino green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Grant green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Coston green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Scielzo green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.