detention hearing in Illinois

2026Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54 . ¶ 25 The record shows that following the initial detention hearing, the circuit court considered the presentation of evidence by proffer, the pretrial investigation report, and arguments of counsel.

2026To satisfy its burden, the State may present evidence at a detention hearing through witnesses (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(3) (West 2024)) or “by way of proffer based upon reliable information” (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West 2024); Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 26 ).

2025The finding, as required by section 110-6.1(i- 5), is “a less demanding standard than what is required at the detention hearing, though both are concerned with fundamentally the same question.” Id. ¶ 22 Under the recent Supreme Court decision in People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626 , “when the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” People v. -5- No. 1-24-2240B Morgan

2025Instead, as required by section 110-6.1(i-5), the finding at a continued detention hearing is “a less demanding standard than what is required at the detention hearing, though both are concerned with fundamentally the same question.” People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 14 .

2025See People v. Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶¶ 20-21 .

2025See Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶ 20 .

2004See People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515 , 802 N.E.2d 219 (2003) (warrant checks conducted on a passenger’s identification changed the fundamental nature of a minor traffic stop and exceeded the scope of the initial detention in violation of the fourth amendment).

2004See People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515 , 802 N.E.2d 219 (2003) (warrant checks conducted on a passenger’s identification changed the fundamental nature of a minor traffic stop and exceeded the scope of the initial detention in violation of the fourth amendment).

2026People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 24 . ¶ 50 We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal in this matter, including the initial detention hearing and the hearing on the defendant’s motion for relief.

2026See, e.g., People v. Mancilla, 2024 IL App (2d) 230505, ¶ 24 ; People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 24 ; People v. Arroyo, 2025 IL App (2d) 250058-U, ¶ 34 ; People v. Hill, 2024 IL App (2d) 240436-U, ¶ 29 ; People v. Wesby, 2024 IL App (2d) 230523-U, ¶ 28 ; People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (2d) 230546-U, ¶ 9 . ¶ 27 Additionally, defendant’s claim that L.B.’s allegations lacked corroboration reflects a misunderstanding of the State’s burden of proof at a detention hearing.

2026The Code provides that the State need not actually introduce the underlying evidence at the hearing, and may satisfy its burden of persuasion by presenting evidence “at the hearing by way of proffer based upon reliable information.” Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2). ¶ 17 We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal in this matter, including the initial detention hearing and the hearing on the defendant’s motion for relief.

2025People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 18 (applying abuse of discretion standard to all aspects of the detention hearing); People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 12 (applying the manifest weight of the evidence standard to all aspects of the detention hearing); People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13 (applying the manifest weight of the evidence standard to factual findings and abuse of discretion standard to the ultimate detention decision). ¶ 23 It is appropriate that the supreme court provided guidance on this question.

2025While the trial court may hear new evidence when considering whether continued detention is necessary under section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code (see People v. Harris, 2024 IL App (2d) 240070, ¶ 51 ), a proper hearing under Rule 604(h) consists only of an - 12 - No. 1-24-2306B examination of the State’s evidence at the initial detention hearing and a determination of whether the State had met its burden of proof.

2025No witnesses testified at any of the detention hearings in this case. “[W]hen the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54 . ¶ 25 “[A] court ordering continued pretrial detention must make certain findings based on specific, articulable facts, just as at an initial detention hearing. [Citation.] However, [these] subsequent determination

2026The nature and circumstances of the underlying offense is “just one factor to consider in determining whether the threat posed can be mitigated by conditions of release.” People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709, ¶ 19. ¶ 38 We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal in this matter, including the initial detention hearing and the motion for relief hearing.

2026The nature and circumstances of the underlying offense is “just one factor to consider in determining whether the threat posed can be mitigated by conditions of release.” People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709, ¶ 19 . ¶ 32 We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal in this matter, including the initial detention hearing and the motion for relief hearing.

2026The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) specifically provides that, in any proceeding under the Act, the parents’ appearance “shall constitute a waiver of service and submission to the jurisdiction of the court.” 705 ILCS 405/5-525(4) (West 2024); In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 428 (2009) (in proceedings under the Act, personal jurisdiction over the parents was established when they “appeared at the detention hearing and were given copies of the petition”). ¶ 17 The parents do not dispute that they attended the shelter care hearing.

2024There, when the necessary parties “appeared at the detention hearing and were given copies of the petition, personal jurisdiction over them was established.” In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 428 .

2025See Ramyyeh, 2024 IL App (1st) 240299, ¶ 22 ; Mezo, 2024 IL App (3d) 230499, ¶ 10 (finding the State’s failure to 9 No. 1-25-0945B comply with section 110-6.1(f)(1) and (f)(4), and the court’s failure to hold the State to its obligation to comply, warrants a new detention hearing). ¶ 29 III.

