Rogers motion in South Carolina

2014Additionally, Rogers argues he was immune from prosecution by referencing the Act and comparing the instant case to State v. Duncan, 392 S.C. 404, 411 , 709 S.E.2d 662, 665 (2011).2 We disagree and find the circuit court properly denied Rogers' motion to dismiss because Rogers failed to carry his burden of proof and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was permitted to use deadly force under any section of the Act or other applicable provision of law.

2014Additionally, Rogers argues he was immune from prosecution by referencing the Act and comparing the instant case to State v. Duncan, 392 S.C. 404, 411 , 709 S.E.2d 662, 665 (2011).2 We disagree and find the circuit court properly denied Rogers' motion to dismiss because Rogers failed to carry his burden of proof and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was permitted to use deadly force under any section of the Act or other applicable provision of law.

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion for directed verdict: State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict [only] when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); State v. Brannon, 379 S.C. 487, 494 , 666 S.E.2d 272, 275 (Ct. App. 2008) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, we must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."). 4.

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion for directed verdict: State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict [only] when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); State v. Brannon, 379 S.C. 487, 494 , 666 S.E.2d 272, 275 (Ct. App. 2008) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, we must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."). 4.

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion for directed verdict: State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict [only] when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); State v. Brannon, 379 S.C. 487, 494 , 666 S.E.2d 272, 275 (Ct. App. 2008) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, we must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."). 4.

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion for directed verdict: State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 321 , 555 S.E.2d 402, 404 (2001) ("A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict [only] when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged."); State v. Brannon, 379 S.C. 487, 494 , 666 S.E.2d 272, 275 (Ct. App. 2008) ("If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, we must find the case was properly submitted to the jury."). 4.

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion to suppress the return to the search warrant: Rule 401, SCRE ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or n

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion to suppress the return to the search warrant: Rule 401, SCRE ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or n

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion to suppress the return to the search warrant: Rule 401, SCRE ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or n

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion to suppress the return to the search warrant: Rule 401, SCRE ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or n

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion to suppress evidence seized from the vehicle based on a lack of reasonable suspicion and probable cause: State v. Blassingame, 338 S.C. 240, 248 , 525 S.E.2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1999) ("A police officer may stop and briefly detain and question a person for investigative purposes, without treading upon his Fourth Amendment rights, when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts, short of probable cause for arrest, that the person is involved in criminal activity."). 3.

2013As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Rogers's motion to suppress evidence seized from the vehicle based on a lack of reasonable suspicion and probable cause: State v. Blassingame, 338 S.C. 240, 248 , 525 S.E.2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1999) ("A police officer may stop and briefly detain and question a person for investigative purposes, without treading upon his Fourth Amendment rights, when the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts, short of probable cause for arrest, that the person is involved in criminal activity."). 3.

2013See Rayfield, 369 S.C. at 112 , 631 S.E.2d at 247 (stating that once the proponent of the strike offers a reason that is race-neutral, the burden is on the party challenging the strike to show the explanation is mere pretext).

2013See Rayfield, 369 S.C. at 112 , 631 S.E.2d at 247 (stating that once the proponent of the strike offers a reason that is race-neutral, the burden is on the party challenging the strike to show the explanation is mere pretext).

2001See People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 , 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 , 558 N.E.2d 1011 (1990) (distinguishing Rogers and holding that where no Fifth Amendment right to counsel was invoked, defendants in custody on bench warrants for other charges could be questioned on unrelated charges even though right to counsel had attached on custodial charges); see also Burdo, supra (Wesley, J. dissenting) (Rogers rule applies only where defendant has invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel on custodial charges).

2001See People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 , 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 , 558 N.E.2d 1011 (1990) (distinguishing Rogers and holding that where no Fifth Amendment right to counsel was invoked, defendants in custody on bench warrants for other charges could be questioned on unrelated charges even though right to counsel had attached on custodial charges); see also Burdo, supra (Wesley, J. dissenting) (Rogers rule applies only where defendant has invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel on custodial charges).