Rogers motion in Florida

1993Gunsby v. State, 574 So.2d 1085 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 136 , 116 L.Ed.2d 103 (1991).

1993Gunsby v. State, 574 So.2d 1085 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 136 , 116 L.Ed.2d 103 (1991).

1993Gunsby v. State, 574 So.2d 1085 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 136 , 116 L.Ed.2d 103 (1991).

1993Gunsby v. State, 574 So.2d 1085 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 136 , 116 L.Ed.2d 103 (1991).

2018This Court stayed Rogers’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017).

2018This Court stayed Rogers’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017); cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017).

2018This Court stayed Rogers’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017).

2018This Court stayed Rogers’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017); cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017).

2018This Court stayed Rogers’ appeal pending the disposition of Hitchcock v. State, 226 So.3d 216 (Fla. 2017); cert. denied, — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 513 , 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rogers’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rogers’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rogers’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rogers’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rogers’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rogers’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).

2018V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Rogers’ motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, — U.S. --, 137 S.Ct. 2161 , 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017).

2006THE ISSUES ON APPEAL Rodgers raises the following seven issues for our review: that the trial court erred (A) by excusing a potential juror for cause; (B) by admitting hearsay testimony during the penalty phase; (C) by admitting Rodgers's old IQ scores from Department of Corrections records; (D) in determining that Rodgers is not mentally retarded; (E) in finding the mitigating circumstances, weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and determining proportionality; (F) in denying Rogers's motion for disqualification; and (G) in failing to find Florida's death penalty statute unco

2006THE ISSUES ON APPEAL Rodgers raises the following seven issues for our review: that the trial court erred (A) by excusing a potential juror for cause; (B) by admitting hearsay testimony during the penalty phase; (C) by admitting Rodgers's old IQ scores from Department of Corrections records; (D) in determining that Rodgers is not mentally retarded; (E) in finding the mitigating circumstances, weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and determining proportionality; (F) in denying Rogers's motion for disqualification; and (G) in failing to find Florida's death penalty statute unco

2006Wesner v. State, 843 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Ziegler v. State, 380 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

2006Wesner v. State, 843 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Ziegler v. State, 380 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

1995A similar tack was taken by the trial judge in Rogers v. State, 652 So.2d 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), where a notice of deposition and witness list from the court file were appended to the order denying Rogers’ motion to vacate his conviction.

1991Applying the first step of the Rogers analysis, I find that the evidence clearly supports "the facts alleged in mitigation." Rogers, 511 So.2d at 534 .

1991Applying the first step of the Rogers analysis, I find that the evidence clearly supports "the facts alleged in mitigation." Rogers, 511 So.2d at 534 .

1987See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1330 , 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 , 99 S.Ct. 1548 , 59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979).

1987See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1330 , 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 , 99 S.Ct. 1548 , 59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979).

1987See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 , 104 S.Ct. 1330 , 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 , 99 S.Ct. 1548 , 59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979).

1980Section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (1979), defines second degree murder as "[t]he unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual... ." The thrust of Rogers' motion was that his actions did not indicate "a depraved mind regardless of human life." As this court explained in State v. J.T.S. and G.R.W., 373 So.2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), intent or state of mind is not an issue to be decided on a motion to di

1980Section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (1979), defines second degree murder as "[t]he unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual... ." The thrust of Rogers' motion was that his actions did not indicate "a depraved mind regardless of human life." As this court explained in State v. J.T.S. and G.R.W., 373 So.2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), intent or state of mind is not an issue to be decided on a motion to di

1974The Loftin v. Joyner case, supra , is a pre-Rogers' rule case in which the degree of negligence necessary to establish liability on the part of the employer is much higher than that degree of employer negligence, as set forth in the post-Rogers' rule cases in which liability is established where it can be shown that "employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." If the District Court of Appeal decision is interpreted as applying the less stringent Rogers' rule and not the rule of law announced in Loftin v. Joyner, supra

1974The Loftin v. Joyner case, supra , is a pre-Rogers' rule case in which the degree of negligence necessary to establish liability on the part of the employer is much higher than that degree of employer negligence, as set forth in the post-Rogers' rule cases in which liability is established where it can be shown that "employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." If the District Court of Appeal decision is interpreted as applying the less stringent Rogers' rule and not the rule of law announced in Loftin v. Joyner, supra

1974The District Court of Appeal in holding that there were sufficient facts to support negligence on the part of the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, stated that the trial court was close to being correct when saying that: "A mere inference of negligence is sufficient to sustain a verdict." In the case sub judice the facts set out in the District Court's opinion amounted to more than a "mere inference of negligence." We find that the District Court of Appeal, in applying and recognizing the standard of negligence embodied in the Rogers' rule reached a different result in a cas

1973The ‘Rogers rule’ on the question of causation is stated as ‘whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.’ This Court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Barrett, supra [Fla., 101 So.2d 37 ] recognized the Rogers rule and quoted extensively from that case.

1973The ‘Rogers rule’ on the question of causation is stated as ‘whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.’ This Court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Barrett, supra [Fla., 101 So.2d 37 ] recognized the Rogers rule and quoted extensively from that case.