excepting clause (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

excepting clause in California

16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Van Slyke v. Arrowhead Reservoir & Power Co.green
cal · 1909 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1927–1964
2 sentences

1964The latter term applies to something which constitutes a part of the thing described as granted and which would pass but for the excepting clause, the office of which is to exclude it from the thing described, and the title to the thing excepted remains in the grantor.” (Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co. (1909) 155 Cal. 675, 679 [ 102 P. 816 ], In accord: Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 330 P.2d 775 ]; Estate of Broome (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 488, 490-491 [ 333 P.2d 273 ]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 222, 232 [ 270 P.2d 604 ].) Whi

1964The latter term applies to something which constitutes a part of the thing described as granted and which would pass but for the excepting clause, the office of which is to exclude it from the thing described, and the title to the thing excepted remains in the grantor.” (Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co. (1909) 155 Cal. 675, 679 [ 102 P. 816 ], In accord: Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 330 P.2d 775 ]; Estate of Broome (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 488, 490-491 [ 333 P.2d 273 ]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 222, 232 [ 270 P.2d 604 ].) Whi

44
People v. Johnsongreen
calctapp · 2003 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Thus, the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1) barred the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement—specifically (b)(l)(C)—to maximize the defendant’s overall sentence. ( Lopez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1004, 1006; accord, People v. Johnson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236–1238; People v. Harper, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 525 ; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480 , 485–486.) Since Lopez construed subdivision (b)(1) in 2005, the Legislature has amended the STEP Act several times.

2017Thus, the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1) barred the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement-specifically (b)(1)(C)-to maximize the defendant's overall sentence. ( Lopez , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1004, 1006, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 , 103 P.3d 270 ; accord, People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ; People v. Harper , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 525, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 120 ; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480 , 485-486, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 .) Since Lopez construed subdivision (b)(1) in 2005, the Legislature has amended the STEP Act several

22
People v. Lopezgreen
cal · 2005 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Thus, the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1) barred the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement-specifically (b)(1)(C)-to maximize the defendant's overall sentence. ( Lopez , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1004, 1006, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 , 103 P.3d 270 ; accord, People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ; People v. Harper , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 525, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 120 ; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480 , 485-486, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 .) Since Lopez construed subdivision (b)(1) in 2005, the Legislature has amended the STEP Act several

2017Thus, the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1) barred the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement-specifically (b)(1)(C)-to maximize the defendant's overall sentence. ( Lopez , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1004, 1006, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 , 103 P.3d 270 ; accord, People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ; People v. Harper , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 525, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 120 ; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480 , 485-486, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 .) Since Lopez construed subdivision (b)(1) in 2005, the Legislature has amended the STEP Act several

12
People v. Harpergreen
calctapp · 2003 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Thus, the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1) barred the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement-specifically (b)(1)(C)-to maximize the defendant's overall sentence. ( Lopez , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1004, 1006, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 , 103 P.3d 270 ; accord, People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ; People v. Harper , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 525, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 120 ; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480 , 485-486, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 .) Since Lopez construed subdivision (b)(1) in 2005, the Legislature has amended the STEP Act several

2017Thus, the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1) barred the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement-specifically (b)(1)(C)-to maximize the defendant's overall sentence. ( Lopez , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1004, 1006, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 , 103 P.3d 270 ; accord, People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ; People v. Harper , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 525, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 120 ; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480 , 485-486, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 .) Since Lopez construed subdivision (b)(1) in 2005, the Legislature has amended the STEP Act several

12
Cohn v. City of Oaklandgreen
calctapp · 1990 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993The Fielder court followed Cohn v. City of Oakland (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 261 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 714 ], which interpreted the excepting clause as prohibiting only those real estate transfer taxes which are special taxes within the meaning of City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d 47 .

1993The Fielder court followed Cohn v. City of Oakland (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 261 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 714 ], which interpreted the excepting clause as prohibiting only those real estate transfer taxes which are special taxes within the meaning of City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d 47 .

12
Pitcairn v. Harknessgreen
calctapp · 1909 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1927–1964
2 sentences

1964(Coon v. Sonoma Magnesite Co. (1920) 182 Cal. 597, 600-601 [ 189 P. 271 ]; Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co., supra, 155 Cal. 675, 680-681 ; Pitcairn v. Harkness (1909) 10 Cal.App. 295, 298 [ 101 P. 809 ].) Although a reservation in a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor (Civ.