2025See Id.; Mezo, 2024 IL App (3d) 230499, ¶ 10 (finding the State’s failure to comply with section 110-6.1(f)(1) and (f)(4), and the court’s failure to hold the State to its obligation to comply, warrants a new detention hearing). ¶ 29 III.

2026Apr. 15, 2024) (establishing that the motion for relief will serve as the appellant’s argument on appeal, and allowing, but not requiring, the appellant to file an additional memorandum in support). “[A] proper Rule 604(h)(2) hearing *** would consist of an examination of the State's evidence at the initial detention hearing and a determination of whether the State had met its burden of proof.” People v. Williams, 2024 IL App (1st) 241013, ¶ 29 ; see People v. Badie, 2025 IL App (3d) 250033, ¶ 27 . 2 Unpublished Rule 23 orders entered on January 1, 2021, or later “may be cited for persuasive p

2025S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2). “[A] proper Rule 604(h)(2) hearing *** would consist of an examination of the State's evidence at the initial detention hearing and a determination of whether the State had met its burden of proof.” People v. Williams, 2024 IL App (1st) 241013, ¶ 29 ; see People v. Badie, 2025 IL App (3d) 250033, ¶ 27 . ¶ 26 In his notice of appeal, Martinez lists both October 1, 2024 (original detention hearing) and January 28, 2025 (hearing on the motion for relief) as the “date(s) of hearing(s) regarding pretrial release” from which he is appealing.

2026The Fourth District, following the First District, found that “[a] hearing under Rule 604(h) should consist only of ‘an examination of the State’s evidence at the initial detention hearing.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Williams, 2024 IL App (1st) 241013, ¶ 29 ). ¶ 24 At the motion for relief hearing in this case, the parties agreed to proceed simultaneously on the motion for relief and the preliminary hearing.

2026Apr. 15, 2024) (establishing that the motion for relief will serve as the appellant’s argument on appeal, and allowing, but not requiring, the appellant to file an additional memorandum in support). “[A] proper Rule 604(h)(2) hearing *** would consist of an examination of the State's evidence at the initial detention hearing and a determination of whether the State had met its burden of proof.” People v. Williams, 2024 IL App (1st) 241013, ¶ 29 ; see People v. Badie, 2025 IL App (3d) 250033, ¶ 27 . 2 Unpublished Rule 23 orders entered on January 1, 2021, or later “may be cited for persuasive p

2026See, e.g., People v. Hill, 2024 IL App (2d) 240436-U, ¶ 29 ; People v. Mancilla, 2024 IL App (2d) 230505, ¶ 24 ; People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (2d) 230546-U, ¶ 9 ; People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 24 . ¶ 30 Here, the proffered synopsis provided credible evidence from Sandoval that occupants in a vehicle pointed a gun at him.

2026See, e.g., People v. Mancilla, 2024 IL App (2d) 230505, ¶ 24 ; People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 24 ; People v. Arroyo, 2025 IL App (2d) 250058-U, ¶ 34 ; People v. Hill, 2024 IL App (2d) 240436-U, ¶ 29 ; People v. Wesby, 2024 IL App (2d) 230523-U, ¶ 28 ; People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (2d) 230546-U, ¶ 9 . ¶ 27 Additionally, defendant’s claim that L.B.’s allegations lacked corroboration reflects a misunderstanding of the State’s burden of proof at a detention hearing.

2024“This determination also does not contemplate the filing of a petition for detention.” Id. ¶ 20 Here, Wynne’s arguments on appeal are directed at the three propositions the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence at an initial detention hearing.

2024I also agree with the majority’s position that the fact that the trial court held such a hearing does not necessitate reversal, as the findings required by section 6.1(i-5) are “effectively subsumed by the elements the State must prove at a detention hearing.” Supra ¶ 13; see also People v. Mansoori, 2024 IL App (1st) 232351, ¶ 44 (Reyes, P.J., dissenting) (“By conducting a hearing pursuant to the requirements of section 110-6.1, *** the trial court in the instant case necessarily found that the State had satisfied a more stringent standard of proof than would be otherwise required,” making re

2024At the detention hearing on March 26, 2024, the State presented the following allegations. 1 In 2021, the General Assembly passed two separate acts that “dismantled and rebuilt Illinois’s statutory framework for the pretrial release of criminal defendants.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶4 (discussing Pub.

2024Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248 , ¶ 4 n.1. -2- 2024 IL App (2d) 230595-U the court and the State indicating that defendant had been indicted by the date of the detention hearing, the indictment has not been made part of the record on appeal. ¶5 On December 15, 2023, the State filed a “Verified Petition to Deny Defendant Pretrial Release” (Petition).

