detention hearing in Florida

2014See Puryear v. State, 810 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2002) (noting statements not necessary to the holding constitute dicta.) We hold that, in light of the statutory elements of the crime, and the factual allegations in this case,2 the offense of robbery by sudden snatching should not 2At a detention hearing, the court is required, in part, to determine “the existence of probable cause to believe the child has committed a delinquent act.” See Fla. R. 7 have been scored as a violent third-degree felony.

2014See Puryear v. State, 810 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2002) (noting statements not necessary to the holding constitute dicta.) We hold that, in light of the statutory elements of the crime, and the factual allegations in this case,2 the offense of robbery by sudden snatching should not 2At a detention hearing, the court is required, in part, to determine “the existence of probable cause to believe the child has committed a delinquent act.” See Fla. R. 7 have been scored as a violent third-degree felony.

2012Counsel maintains that “the intent to avoid the legal process” means that the State must show the intent “to avoid arrest, prosecution, service or process.” Counsel further argues that the Department handbook’s definition requires that the State show that T.J.S. concealed herself “with the intent to avoid the means of legal process.” As support for this argument, counsel cites the Third District’s B.M. opinion, which rephrased the definition of absconder to require that the State show that the juvenile was absent in an “effort to avoid judicial process.” 979 So.2d at 314 (emphasis added).

2008See B.M., 979 So.2d at 312 n. 2. [3] Because time was of the essence in releasing C.B. from custody, we advised that an opinion explaining our reasoning would follow. [4] Section 985.255(1)(i) reads: (1) [A] child taken into custody and placed into nonsecure or home detention care or detained in secure detention care prior to a detention hearing may continue to be detained by the court if: .... (i) The child is detained on a judicial order for failure to appear and has previously willfully failed to appear, after proper notice, for an adjudicatory hearing on the same case regardless of the res

1992In re Petition of the Florida Bar to Amend The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 589 So.2d 818, 819 (Fla. 1991).

1992In re Petition of the Florida Bar to Amend The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 589 So.2d 818, 819 (Fla.1991).

2019Importantly, in 2014, the Florida Legislature amended the definition of “nonsecure detention” to expressly provide that “(n)onsecure detention may include other requirements imposed by the court.” Ch. 2014-163, § 3, Laws of Fla. Hence, if a child is otherwise validly ordered 8 See C.A.F. v. State, 976 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). 12 into “nonsecure detention,” then do not run orders, such as the ones entered against S.F. and N.A., are expressly authorized by statute as “other requirements imposed by the court.”9 Assuming DJJ’s initial risk assessment establishes grounds for “detention

2009See § 985.26(2) (“A child may not be held in ... detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days ....” (emphasis added)); § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (holding that penal statutes “shall be strictly construed” and that any ambiguities “shall be construed most favorably to the accused”); see also A.M.P. v. State, 927 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (applying rule of lenity in section 775.021(1) in juvenile case); G.S. v. State, 761 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (applying strict construction provision of section 775.021(1) in juvenile case).

2009See § 985.26(2) (“A child may not be held in ... detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days ....” (emphasis added)); § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (holding that penal statutes “shall be strictly construed” and that any ambiguities “shall be construed most favorably to the accused”); see also A.M.P. v. State, 927 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (applying rule of lenity in section 775.021(1) in juvenile case); G.S. v. State, 761 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (applying strict construction provision of section 775.021(1) in juvenile case).

2008On direct appeal, the State relied on Dominique v. State, 590 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), and Harris v. State, 801 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), decisions applying section 776.051(1) and holding that the illegality of a detention was not a defense to charges of battery on a law enforcement officer.

2006See S.J.D. v. State, 774 So.2d 33, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(citing section 985.215(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1999), and observing "the provision of the order requiring S.J.D. to be brought before the issuing judge when [the issuing judge] was not available to hold a hearing within twenty-four hours of S.J.D. being taken into custody is prohibited by the plain language of the statute").

2006In the absence of a statutory directive that failure to comply with those statutes at the detention hearing cannot be cured at a later time, we agree with the state as to the remedy., See K.M., 898 So.2d at 1194 ; see also M.D., 923 So.2d at 556-57 ; T.D.S., 922 So.2d at 348 ; and C.D.T., 920 So.2d at 788 (all granting relief because of a lack of written findings but holding that the trial court could revisit the issue if it decided that there was a basis to do so).

2006V.M., 363 N.J.Super. 529 , 833 A.2d 692, 695 (2003) (stating that "the importance of the presence of an accused juvenile’s parents at critical stages of the juvenile delinquency process is firmly established,” citing the New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice which "explicitly gives an accused juvenile's parent the right to participate in the juvenile’s detention hearing,” the Code's general purpose, and the Code's requirement that parents receive the predisposition report, and concluding that “a juvenile's family members need to be involved in both the adjudicatory and rehabilitative process”).

2006V.M., 363 N.J.Super. 529 , 833 A.2d 692, 695 (2003) (stating that "the importance of the presence of an accused juvenile’s parents at critical stages of the juvenile delinquency process is firmly established,” citing the New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice which "explicitly gives an accused juvenile's parent the right to participate in the juvenile’s detention hearing,” the Code's general purpose, and the Code's requirement that parents receive the predisposition report, and concluding that “a juvenile's family members need to be involved in both the adjudicatory and rehabilitative process”).

2006In the absence of a statutory directive that failure to comply with those statutes at the detention hearing cannot be cured at a later time, we agree with the state as to the remedy., See K.M., 898 So.2d at 1194 ; see also M.D., 923 So.2d at 556-57 ; T.D.S., 922 So.2d at 348 ; and C.D.T., 920 So.2d at 788 (all granting relief because of a lack of written findings but holding that the trial court could revisit the issue if it decided that there was a basis to do so).

2006The rationale for this rule was explained in Hamilton v. Pacific Drug Co., 78 Wash. 689 , 139 P. 642, 644 (1914), a case in which the court allowed a false imprisonment suit to proceed where the defendant procured a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest as an "absconding debtor" and the lower court had no jurisdiction to authorize the arrest: It is argued that, since the arrest was upon a warrant authorized by order of the superior court, the appellant is exonerated from liability, even though the law at the present time does not authorize the arrest.

2006The rationale for this rule was explained in Hamilton v. Pacific Drug Co., 78 Wash. 689 , 139 P. 642, 644 (1914), a case in which the court allowed a false imprisonment suit to proceed where the defendant procured a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest as an "absconding debtor" and the lower court had no jurisdiction to authorize the arrest: It is argued that, since the arrest was upon a warrant authorized by order of the superior court, the appellant is exonerated from liability, even though the law at the present time does not authorize the arrest.

2005See D.B., 848 So.2d at 1220 ("The [trial] court may revisit the issue if there is a basis to do so.") To ensure that the duration of any improper detention is kept to a minimum, the trial court shall either enter a written order in accordance with section 985.215(2)(j), Florida Statutes, or order K.M.'s release from secure detention by 5 o'clock P.M. on the second business day that follows the date of this opinion.

2005See State v. Kirkland, 401 So.2d 1335 (Fla. 1981).