1964(Coon v. Sonoma Magnesite Co. (1920) 182 Cal. 597, 600-601 [ 189 P. 271 ]; Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co., supra, 155 Cal. 675, 680-681 ; Pitcairn v. Harkness (1909) 10 Cal.App. 295, 298 [ 101 P. 809 ].) Although a reservation in a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor (Civ.

12
Heckendorn v. City of San Marinogreen
cal · 1986 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
2 sentences

1993(Id. at p. 57; accord, Heckendom v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ].) Recognizing the essential meaning of Farrell, Cohn v. City of Oakland (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 261 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 714 ] interprets the excepting clause, at issue here, as prohibiting the imposition of ad valorem real property taxes and real property sale or transfer taxes which are special taxes.

1993(Id. at p. 57; accord, Heckendom v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 489 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 324 , 723 P.2d 64 ].) Recognizing the essential meaning of Farrell, Cohn v. City of Oakland (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 261 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 714 ] interprets the excepting clause, at issue here, as prohibiting the imposition of ad valorem real property taxes and real property sale or transfer taxes which are special taxes.

11
Parsons v. Bristol Development Co.green
cal · 1965 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981This view is consistent with Civil Code section 2269, reading: “A discretionary power conferred upon a trustee is presumed not to be left to his arbitrary discretion, but may be controlled by the proper Court if not reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly conferred by the declaration of trust.” In short, the trial court’s interpretation the trustees’ discretion is not absolute is a reasonable one with which we cannot disagree in the exercise of our independent authority to construe written instruments (see Estate of Collins (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 663, 672, 673 [ 139 Cal.Rp

1981This view is consistent with Civil Code section 2269, reading: “A discretionary power conferred upon a trustee is presumed not to be left to his arbitrary discretion, but may be controlled by the proper Court if not reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly conferred by the declaration of trust.” In short, the trial court’s interpretation the trustees’ discretion is not absolute is a reasonable one with which we cannot disagree in the exercise of our independent authority to construe written instruments (see Estate of Collins (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 663, 672, 673 [ 139 Cal.Rp

11
Estate of Collinsgreen
calctapp · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981This view is consistent with Civil Code section 2269, reading: “A discretionary power conferred upon a trustee is presumed not to be left to his arbitrary discretion, but may be controlled by the proper Court if not reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly conferred by the declaration of trust.” In short, the trial court’s interpretation the trustees’ discretion is not absolute is a reasonable one with which we cannot disagree in the exercise of our independent authority to construe written instruments (see Estate of Collins (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 663, 672, 673 [ 139 Cal.Rp

1981This view is consistent with Civil Code section 2269, reading: “A discretionary power conferred upon a trustee is presumed not to be left to his arbitrary discretion, but may be controlled by the proper Court if not reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly conferred by the declaration of trust.” In short, the trial court’s interpretation the trustees’ discretion is not absolute is a reasonable one with which we cannot disagree in the exercise of our independent authority to construe written instruments (see Estate of Collins (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 663, 672, 673 [ 139 Cal.Rp

11
Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Districtgreen
cal · 1958 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1964–1964
2 sentences

1964The latter term applies to something which constitutes a part of the thing described as granted and which would pass but for the excepting clause, the office of which is to exclude it from the thing described, and the title to the thing excepted remains in the grantor.” (Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co. (1909) 155 Cal. 675, 679 [ 102 P. 816 ], In accord: Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 330 P.2d 775 ]; Estate of Broome (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 488, 490-491 [ 333 P.2d 273 ]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 222, 232 [ 270 P.2d 604 ].) Whi

1964The latter term applies to something which constitutes a part of the thing described as granted and which would pass but for the excepting clause, the office of which is to exclude it from the thing described, and the title to the thing excepted remains in the grantor.” (Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co. (1909) 155 Cal. 675, 679 [ 102 P. 816 ], In accord: Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 330 P.2d 775 ]; Estate of Broome (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 488, 490-491 [ 333 P.2d 273 ]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 222, 232 [ 270 P.2d 604 ].) Whi

11
Coon v. Sonoma Magnesite Co.green
cal · 1920 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1964–1964
2 sentences

1964(Coon v. Sonoma Magnesite Co. (1920) 182 Cal. 597, 600-601 [ 189 P. 271 ]; Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co., supra, 155 Cal. 675, 680-681 ; Pitcairn v. Harkness (1909) 10 Cal.App. 295, 298 [ 101 P. 809 ].) Although a reservation in a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor (Civ.

