Rogers rule in New York

2011In People v Burdo ( 91 NY2d 146 [1997]), we applied the Rogers rule to a situation where the defendant was incarcerated for rape, had been assigned an attorney for that charge and the police were aware of counsel’s involvement.

2011In People v Burdo ( 91 NY2d 146 [1997]), we applied the Rogers rule to a situation where the defendant was incarcerated for rape, had been assigned an attorney for that charge and the police were aware of counsel’s involvement.

1999In any event, even if defendant had been represented, with the knowledge of the police, on the unrelated charges, the Rogers rule (People v Rogers, 48 NY2d 167 ) upon which defendant relies, would be inapplicable because defendant had not remained in custody on those charges but had instead been released and rearrested on the bench warrants (see, People v Burdo, 91 NY2d 146 ; People v Steward, 88 NY2d 496 ; People v Bing, supra).

1999In any event, even if defendant had been represented, with the knowledge of the police, on the unrelated charges, the Rogers rule (People v Rogers, 48 NY2d 167 ) upon which defendant relies, would be inapplicable because defendant had not remained in custody on those charges but had instead been released and rearrested on the bench warrants (see, People v Burdo, 91 NY2d 146 ; People v Steward, 88 NY2d 496 ; People v Bing, supra).

1997Thereafter, in People v Bartolomeo ( 53 NY2d 225 ), we extended the Rogers rule to hold that the mere pendency of one matter in which the right to counsel had attached prohibited the police from questioning a suspect about other matters, related or unrelated.

1997Thereafter, in People v Bartolomeo ( 53 NY2d 225 ), we extended the Rogers rule to hold that the mere pendency of one matter in which the right to counsel had attached prohibited the police from questioning a suspect about other matters, related or unrelated.

1983While acknowledging that this issue was not raised in the trial court, defendant correctly observes that his trial took place prior to Rogers (supra) and that the Court of Appeals has held that the Rogers rule should be applied to cases still on appellate review (see People v Albro, 52 NY2d 619, 624 ; People v Bell, 50 NY2d 869, 871 ).

1983While acknowledging that this issue was not raised in the trial court, defendant correctly observes that his trial took place prior to Rogers (supra) and that the Court of Appeals has held that the Rogers rule should be applied to cases still on appellate review (see People v Albro, 52 NY2d 619, 624 ; People v Bell, 50 NY2d 869, 871 ).

1984The issue was whether the rule of People v Rogers ( 48 NY2d 167 ), that representation by counsel even on an unrelated charge bars interrogation in the absence of counsel, applied, or whether, on the other hand, defendant was not actually represented by counsel on the unrelated charge, so that the People v Rogers rule would not apply under People v Kazmariek ( 52 NY2d 322 ).

1981(People v Whitaker, 75 AD2d 111 .) There can be no dispute that the Rogers rule was extended by the law enunciated in the Kazmarick case so as to bar police interrogation of a suspect, if the police can be imputed to have knowledge, actual or constructive, that the suspect in fact is represented by counsel in any criminal proceeding (People v Kazmarick, supra).

1983While acknowledging that this issue was not raised in the trial court, defendant correctly observes that his trial took place prior to Rogers (supra) and that the Court of Appeals has held that the Rogers rule should be applied to cases still on appellate review (see People v Albro, 52 NY2d 619, 624 ; People v Bell, 50 NY2d 869, 871 ).

1983While acknowledging that this issue was not raised in the trial court, defendant correctly observes that his trial took place prior to Rogers (supra) and that the Court of Appeals has held that the Rogers rule should be applied to cases still on appellate review (see People v Albro, 52 NY2d 619, 624 ; People v Bell, 50 NY2d 869, 871 ).

2024People v. Burdo, 91 NY2d at 149; People v. Steward, 88 NY2d at 502 ; People v. West, 81 NY2d at 377 ; Bing, 76 NY2d at 350).

2024People v. Burdo, 91 NY2d at 149; People v. Steward, 88 NY2d at 502 ; People v. West, 81 NY2d at 377 ; Bing, 76 NY2d at 350).

1982The Rogers rule has been further refined in a whole series of cases in its prohibition of the interrogation of defendants represented by counsel on unrelated crimes (see People v Smith, 54 NY2d 954 ; People v Bartolomeo, 53 NY2d 225 ; People v Marrero, 51 NY2d 56 ; People v Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203 ).

1982The Rogers rule has been further refined in a whole series of cases in its prohibition of the interrogation of defendants represented by counsel on unrelated crimes (see People v Smith, 54 NY2d 954 ; People v Bartolomeo, 53 NY2d 225 ; People v Marrero, 51 NY2d 56 ; People v Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203 ).

1982The Rogers rule has been further refined in a whole series of cases in its prohibition of the interrogation of defendants represented by counsel on unrelated crimes (see People v Smith, 54 NY2d 954 ; People v Bartolomeo, 53 NY2d 225 ; People v Marrero, 51 NY2d 56 ; People v Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203 ).

