detention hearing in New Mexico

2023Because this delicate balancing necessarily requires an 14 individualized risk assessment, the district court must take care to explain its 15 reasoning, in writing, as to how each factor applies to the specific facts of the case. 16 See State v. Ferry, 2018-NMSC-004, ¶ 7 , 409 P.3d 918 (“[D]istrict court judges are 17 required to file written findings of the individualized facts justifying the detention 18 of the defendant or the denial of the detention motion.”). 19 {37} In this case, the district court applied the wrong test: it did not apply the Rule 20 5-409 factors but instead analyzed t

2023See State v. Ferry, 2018-NMSC-004, ¶ 7 , 409 P.3d 918 (“[D]istrict court judges are required to file written findings of the individualized facts justifying the detention of the defendant or the denial of the detention motion.”). {37} In this case, the district court applied the wrong test: it did not apply the Rule 5- 409 factors but instead analyzed the case through the lens of Groves, which described three general “categories of determinations” that the district court must make at a detention hearing.

2018See Brown , 2014-NMSC-038 , ¶ 13, 338 P.3d 1276 . {35} As to the third part of the detention analysis, several facts supported the district court's determination by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of pretrial release the court could impose under Rule 5-401 would reasonably protect the safety of any other person or the community. {36} The clear and convincing evidence standard is a recognized term of art in our jurisprudence.

2018See Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, ¶ 13 . {35} As to the third part of the detention analysis, several facts supported the district court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of pretrial release the court could impose under Rule 5-401 would reasonably protect the safety of any other person or the community. {36} The clear and convincing evidence standard is a recognized term of art in our jurisprudence.

2023Groves, 2018-NMSC-006, ¶ 29 (affirming categories 3 set forth in Torrez, 2018-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 99-102 ).

2023Groves, 2018-NMSC-006, ¶ 29 (affirming categories set forth in Torrez, 2018-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 99-102 ).

2018See State v. Clements , 1988-NMCA-094 , ¶ 15, 108 N.M. 13 , 765 P.2d 1195 (looking to federal law in interpreting a New Mexico rule with language similar to the federal rule); State v. Weddle , 1967-NMSC-028 , ¶ 8, 77 N.M. 420 , 423 P.2d 611 (same), contested on other grounds , Caristo v. Sullivan , 1991-NMSC-088 , 112 N.M. 623 , 818 P.2d 401 . {95} Our New Mexico Constitution and court rules relating to detention contain all the procedural safeguards that the United States Supreme Court found constitutionally sufficient in Salerno , including a detention hearing requiring a clear and convinci

2018See State v. Clements , 1988-NMCA-094 , ¶ 15, 108 N.M. 13 , 765 P.2d 1195 (looking to federal law in interpreting a New Mexico rule with language similar to the federal rule); State v. Weddle , 1967-NMSC-028 , ¶ 8, 77 N.M. 420 , 423 P.2d 611 (same), contested on other grounds , Caristo v. Sullivan , 1991-NMSC-088 , 112 N.M. 623 , 818 P.2d 401 . {95} Our New Mexico Constitution and court rules relating to detention contain all the procedural safeguards that the United States Supreme Court found constitutionally sufficient in Salerno , including a detention hearing requiring a clear and convinci

2022In this respect, our case law and court rules afford the state considerable 17 flexibility and ease in presenting its case for detention by (1) dispensing with the 18 rules of evidence, Rule 5-409(F)(5), (2) declining to extend a defendant’s 19 constitutional confrontation rights to a detention hearing, Torrez, 2018-NMSC-005 , 17 1 ¶¶ 45, 89, 91, and (3) not imposing any categorical requirement for live-witness 2 testimony, id. ¶¶ 80-95, 110; Ferry, 2018-NMSC-004, ¶ 3 (endorsing the use in 3 detention hearings of live testimony or a “proffer [of] documentary evidence in a 4 form that carries s

2022In this respect, our case law and court rules afford the state considerable flexibility and ease in presenting its case for detention by (1) dispensing with the rules of evidence, Rule 5-409(F)(5), (2) declining to extend a defendant’s constitutional confrontation rights to a detention hearing, Torrez, 2018-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 45, 89, 91 , and (3) not imposing any categorical requirement for live-witness testimony, id. ¶¶ 80-95, 110; Ferry, 2018-NMSC-004, ¶ 3 (endorsing the use in detention hearings of live testimony or a “proffer [of] documentary evidence in a form that carries sufficient indicia of

2018For example, United States v. Gaviria , 828 F.2d 667 , 669 (11th Cir. 1987), relied *210 on the District of Columbia holding in Edwards to hold that "the government as well as the defense may proceed by proffering evidence subject to the discretion of the judicial officer presiding at the detention hearing." Accord United States v. LaFontaine , 210 F.3d 125 , 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that "proffers are permissible both in the bail determination and bail revocation contexts" but that a court "must also ensure the reliability of the evidence, by selectively insisting upon the production of th

2018For example, United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1987), relied on the District of Columbia holding in Edwards to hold that “the government as well as the defense may proceed by proffering evidence subject to the discretion of the judicial officer presiding at the detention hearing.” Accord United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “proffers are permissible both in the bail determination and bail revocation contexts” but that a court “must also ensure the reliability of the evidence, by selectively insisting upon the production of the underly