2026A -8- reviewing court will find an abuse of discretion occurred if the trial court’s “decision is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the [trial] court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 33 . ¶ 20 A. Change in Circumstances Regarding Defendant’s Safety Threat ¶ 21 In support of her argument that she poses a lesser safety threat than she did after the initial detention hearing, defendant points to the following as new evidence or changes in circumstances: (1) the uncertainty as to the

2026In People v. Post, 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 25 , this court explained the fundamental difference between an initial order -7- of detention and an order of continued detention: “When issuing an order of detention, the trial court begins with the presumption a defendant should be granted pretrial release unless certain criteria are met and the State meets its burden of proving the necessity for pretrial detention. [Citation.] When issuing an order of continued detention, however, the detention decision has already been made and often already subject to appellate review *** so the question rel

2025“A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite 7 conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). ¶ 24 We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal in this matter, including the initial detention hearing and the motion for relief hearing.

2024Under this standard, we give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact as it is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses.” Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d at 332 . ¶ 18 In the case at bar, upon consideration of the specific articulable facts of the case and the record of the detention hearing, we are hard pressed to find that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.

2025In re R.L., 282 Ill.

1996In a thoughtful opinion the court held "the finding of probable cause at the detention hearing does not bind the trial court as to probable cause at the transfer hearing and the minor is entitled to a de novo hearing.” In re R.L., 282 Ill.

2025Finally, Judge Patrick Coughlin presided over Hall’s motion for relief. 4 “Gerstein” refers to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112, 125 (1975), which holds that a defendant arrested without a warrant and charged by information must be promptly presented before a neutral magistrate to determine whether probable cause for arrest exists. -6- No. 1-25-0684B regarding defendant Ronnie Martin, second, specifically regarding Ronell Martin, and third, regarding Hall.

1996If we were to search for an analogy, it would rest in the criminal law somewhere between the hearing on probable cause to detain an arrested person (Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 43 L.

2025Like the panel in Ramyyeh, we “disagree that such a drastic remedy is warranted in this case due to the [State’s] noncompliance with section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code.” Ramyyeh, 2024 IL App (1st) 240299, ¶ 22 . ¶ 28 Instead, where the State’s conduct rendered Shorts’s detention hearing deficient, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand the matter for a new detention hearing—compliant with section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code—on the State’s detention petition.

2025Like the panel in Ramyyeh, we “disagree that such a drastic remedy is warranted in this case due to the [State’s] noncompliance with section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code.” 2024 IL App (1st) 240299, ¶ 22 . 9 No. 1-25-0298B ¶ 28 Instead, where the State’s conduct rendered Shorts’s detention hearing deficient, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand the matter for a new detention hearing—compliant with section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code—on the State’s detention petition.

2025See People v. Luna, 2024 IL App (2d) 230568, ¶ 9 (evidence required at a detention hearing is less than required at trial). -5- 2025 IL App (2d) 250105-U ¶ 19 Defendant next argues that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he posed a threat to the community.

2025See People v. Luna, 2024 IL App (2d) 230568, ¶ 9 (evidence required at a detention hearing is less than required at trial). -5- 2025 IL App (2d) 250105-U ¶ 19 Defendant next argues that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he posed a threat to the community.

2024See People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶¶ 17, 38 (Turner, J., specially concurring); People v. O’Neal, 2024 IL App (5th) 231111, ¶¶ 8-18 ; People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d) 230435, ¶ 15 ; but see People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (1st) 231890, ¶ 20 .

2024“A misapplication of the law rises to plain error when it affects a defendant’s fundamental right to liberty.” Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 11 ; People v. Gathing, 2023 IL App (3d) 230491 , ¶ 19 (finding the trial court’s failure to conduct the defendant’s detention hearing in person pursuant to section 110-6(a) was reversible error). ¶ 23 Additionally, we find this error falls under the second prong of the plain error analysis.

2024In his memorandum, defendant, relying on People v. Gatlin, 2024 IL App (4th) 231199, ¶¶ 20-23 , asserts we “should reverse the trial court’s detention order and order that [he] be released from custody.” In Gatlin, we found the trial court committed second-prong plain error by holding a detention hearing without the defendant being physically present in court, in violation of section 110-6.1(f)(3.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(3.5) (West 2022).

2024CONCLUSION ¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we vacate the trial court’s order denying defendant pretrial release and remand with directions for the court to set a new detention hearing and conduct those further proceedings in a manner consistent with this order. ¶ 26 Vacated and remanded with directions. - 10 - People v. Gatlin, 2024 IL App (4th) 231199 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No. 23- CF-796; the Hon.