Rogers motion in Georgia

2017Additionally, the trial court found that, absent evidence Dupree had leaked any information to the media, Rogers’ claim that Dupree was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress in that regard also violated the anti-SLAPP statute. 30 While it is true that a latecomer to a conspiracy may be liable for his co- conspirators’ previous wrongful acts, “where the act of conspiring is itself legal, the means or method of its accomplishment must be illegal.” Savannah College of Art & Design v. School of Visual Arts of Savannah, 219 Ga. App. 296, 297 ( 464 SE2d 895 ) (1995).

2017Additionally, the trial court found that, absent evidence Dupree had leaked any information to the media, Rogers’ claim that Dupree was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress in that regard also violated the anti-SLAPP statute. 30 While it is true that a latecomer to a conspiracy may be liable for his co- conspirators’ previous wrongful acts, “where the act of conspiring is itself legal, the means or method of its accomplishment must be illegal.” Savannah College of Art & Design v. School of Visual Arts of Savannah, 219 Ga. App. 296, 297 ( 464 SE2d 895 ) (1995).

2013See Mitchell v. Austin, 261 Ga. App. 585, 587 ( 583 SE2d 249 ) (2003) (evidence to defeat summary judgment must be more than mere possibility or speculation).

2013See Mitchell v. Austin, 261 Ga. App. 585, 587 ( 583 SE2d 249 ) (2003) (evidence to defeat summary judgment must be more than mere possibility or speculation).

2023An admission is a statement offered against a party which is the party’s own statement.” (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Glispie v. State, 300 Ga. 128, 131 (1) ( 793 SE2d 381 ) (2016); see also OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (A).

2023An admission is a statement offered against a party which is the party’s own statement.” (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Glispie v. State, 300 Ga. 128, 131 (1) ( 793 SE2d 381 ) (2016); see also OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (A).

2021See Thompson, 304 Ga. at 153.

2021See Thompson, 304 Ga. at 153 .

2017However, “[w]e are not authorized to consider that [evidence] as we are limited to the record in the case sub judice.” Tingle v. Arnold, 129 Ga. App. 134, 139 ( 199 SE2d 260 ) (1973). 21 Brindle’s opposition to Rogers’ motion to seal the record was not frivolous and did not lack substantial justification.

2017However, “[w]e are not authorized to consider that [evidence] as we are limited to the record in the case sub judice.” Tingle v. Arnold, 129 Ga. App. 134, 139 ( 199 SE2d 260 ) (1973). 21 Brindle’s opposition to Rogers’ motion to seal the record was not frivolous and did not lack substantial justification.

2017The court further explicitly stated that it was not determining “whether or not [Brindle] has committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt or whether the State could disprove any defenses she may assert” in the future, made “no findings as to Cohen’s and Butter’s [sic] involvement” in making the recording, and decided only that “discovery may be had on that issue.” Cohen v. Rogers, 338 Ga. App. 156, 161-162 (1) ( 789 SE2d 352 ) (2016).

2017The court further explicitly stated that it was not determining “whether or not [Brindle] has committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt or whether the State could disprove any defenses she may assert” in the future, made “no findings as to Cohen’s and Butter’s [sic] involvement” in making the recording, and decided only that “discovery may be had on that issue.” Cohen v. Rogers, 338 Ga. App. 156, 161-162 (1) ( 789 SE2d 352 ) (2016).

2017Rogers argues essentially that Dupree’s representation of Brindle was illegal, and as paraphrased by Dupree, that “[t]he conspiracy is using the evidence at hand to prosecute claims against [Rogers] in spite of the fact that [Rogers] believes that evidence was procured illegally.” In an appeal affirming the grant of summary judgment to a defendant in a tortious interference with contract suit based on the filing of another suit, this Court held that Georgia has “a compelling government interest in encouraging citizens to settle disputes through the court, rather than through self-help which ca

2017Rogers argues essentially that Dupree’s representation of Brindle was illegal, and as paraphrased by Dupree, that “[t]he conspiracy is using the evidence at hand to prosecute claims against [Rogers] in spite of the fact that [Rogers] believes that evidence was procured illegally.” In an appeal affirming the grant of summary judgment to a defendant in a tortious interference with contract suit based on the filing of another suit, this Court held that Georgia has “a compelling government interest in encouraging citizens to settle disputes through the court, rather than through self-help which ca

2017See Miller v. State, 264 Ga. App. 801, 803 (b) ( 592 SE2d 450 ) (2003).

2017See Miller v. State, 264 Ga. App. 801, 803 (b) ( 592 SE2d 450 ) (2003).

2015See Holder v. State, 319 Ga. App. 239, 249 (3) (b) ( 736 SE2d 449 ) (2012). 2.

2015See Holder v. State, 319 Ga. App. 239, 249 (3) (b) ( 736 SE2d 449 ) (2012). 2.

