excepting rule in New York

1856But this rule, intended for the protection of the liberty or property of the citizen, should not he so applied as to narrow the ordinary import of the words used, to the exclusion of cases, a description of property or persons, which, according to common acceptation, would be within them. ( 5 Wheat. 76 .) The office of all construction or interpretation of statutes, whether penal or remedial in the application of its maxims, is to ascertain the mind or intention of the law makers. (1 Seld. 562; 2 id. 9.) ' Effectshould be given, if possible, to every word used, and if doubt exist as to the rea

1856But this rule, intended for the protection of the liberty or property of the citizen, should not be so applied as to narrow the ordinary import of the words used, to the exclusion of cases, or description of property or persons, which, according to common acceptation, would be within them. ( 5 Wheat., 76 .) The office of all construction or interpretation of statutes, whether penal or remedial, in the application of its maxims, is to ascertain the mind or intention of the law makers. (1 Seld., 562; 2 id., 9.) Effect should be given, if possible, to every word used; and if doubt exists as to th

1947(People v. Buchalter, 289 N. Y. 181 ; People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39 ; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264 ; People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 ; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576 ; People v. McLaughlin, 150 N. Y. 365 ; People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423 .) The exception quoted as being taken against the ruling on the admission of evidence, and the exception to the quoted portion of the court’s charge as given, neither avail the appellant because it was clear that the court received such testimony solely as bearing on the question of motive.

1947(People v. Buchalter, 289 N. Y. 181 ; People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39 ; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264 ; People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 ; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576 ; People v. McLaughlin, 150 N. Y. 365 ; People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423 .) The exception quoted as being taken against the ruling on the admission of evidence, and the exception to the quoted portion of the court’s charge as given, neither avail the appellant because it was clear that the court received such testimony solely as bearing on the question of motive.

1947(People v. Buchalter, 289 N. Y. 181 ; People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39 ; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264 ; People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 ; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576 ; People v. McLaughlin, 150 N. Y. 365 ; People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423 .) The exception quoted as being taken against the ruling on the admission of evidence, and the exception to the quoted portion of the court’s charge as given, neither avail the appellant because it was clear that the court received such testimony solely as bearing on the question of motive.

1947(People v. Buchalter, 289 N. Y. 181 ; People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39 ; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264 ; People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 ; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576 ; People v. McLaughlin, 150 N. Y. 365 ; People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423 .) The exception quoted as being taken against the ruling on the admission of evidence, and the exception to the quoted portion of the court’s charge as given, neither avail the appellant because it was clear that the court received such testimony solely as bearing on the question of motive.

1947Although there is the general rule (People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 ; People v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137 ; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 13) that ordinarily there must be excluded on the trial of an indictment proof of crimes other than that on which the defendant is being tried, there is the excepting rule that the general prohibition against such proof of other crimes falls when it becomes necessary to show motive and intent, and especially when such motive and intent cannot be proven by direct evidence.

1947Although there is the general rule (People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 ; People v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137 ; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 13) that ordinarily there must be excluded on the trial of an indictment proof of crimes other than that on which the defendant is being tried, there is the excepting rule that the general prohibition against such proof of other crimes falls when it becomes necessary to show motive and intent, and especially when such motive and intent cannot be proven by direct evidence.

1947(People v. Buchalter, 289 N. Y. 181 ; People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39 ; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264 ; People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 ; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576 ; People v. McLaughlin, 150 N. Y. 365 ; People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423 .) The exception quoted as being taken against the ruling on the admission of evidence, and the exception to the quoted portion of the court’s charge as given, neither avail the appellant because it was clear that the court received such testimony solely as bearing on the question of motive.

1947(People v. Buchalter, 289 N. Y. 181 ; People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39 ; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264 ; People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 ; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576 ; People v. McLaughlin, 150 N. Y. 365 ; People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423 .) The exception quoted as being taken against the ruling on the admission of evidence, and the exception to the quoted portion of the court’s charge as given, neither avail the appellant because it was clear that the court received such testimony solely as bearing on the question of motive.

1947(People v. Buchalter, 289 N. Y. 181 ; People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39 ; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264 ; People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 ; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576 ; People v. McLaughlin, 150 N. Y. 365 ; People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423 .) The exception quoted as being taken against the ruling on the admission of evidence, and the exception to the quoted portion of the court’s charge as given, neither avail the appellant because it was clear that the court received such testimony solely as bearing on the question of motive.

1912The argument of the appellant is, however, indubitably answered by the opinion of Chancellor Kent, delivered in 1814, in Nicoll v. Trustees, etc., of Town of Huntington ( 1 Johns.

1901The same contention was made in People v. Meakim ( 133 N. Y. 214 ), and it was there held that the special provision referred to in these sections is some special provision of the criminal law imposing a criminal liability for the neglect of duty, and that neither liability to a fine nor liability to removal from office answers the requirements of the excepting clause.