2018Cir. 1996) (holding that the government may proceed by way of proffer instead of presenting live witnesses); United States v. Winsor , 785 F.2d 755 , 756 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the government may present information "by proffer or hearsay" and that the "accused has no right to cross-examine adverse witnesses who have not been called to testify"); United States v. Delker , 757 F.2d 1390 , 1396 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that "discretion lies with the district court to accept evidence by live testimony or proffer"); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos , 755 F.2d 203 , 206, 208 (1st Cir. 1985) (ac

2018Cir. 1996) (holding that the government may proceed by way of proffer instead of presenting live witnesses); United States v. Winsor, 785 F.2d 755, 756 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the government may present information “by proffer or hearsay” and that the “accused has no right to cross-examine adverse witnesses who have not been called to testify”); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1396 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that “discretion lies with the district court to accept evidence by live testimony or proffer”); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 206, 208 (1st Cir. 1985) (acknowle

2018Cir. 1996) (holding that the government may proceed by way of proffer instead of presenting live witnesses); United States v. Winsor , 785 F.2d 755 , 756 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the government may present information "by proffer or hearsay" and that the "accused has no right to cross-examine adverse witnesses who have not been called to testify"); United States v. Delker , 757 F.2d 1390 , 1396 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that "discretion lies with the district court to accept evidence by live testimony or proffer"); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos , 755 F.2d 203 , 206, 208 (1st Cir. 1985) (ac

2018Cir. 1996) (holding that the government may proceed by way of proffer instead of presenting live witnesses); United States v. Winsor, 785 F.2d 755, 756 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the government may present information “by proffer or hearsay” and that the “accused has no right to cross-examine adverse witnesses who have not been called to testify”); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1396 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that “discretion lies with the district court to accept evidence by live testimony or proffer”); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 206, 208 (1st Cir. 1985) (acknowle

2018For example, United States v. Gaviria , 828 F.2d 667 , 669 (11th Cir. 1987), relied *210 on the District of Columbia holding in Edwards to hold that "the government as well as the defense may proceed by proffering evidence subject to the discretion of the judicial officer presiding at the detention hearing." Accord United States v. LaFontaine , 210 F.3d 125 , 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that "proffers are permissible both in the bail determination and bail revocation contexts" but that a court "must also ensure the reliability of the evidence, by selectively insisting upon the production of th

2018For example, United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1987), relied on the District of Columbia holding in Edwards to hold that “the government as well as the defense may proceed by proffering evidence subject to the discretion of the judicial officer presiding at the detention hearing.” Accord United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “proffers are permissible both in the bail determination and bail revocation contexts” but that a court “must also ensure the reliability of the evidence, by selectively insisting upon the production of the underly

2018Cir. 1996) (holding that the government may proceed by way of proffer instead of presenting live witnesses); United States v. Winsor , 785 F.2d 755 , 756 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the government may present information "by proffer or hearsay" and that the "accused has no right to cross-examine adverse witnesses who have not been called to testify"); United States v. Delker , 757 F.2d 1390 , 1396 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that "discretion lies with the district court to accept evidence by live testimony or proffer"); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos , 755 F.2d 203 , 206, 208 (1st Cir. 1985) (ac

2018Cir. 1996) (holding that the government may proceed by way of proffer instead of presenting live witnesses); United States v. Winsor, 785 F.2d 755, 756 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the government may present information “by proffer or hearsay” and that the “accused has no right to cross-examine adverse witnesses who have not been called to testify”); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1396 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that “discretion lies with the district court to accept evidence by live testimony or proffer”); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 206, 208 (1st Cir. 1985) (acknowle

2018For example, United States v. Gaviria , 828 F.2d 667 , 669 (11th Cir. 1987), relied *210 on the District of Columbia holding in Edwards to hold that "the government as well as the defense may proceed by proffering evidence subject to the discretion of the judicial officer presiding at the detention hearing." Accord United States v. LaFontaine , 210 F.3d 125 , 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that "proffers are permissible both in the bail determination and bail revocation contexts" but that a court "must also ensure the reliability of the evidence, by selectively insisting upon the production of th

2018For example, United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1987), relied on the District of Columbia holding in Edwards to hold that “the government as well as the defense may proceed by proffering evidence subject to the discretion of the judicial officer presiding at the detention hearing.” Accord United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “proffers are permissible both in the bail determination and bail revocation contexts” but that a court “must also ensure the reliability of the evidence, by selectively insisting upon the production of the underly

2018See id. (explaining that "the particular facts and circumstances in currently charged cases, as well as a defendant's prior conduct, charged or uncharged, can be helpful in making reasoned predictions of future dangerousness"). {34} In this case, Defendant's past conduct created a strong basis for reasoned inferences of her likely future conduct.

2000See Kennedy, 1998-NMCA-051, ¶49 , 124 N.M. 764 , 955 P.2d 693 .

2000See Kennedy, 1998-NMCA-051, ¶49 , 124 N.M. 764 , 955 P.2d 693 .

2000Relying on Gerety v. Demers, 86 N.M. 141, 143 , 520 P.2d 869, 871 (1974), the Court ruled that the jury verdict must be set aside because the detention instruction was legally inadequate.

2000Relying on Gerety v. Demers, 86 N.M. 141, 143 , 520 P.2d 869, 871 (1974), the Court ruled that the jury verdict must be set aside because the detention instruction was legally inadequate.