1964(Coon v. Sonoma Magnesite Co. (1920) 182 Cal. 597, 600-601 [ 189 P. 271 ]; Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co., supra, 155 Cal. 675, 680-681 ; Pitcairn v. Harkness (1909) 10 Cal.App. 295, 298 [ 101 P. 809 ].) Although a reservation in a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor (Civ.

11
Estate of Broomegreen
calctapp · 1958 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1964–1964
2 sentences

1964The latter term applies to something which constitutes a part of the thing described as granted and which would pass but for the excepting clause, the office of which is to exclude it from the thing described, and the title to the thing excepted remains in the grantor.” (Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co. (1909) 155 Cal. 675, 679 [ 102 P. 816 ], In accord: Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 330 P.2d 775 ]; Estate of Broome (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 488, 490-491 [ 333 P.2d 273 ]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 222, 232 [ 270 P.2d 604 ].) Whi

1964The latter term applies to something which constitutes a part of the thing described as granted and which would pass but for the excepting clause, the office of which is to exclude it from the thing described, and the title to the thing excepted remains in the grantor.” (Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co. (1909) 155 Cal. 675, 679 [ 102 P. 816 ], In accord: Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 330 P.2d 775 ]; Estate of Broome (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 488, 490-491 [ 333 P.2d 273 ]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 222, 232 [ 270 P.2d 604 ].) Whi

11
Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co.green
calctapp · 1954 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1964–1964
2 sentences

1964The latter term applies to something which constitutes a part of the thing described as granted and which would pass but for the excepting clause, the office of which is to exclude it from the thing described, and the title to the thing excepted remains in the grantor.” (Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co. (1909) 155 Cal. 675, 679 [ 102 P. 816 ], In accord: Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 330 P.2d 775 ]; Estate of Broome (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 488, 490-491 [ 333 P.2d 273 ]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 222, 232 [ 270 P.2d 604 ].) Whi

1964The latter term applies to something which constitutes a part of the thing described as granted and which would pass but for the excepting clause, the office of which is to exclude it from the thing described, and the title to the thing excepted remains in the grantor.” (Van Slyke v. Arrowhead etc. Power Co. (1909) 155 Cal. 675, 679 [ 102 P. 816 ], In accord: Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist. (1958) 51 Cal.2d 33, 36 [ 330 P.2d 775 ]; Estate of Broome (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 488, 490-491 [ 333 P.2d 273 ]; Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 222, 232 [ 270 P.2d 604 ].) Whi

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Ortiz green
calctapp · 1997
2 sentences

2017Thus, the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1) barred the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement-specifically (b)(1)(C)-to maximize the defendant's overall sentence. ( Lopez , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1004, 1006, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 , 103 P.3d 270 ; accord, People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ; People v. Harper , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 525, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 120 ; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480 , 485-486, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 .) Since Lopez construed subdivision (b)(1) in 2005, the Legislature has amended the STEP Act several

2017Thus, the excepting clause in subdivision (b)(1) barred the trial court from imposing a gang enhancement-specifically (b)(1)(C)-to maximize the defendant's overall sentence. ( Lopez , supra , 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1004, 1006, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869 , 103 P.3d 270 ; accord, People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1236-1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ; People v. Harper , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 525, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 120 ; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480 , 485-486, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 .) Since Lopez construed subdivision (b)(1) in 2005, the Legislature has amended the STEP Act several

22017–2017
People v. Meloney green
cal · 2003
1 sentence

2017“When as here ‘ “a statute has been construed by judicial decision, and that construction is not altered by subsequent legislation, it must be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the judicial construction and approves of it.” [Citations.] “There is a strong presumption that when the Legislature reenacts a statute which has been judicially construed it adopts the construction placed on the statute by the courts.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Meloney, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1161 .) 4.

12017–2017
Fielder v. City of Los Angeles green
calctapp · 1993
1 sentence

1993Accordingly, we adopt the holding of Cohn v. City of Oakland, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at page 263 , that the enactment of or increase in a transfer tax is not prohibited by article XIII A when the transfer tax is a general, rather than a specific, tax.” (Fielder, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 142 .) With respect to Proposition 62, appellant relies on section 53725, which unambiguously prohibits local governments, including charter cities, from imposing a real property transfer tax: “[N]o local government or *125 district may impose any transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of real property with

11993–1993
City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell green
cal · 1982
1 sentence

1993The Fielder court followed Cohn v. City of Oakland (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 261 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 714 ], which interpreted the excepting clause as prohibiting only those real estate transfer taxes which are special taxes within the meaning of City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, supra, 32 Cal.3d 47 .