1982The Rogers rule has been further refined in a whole series of cases in its prohibition of the interrogation of defendants represented by counsel on unrelated crimes (see People v Smith, 54 NY2d 954 ; People v Bartolomeo, 53 NY2d 225 ; People v Marrero, 51 NY2d 56 ; People v Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203 ).

1980The easy to apply common-law rule that cases on direct appeal received the benefit or detriment of changes in decisional law and that final judgments were not affected by subsequent changes is no longer valid (see People v Morales, 37 NY2d 262, 267-269 ).

1980The easy to apply common-law rule that cases on direct appeal received the benefit or detriment of changes in decisional law and that final judgments were not affected by subsequent changes is no longer valid (see People v Morales, 37 NY2d 262, 267-269 ).

2018In sharp contrast, on a second-tier appeal, the facts for the appeal are confined to the trial court record, the legal issues have been fully briefed, and the appeal is "not an accusatory proceeding affording defendant an opportunity to explain charges against him or requiring the court to make [de novo] factual or legal determinations affecting his liberty" ( Garcia , 92 NY2d at 731 ; People v Colwell , 65 NY2d 883 , 885 [1985] [rejecting the requested extension of the Rogers rule ( People v Rogers , 48 NY2d 167 [1979]) to situations in which "the defendant already stands convicted and is rep

2018In sharp contrast, on a second-tier appeal, the facts for the appeal are confined to the trial court record, the legal issues have been fully briefed, and the appeal is "not an accusatory proceeding affording defendant an opportunity to explain charges against him or requiring the court to make [de novo] factual or legal determinations affecting his liberty" ( Garcia , 92 NY2d at 731 ; People v Colwell , 65 NY2d 883 , 885 [1985] [rejecting the requested extension of the Rogers rule ( People v Rogers , 48 NY2d 167 [1979]) to situations in which "the defendant already stands convicted and is rep

2018As in Andrews and Arjune , neither defendant nor the dissent can "cite any legal support for the imposition" of a state constitutional right to representation on a CLA for a second-tier appellate review ( Arjune , 30 NY3d at 354 ; see Andrews , 23 NY3d at 616 ).

2018As in Andrews and Arjune , neither defendant nor the dissent can "cite any legal support for the imposition" of a state constitutional right to representation on a CLA for a second-tier appellate review ( Arjune , 30 NY3d at 354 ; see Andrews , 23 NY3d at 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990The Rogers rule applies to the defendant’s right to counsel when other charges are pending—not when such charges have been concluded (People v Colwell, 65 NY2d 883 , 885; People v Marshall, 98 AD2d 452, 462 ).

1990The Rogers rule applies to the defendant’s right to counsel when other charges are pending—not when such charges have been concluded (People v Colwell, 65 NY2d 883 , 885; People v Marshall, 98 AD2d 452, 462 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1990In other cases, the Appellate Divisions had already applied the Rogers rule in both contexts (see, e.g., People v Outlaw, 81 AD2d 796 ; People v Pitt, 80 AD2d 864 ; People v Butler, 80 AD2d 644 ; People v Catalano, 80 AD2d 587 ; People v Miller, 76 AD2d 576 , affd 54 NY2d 616 ).

1989Because the Rogers rule applies to cases still on appellate review and because the record is insufficient to determine this issue, the hearing must be reopened (see, People v Tindal, 92 AD2d 717 ).

1989Because the Rogers rule applies to cases still on appellate review and because the record is insufficient to determine this issue, the hearing must be reopened (see, People v Tindal, 92 AD2d 717 ).

1989This, as the court explained in People v Robles and People v Murray, is so because the Rogers rule "established a derivative and accordingly limited right with respect to unrelated charges in order to protect the direct and full-fledged right to counsel in the pending proceeding” ( 72 NY2d, at 698 , supra).

1989This, as the court explained in People v Robles and People v Murray, is so because the Rogers rule "established a derivative and accordingly limited right with respect to unrelated charges in order to protect the direct and full-fledged right to counsel in the pending proceeding” ( 72 NY2d, at 698 , supra).

1988We noted, for example, that the common thread running through the cases in which we had found the Taylor exception inapplicable (e.g., People v Ermo, supra; People v Carl, supra; People v Ramos, supra) was that in each case the defendant had been represented by an attorney at the time of the questioning (People v Rogers, supra, at 172-173 ).

1988We noted, for example, that the common thread running through the cases in which we had found the Taylor exception inapplicable (e.g., People v Ermo, supra; People v Carl, supra; People v Ramos, supra) was that in each case the defendant had been represented by an attorney at the time of the questioning (People v Rogers, supra, at 172-173 ).

1988We noted, for example, that the common thread running through the cases in which we had found the Taylor exception inapplicable (e.g., People v Ermo, supra; People v Carl, supra; People v Ramos, supra) was that in each case the defendant had been represented by an attorney at the time of the questioning (People v Rogers, supra, at 172-173 ).

1988We noted, for example, that the common thread running through the cases in which we had found the Taylor exception inapplicable (e.g., People v Ermo, supra; People v Carl, supra; People v Ramos, supra) was that in each case the defendant had been represented by an attorney at the time of the questioning (People v Rogers, supra, at 172-173 ).