2013We agree.5 4 See Moody v. State, 232 Ga. App. 499, 504 (4) (a) ( 502 SE2d 323 ) (1998) (when a defendant lacks ownership or possessory interest in a residence, then he has “no expectation of privacy in the premises and lacks standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant”). 5 We note that OCGA § 17-5-30 (b) requires that a defendant file a written motion to suppress stating “facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful,” specifically, “the suppression motion must be sufficient to put the State on notice as to the type of search or seizure involved, which witness to bring t

2013We agree.5 4 See Moody v. State, 232 Ga. App. 499, 504 (4) (a) ( 502 SE2d 323 ) (1998) (when a defendant lacks ownership or possessory interest in a residence, then he has “no expectation of privacy in the premises and lacks standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant”). 5 We note that OCGA § 17-5-30 (b) requires that a defendant file a written motion to suppress stating “facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful,” specifically, “the suppression motion must be sufficient to put the State on notice as to the type of search or seizure involved, which witness to bring t

2013We agree.5 4 See Moody v. State, 232 Ga. App. 499, 504 (4) (a) ( 502 SE2d 323 ) (1998) (when a defendant lacks ownership or possessory interest in a residence, then he has “no expectation of privacy in the premises and lacks standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant”). 5 We note that OCGA § 17-5-30 (b) requires that a defendant file a written motion to suppress stating “facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful,” specifically, “the suppression motion must be sufficient to put the State on notice as to the type of search or seizure involved, which witness to bring t

2013We agree.5 4 See Moody v. State, 232 Ga. App. 499, 504 (4) (a) ( 502 SE2d 323 ) (1998) (when a defendant lacks ownership or possessory interest in a residence, then he has “no expectation of privacy in the premises and lacks standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant”). 5 We note that OCGA § 17-5-30 (b) requires that a defendant file a written motion to suppress stating “facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful,” specifically, “the suppression motion must be sufficient to put the State on notice as to the type of search or seizure involved, which witness to bring t

2013We agree.5 4 See Moody v. State, 232 Ga. App. 499, 504 (4) (a) ( 502 SE2d 323 ) (1998) (when a defendant lacks ownership or possessory interest in a residence, then he has “no expectation of privacy in the premises and lacks standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant”). 5 We note that OCGA § 17-5-30 (b) requires that a defendant file a written motion to suppress stating “facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful,” specifically, “the suppression motion must be sufficient to put the State on notice as to the type of search or seizure involved, which witness to bring t

2013We agree.5 4 See Moody v. State, 232 Ga. App. 499, 504 (4) (a) ( 502 SE2d 323 ) (1998) (when a defendant lacks ownership or possessory interest in a residence, then he has “no expectation of privacy in the premises and lacks standing to challenge the validity of the search warrant”). 5 We note that OCGA § 17-5-30 (b) requires that a defendant file a written motion to suppress stating “facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful,” specifically, “the suppression motion must be sufficient to put the State on notice as to the type of search or seizure involved, which witness to bring t

2013(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Palmer, 285 Ga. 75, 78 ( 673 SE2d 237 ) (2009).

2013(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Palmer, 285 Ga. 75, 78 ( 673 SE2d 237 ) (2009).

2012And “[a] motion in arrest of judgment [also] must be made during the term at which the judgment was obtained.” OCGA § 17-9-61 (b); Johnson v. State, 298 Ga. App. 639, 645 (4) (a) ( 680 SE2d 675 ) (2009).

2012And “[a] motion in arrest of judgment [also] must be made during the term at which the judgment was obtained.” OCGA § 17-9-61 (b); Johnson v. State, 298 Ga. App. 639, 645 (4) (a) ( 680 SE2d 675 ) (2009).

2011See Baptiste, supra, 229 Ga. App. at 697 (1).

2011See Baptiste, supra, 229 Ga. App. at 697 (1).

2007Compare United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140 (126 SC 2557, 2563, 165 LE2d 409) (2006).

2007“There is a strong presumption that trial counsel provided effective representation, and we will not find ineffectiveness if trial counsel’s strategy and trial tactics were reasonable at the time.” Welbon, supra, 278 Ga. at 313 (2). (a) In response to Rogers’ claim that trial counsel’s advice and conduct with respect to his police interview constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the State argues that, at the time of that interview, Rogers had not yet been formally charged with a crime and therefore his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached.

2007“There is a strong presumption that trial counsel provided effective representation, and we will not find ineffectiveness if trial counsel’s strategy and trial tactics were reasonable at the time.” Welbon, supra, 278 Ga. at 313 (2). (a) In response to Rogers’ claim that trial counsel’s advice and conduct with respect to his police interview constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the State argues that, at the time of that interview, Rogers had not yet been formally charged with a crime and therefore his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached.

2005Under Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 469 ( 448 SE2d 192 ) (1994), the underlying subject matter of an appeal generally controls when determining the proper appellate procedure.

2005Under Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 469 ( 448 SE2d 192 ) (1994), the underlying subject matter of an appeal generally controls when determining the proper appellate procedure.

1998Compare Pearson v. State, 216 Ga. App. 333, 334 ( 454 SE2d 205 ) (1995).

1998Compare Pearson v. State, 216 Ga. App. 333, 334 ( 454 SE2d 205 ) (1995).

1998See also Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 729 (2) ( 279 SE2d 223 ) (1981).

1998See also Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 729 (2) ( 279 SE2d 223 ) (1981).

1993Mathis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 896, 898-899 (3) ( 420 SE2d 788 ) (1992); Lee v. State, 204 Ga. App. 283 (2) ( 418 SE2d 809 ) (1992). 2.

1993Mathis v. State, 204 Ga. App. 896, 898-899 (3) ( 420 SE2d 788 ) (1992); Lee v. State, 204 Ga. App. 283 (2) ( 418 SE2d 809 ) (1992). 2.

1991“The question of attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 is a question for the jury. [Cit.] The standard of review of an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 is whether there is any evidence to support the award. [Cit.]” Spring Lake Property Owners Assn. v. Peacock, 260 Ga. 80, 81 ( 390 SE2d 31 ) (1990).

1991“The question of attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 is a question for the jury. [Cit.] The standard of review of an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 is whether there is any evidence to support the award. [Cit.]” Spring Lake Property Owners Assn. v. Peacock, 260 Ga. 80, 81 ( 390 SE2d 31 ) (1990).