11993–1993
Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization green
cal · 1991
1 sentence

1993We may not do that. “ ‘Where the electorate has demonstrated the ability to make [its] intent clear, it is not the province of [an appellate] court to imply an intent left unexpressed.’ [Citation.]” (Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 252 .) Accordingly, we adopt the holding of Cohn v. City of Oakland, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at page 263 , that the enactment of or increase in a transfer tax is not prohibited by article XIII A when the transfer tax is a general, rather than a specific, tax.

11993–1993
MAJOR OIL DEVELOP. CO. v. First Nat. Bank, Albuquerque neutral
nm · 1965
1 sentence

1981This view is consistent with Civil Code section 2269, reading: “A discretionary power conferred upon a trustee is presumed not to be left to his arbitrary discretion, but may be controlled by the proper Court if not reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly conferred by the declaration of trust.” In short, the trial court’s interpretation the trustees’ discretion is not absolute is a reasonable one with which we cannot disagree in the exercise of our independent authority to construe written instruments (see Estate of Collins (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 663, 672, 673 [ 139 Cal.Rp

11981–1981
Cartier v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. green
nh · 1931
1 sentence

1978As said in Cartier v. Cartier, supra, 153 A. 6 , 7: “In considering the purpose of the excepting clause of the policy it is clear enough that it was meant to avoid the insurer’s liability to indemnify for injuries to members of the insured’s household, whether or not he was its head.” *775 An ambiguity in an insurance policy cannot be based upon a strained, rather than a reasonable, interpretation of the policy’s terms.

11978–1978
Callahan v. Martin green
cal · 1935
2 sentences

1958The conveyance does predate the leading ease of Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110 [ 43 P.2d 788 , 101 A.L.R. 871 ], in which the Supreme Court extensively reviewed the law concerning oil interests in California and elsewhere, and in which the nature .of the interest of an assignee to whom an owner of land has .transferred a percentage interest in oil rights was defined.

1958The conveyance does predate the leading ease of Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110 [ 43 P.2d 788 , 101 A.L.R. 871 ], in which the Supreme Court extensively reviewed the law concerning oil interests in California and elsewhere, and in which the nature .of the interest of an assignee to whom an owner of land has .transferred a percentage interest in oil rights was defined.

11958–1958
In re the Claim for Benefits under Article 18 of Labor Law neutral
nyappdiv · 1941
2 sentences

1944Financial gain is not the end to which they are directed. ‘ ‘ Our conclusion is that the plaintiff is organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, and educational purposes within the meaning of the excepting clause.” In passing upon a similar question, involving the same language as used in the New York statute, the court said in In re Mendelsohn, 262 App.Div. 605 [ 31 N.Y.S.2d 435 ]: “The record shows that the hospital was organized exclusively for hospital purposes and is engaged exclusively in operating a hospital of a nonprofit character.

1944Financial gain is not the end to which they are directed. ‘ ‘ Our conclusion is that the plaintiff is organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, and educational purposes within the meaning of the excepting clause.” In passing upon a similar question, involving the same language as used in the New York statute, the court said in In re Mendelsohn, 262 App.Div. 605 [ 31 N.Y.S.2d 435 ]: “The record shows that the hospital was organized exclusively for hospital purposes and is engaged exclusively in operating a hospital of a nonprofit character.

11944–1944
Bank of Willows v. County of Glenn neutral
cal · 1909
2 sentences

1940(Bank of Willows v. County of Glenn, 155 Cal. 352 [ 101 Pac. 13 ].) And it is argued that the term “Mortgage” as first employed in the definition of “credits” in section 3617 of the Political Code in 1880 (amendment to codes, 1880, p. 5), and in subsequent amendments of the same section, should have the same exclusive *164 reference to mortgages on real property.

1940(Bank of Willows v. County of Glenn, 155 Cal. 352 [ 101 Pac. 13 ].) And it is argued that the term “Mortgage” as first employed in the definition of “credits” in section 3617 of the Political Code in 1880 (amendment to codes, 1880, p. 5), and in subsequent amendments of the same section, should have the same exclusive *164 reference to mortgages on real property.

11940–1940
Seligman v. Carr green
calctapp · 1908
2 sentences

1927It is pertinent to inquire here, as was done in the opinion upon a closely similar state of facts (Seligman v. Carr, 8 Cal. App. 572 [ 97 Pac. 324 ]) : “Why was the excepting clause inserted if not to reserve some interest in the grantors or to take some interest out of the operation of the deed?” In the case last mentioned, it was said, in considering a closely analogous state of facts: “In whom is vested the reversionary interest in the two acres conveyed to the school district, which is designated as the school land?

1927It is pertinent to inquire here, as was done in the opinion upon a closely similar state of facts (Seligman v. Carr, 8 Cal. App. 572 [ 97 Pac. 324 ]) : “Why was the excepting clause inserted if not to reserve some interest in the grantors or to take some interest out of the operation of the deed?” In the case last mentioned, it was said, in considering a closely analogous state of facts: “In whom is vested the reversionary interest in the two acres conveyed to the school district, which is designated as the school land?

11927–1927
Sears v. Ackerman green
cal · 1903
2 sentences

1927(Sears v. Ackerman, 138 Cal. 583 [ 72 Pac. 171 ]; Pitcairn v. Darkness, 10 Cal. App. 295 [ 101 Pac. 809 ].) The granting part of a deed is not invalidated by a defect in the exception, but the exception itself becomes ineffectual if not properly described, and the grant remains in force.

1927(Sears v. Ackerman, 138 Cal. 583 [ 72 Pac. 171 ]; Pitcairn v. Darkness, 10 Cal. App. 295 [ 101 Pac. 809 ].) The granting part of a deed is not invalidated by a defect in the exception, but the exception itself becomes ineffectual if not properly described, and the grant remains in force.

11927–1927
Law v. City & County of San Francisco green
cal · 1904
1 sentence

1915(Law v. San Francisco, 144 Cal. 391 , [ 77 Pac. 1014 ]; Byrne v. Drain, 127 Cal. 663 , [60 Pac. 433]; Fritz v. San Francisco, 132 Cal. 373 , [ 64 Pac. 566 ].) It follows that any provisions of the charter relating to street improvements which are in conflict with the Vrooman Act must be followed instead of those of that act.

11915–1915
Byrne v. Drain green
cal · 1900
2 sentences

1915(Law v. San Francisco, 144 Cal. 391 , [ 77 Pac. 1014 ]; Byrne v. Drain, 127 Cal. 663 , [60 Pac. 433]; Fritz v. San Francisco, 132 Cal. 373 , [ 64 Pac. 566 ].) It follows that any provisions of the charter relating to street improvements which are in conflict with the Vrooman Act must be followed instead of those of that act.

1915(Law v. San Francisco, 144 Cal. 391 , [ 77 Pac. 1014 ]; Byrne v. Drain, 127 Cal. 663 , [60 Pac. 433]; Fritz v. San Francisco, 132 Cal. 373 , [ 64 Pac. 566 ].) It follows that any provisions of the charter relating to street improvements which are in conflict with the Vrooman Act must be followed instead of those of that act.

11915–1915
Fritz v. City & County of San Francisco neutral
cal · 1901
2 sentences

1915(Law v. San Francisco, 144 Cal. 391 , [ 77 Pac. 1014 ]; Byrne v. Drain, 127 Cal. 663 , [60 Pac. 433]; Fritz v. San Francisco, 132 Cal. 373 , [ 64 Pac. 566 ].) It follows that any provisions of the charter relating to street improvements which are in conflict with the Vrooman Act must be followed instead of those of that act.

1915(Law v. San Francisco, 144 Cal. 391 , [ 77 Pac. 1014 ]; Byrne v. Drain, 127 Cal. 663 , [60 Pac. 433]; Fritz v. San Francisco, 132 Cal. 373 , [ 64 Pac. 566 ].) It follows that any provisions of the charter relating to street improvements which are in conflict with the Vrooman Act must be followed instead of those of that act.

11915–1915
Taylor v. OpperMar neutral
cal · 1889
1 sentence

1900(Taylor v. Opperman, 79 Cal. 468 .) The excepting clause in the conveyance from Thorn and Treat to the Hunts did not operate to vest any title in Sisto Berryesa.

11900–1900

Where else courts name it

CA 16 (1900–2017) TX 7 (1903–1980) NY 5 (1856–1947) PA 5 (1830–1991) NJ 4 (1980–1995) MA 4 (1904–1974) LA 4 (1942–1967) MD 4 (1969–2012) AL 3 (1929–1932) GA 3 (1940–1990) OK 3 (1906–1924) WV 2 (1911–1999) IL 2 (1866–1878) VT 2 (1913–1922) NM 2 (1992–1992) OR 2 (1984–1999) MO 2 (1941–1981)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check